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I. PERCEPTIONS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Legal malpractice is a taboo subject. It has been ignored by
the legal profession,' law schools,2 mandatory continuing legal educa-
tion ("CLE") programs, 3  and even by scholarly' and lay
1. Legal Resource Index ("LRI'), database on Westlaw, Nov. 8, 1994:
Year Total Total Legal % To Law % To Legal % To Lay % To
U.S. Malpractice Total Rev. & Total Publication Total Publication Total
Legal Journal Articles Articles
Articles Articles
1994 15,696 60 .38% 19 .12% 35 .22% 6 .04%
1993 25,048 74 .29% 15 .06% 55 .22% 4 .02%
1992 23,377 65 .28% 12 .05% 46 .20% 7 .03%
1991 24,580 72 .29% 22 .09% 40 .16% 10 .10%
1990 23,892 53 .22% 11 .05% 42 .18% 0 0%
1989 24,599 50 .20% 4 .02% 45 .18% 1 .01%
1988 24,159 63 .26% 22 .09% 35 .15% 6 .03%
LRI is derived from the Information Access Co., and is based on the print publication, Current
Law Index. Only U.S. publications were used for this analysis.
2. The Author teaches a legal malpractice course at Stetson University College of Law. It
is the only legal malpractice course currently offered at an ABA approved law school. See
Michael Braunstein, et al., Law Line Database of American Law School Curriculum 9 (Law
Line, 2d ed. 1990). Only one of the then 171 ABA accredited law schools, The University of
Toledo, offered an elective course on legal malpractice, and it is no longer offered. See
Telephone Interview with Helen Hatcher, Registrar, U. of Toledo Law School (Oct. 31, 1994).
See also A. Craig Fleishman, Teaching Avoidance and Understanding In the Law Schools, in
ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Lawyers' Professional Liability
Update 3.1, 3.2 (ABA, 1992) (describing the legal malpractice course he taught as an adjunct of
the U. of Denver Law School). That course has also been discontinued. Telephone Interview
with Registrar's Office, U. of Denver Law School (Oct. 31, 1994).
3. ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar and the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 1993-1994
54-55 (1993) ("ABA-CLE") (stating that forty states have mandatory CLE programs but only
one, Arizona, requires a legal malpractice prevention component).
4. See note 1. An LRI search found that out of 437 articles published in 1991 by the
A.B.A. Journal, not one was on legal malpractice. See also 1993 Editorial Index, 13 Cal. Law.
83, 83-87 (Dec. 1993). Of the 334 articles published in California's State Bar Journal for 1993,
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publications. Unfortunately, our perception of legal malpractice,
up until now, has been highly distorted by secretive insurance
companies, 6 confidential settlement agreements,7 and a questionable
American Bar Association ("ABA") Study.8 Nonetheless, sharply
contrasting portraits of legal malpractice have emerged: either it is
just a minor problem of "weeding out" a few "bad apples," or it is the
tip of an "iceberg," ready to overwhelm the legal profession.1°
The ABA Study has fostered the "minor problem" portrait
of legal malpractice. Various books," scholarly journals, 12 bar
only one related to legal malpractice. See My Lawyer Went to Negotiations and All I Got Was
This Lousy Mug, 13 Cal. Law. 19 (April 1993) (describing a seven-figure jury award in a San
Diego legal malpractice case).
5. See note 1. LRI surveys legal-related articles taken from general newspapers and
magazines.
6. Telephone Interview with Robert E. O'Malley, Esq., vice-chairman and prevention
counsel of the Attorneys Liability Assurance Society, Ltd. ("ALAS") (Jan. 3, 1994). ALAS, with
$220 million a year in premiums and 49,000 lawyer insureds, insures only law firms with over
40 lawyers. It is the largest legal malpractice insurance carrier in the country based on pre-
mium dollars. O'Malley, citing "proprietary information," refused to give the Author any data.
However, see Appendix D for previously published ALAS data. See also Telephone Interview
with Wendy Wangberg, professional liability administrator, The Home Insurance Co. ("HOME")
(Feb. 22, 1993). HOME, with 60,000 lawyer insureds, writes insurance in 37 states and is the
largest legal malpractice insurance carrier in the country based on the number of lawyer
insureds. Wangberg said that due to its "fear that competing insurance companies may gain an
advantage in underwriting," HOME does not publish claims information. However, see Tables 1
and 3 for previously published HOME data.
7. Lloyd Doggett and Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts: Discouraging
Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 643, 659 nn.71-72 (1991) (noting that Texas, the
most "open" state on confidentially, prohibits confidential settlement agreements, but still
allows for keeping the settlement amount secret). The Author, having handled over 900 legal
malpractice defense cases, does not recall any settlement agreement without a confidentiality
provision which prohibited anyone from discussing the fact, terms, or, most importantly, the
amount of the settlement.
8. The American Bar Association Standing Committee On Lawyers Professional Liability,
Profile Of Legal Malpractice: A Statistical Study of Determinative Characteristics of Claims
Asserted Against Attorneys (1986) ("ABA Study"). The ABA Study examined 29,227 legal
malpractice claims reported to the National Legal Malpractice Data Center of the American Bar
Association between 1980 and 1985 by the participating insurers of lawyers' professional liabil-
ity.
9. Harry H. Schneider, Jr., At Issue: Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, Not An Invitation
to Frivolous Suits, 79 A.B.. J. 45 (Nov. 1993). The author, chairman of the ABA Standing
Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability states: "There is no reliable data documenting
that [legal malpractice] is a widespread phenomenon." Id.
10. Linda Himelstein and David Newdorf, Insurers Cutting Ties to Counsel In the S&L
Fiasco; Changes in Malpractice Policies Ok'd by 6 States, The Recorder 1 (May 1, 1991) (citing a
statement made by the president of a legal malpractice carrier: "We're looking at the tip of the
iceberg, and its going to get bigger and bigger").
11. See, for example, Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice (West, 3d
ed. 1989). Legal Malpractice is the leading legal malpractice text. The authors, insurance
defense lawyers and members of the ABA committee overseeing the ABA Study, use only the
ABA Study statistics throughout. See, for example, id. at vol. 1, 19-29, 288-89, and vol. 2, 175-
76, 237-39, 286-88, 330-31, 360-64, 449-54, 549-52, 590-93. See also American Bar Association
Commission on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint for the Rekindling
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publications, 13 the lay media14 and even the anti-lawyer consumer
group, Help Abolish Legal Tyranny ("HALT"),15 have uncritically
accepted the ABA Study. As noted by HALT, the overwhelming
consensus is that, even though someone may be able to locate an
attorney who will sue another attorney, "extremely few clients ever
receive compensation over $1,000,"16 and "malpractice cases are hard
to win."' 7  The widely accepted ABA Study has thus become the
statistical foundation of the "few bad apples" portrait of legal
malpractice. According to the ABA Study, only between 1.0 and 2.6
percent of lawyers each year face a claim or lawsuit for legal
malpractice.18 A full sixty-seven percent of claimants or plaintiffs
receive no compensation, seventy percent of those who do settle
receive less than $1,000, and only one percent of those who go to trial
win. 9 The ABA Study also reports that almost eighty percent of the
claims are against solo practitioners or small law firms of two to five
lawyers.20  Personal injury-plaintiff work (25%) and real estate
matters (23%) account for most of the malpractice.21
of Lawyer Professionalism, in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal
Profession: Responsibility and Regulation 488 (Foundation, 2d. ed. 1988) (noting that
approximately seventy percent of those eligible to recover for lawyer malpractice would have
been entitled to less than $1,000).
12. See, for example, David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
799 (1992). Citing the ABA Study, Wilkins writes: "More than two thirds of all malpractice
actions ended in no payment to the client [and] only 32.6% result in indemnity payments," and
"moreover, litigation against lawyer-defendants is particularly difficult to win." Id. at 831 &
n.129. See also Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale L. J.
491, 591 n.449 (1985) (noting that "the difficulties of proving malpractice have been frequently
noted"); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 698 (1990) (stating that "[t]he
threat of malpractice may deter some lawyer misconduct, but the remedy is not available to
most deceived clients").
13. See, for example, Emily Couric, The Tangled Web: When Ethical Misconduct Becomes
Legal Liability, 79 A.B.A. J. 64, 66 (April 1993) (citing statistics from the ABA Study and the
Colorado Bar Association, the author points out that two thirds of all legal malpractice claims
are dismissed or plaintiffs win minimal amounts at trial).
14. See, for example, Jeffrey S. Klein, Legal View: Hints On When To Sue Your Attorney,
LA. Times § 5 at 8 (July 27, 1989) (reporting that "fyjour chances of winning are not great").
See also Rosalind Resnick, What If You Want To Sue Your Attorney, Miami Herald 1B (April 16,
1988) (stating that "winning a legal malpractice suit isn't easy").
15. See Kay Ostberg and Theresa Meehan Rudy (in association with HALT), If You Want
To Sue a Lawyer ... A Directory of Legal Malpractice Attorneys 27 (Random House, 1991).
HALT has 150,000 members and is dedicated to changing the legal system to better serve
people with legal problems.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3.
18. See Table 2.
19. ABA Study at 63 (cited in note 8).
20. Id. at 21.
21. Id. at 8. See also Appendix A.
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Since 1970 there has been an unprecedented growth in legal
malpractice claims and lawsuits.22 However, under the "few bad ap-
ples" perception of malpractice, there is no need for any radical
changes in the way law is practiced, in legal education, or in the way
lawyers are regulated. The status quo appears to work. Most legal
malpractice claims and lawsuits, the ABA Study concludes, turn out
to be unfounded, unworthy of compensation, and barely worthy of
attention.
However, there exists another, more accurate portrait of legal
malpractice. It is a view known to insurance company claim manag-
ers, legal malpractice defense attorneys, and a growing number of the
plaintiff's bar, who believe that the current trends in legal
malpractice reveal just the tip of an "iceberg": Malpractice is
becoming increasingly widespread, lawyers hardly ever win in jury
trials, and settlement amounts are skyrocketing. An analysis of the
106 legal malpractice jury verdicts in Los Angeles County in 1988 and
1989 showed that lawyers lost ninety-three percent of the time.23
Similarly, the Author's own analysis of forty-two legal malpractice
cases in southern California, thirty-three of which were disposed of
between 1991 and 1992, showed that, consistent with his prior
experience in over nine-hundred cases, an overwhelming eighty-eight
percent of the clients or noncients suing for legal malpractice were
compensated, and the average settlement was a significant $60,393.24
The Author, a former partner of the California law firm, Lewis,
D'Amato, Brisbois and Bisgaard, saw the firm become the fastest
22. Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice at 18 (cited in note 11). From 1799 to 1969
usually between 2,000 and 10,000 lawyers were sued for legal malpractice annually. The
number filed in 1969, for instance, was less than in 1849. However, from 1970 to 1989 the
number shot up from 10,000 to 55,000 (projected for 1989) legal malpractice cases per year. Id.
See also Katherine Bishop, California Lawyers Must Take Refresher Courses, N.Y. Times B7
(Aug. 9, 1991) (reporting that in California one in every five lawyers has been named in a
malpractice claim or lawsuit).
23. Girardi and Keese, Legal Malpractice Jury Outcomes (1989) (unpublished, on file with
the Author). The unpublished study was conducted by a leading Los Angeles plaintiffs' firm,
Girardi and Keese. The law clerks conducting the study interviewed both plaintiff and
insurance defense counsel. They were able to determine that in 75% of the cases the plaintiffs
obtained a jury verdict award that was higher than the attorney-defendant's last settlement
offer. The results are even more compelling when one considers that usually only a defense
counsel's "best' cases, generally only one to three percent of her legal malpractice cases, go to
trial rather than settling. Understandably, almost all cases are settled by anxious lawyer
defendants and their insurance defense counsel and insurance carriers. See also Linda L.
Castle, Review Claims Legal Malpractice Verdicts Averaged $43,575, 71 A.B.A. J. 122, 122 (Sept.
1985) (reporting that in 1984 defendants lost 67% of all legal malpractice cases tried before a
jury).
24. ("Author's Study). See Appendix A for a description and the data. The Author used
the same questionnaire used in the ABA Study.
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growing law firm in the nation, increasing from seven attorneys to
over two hundred attorneys between 1980 and 1990, predominantly
due to increased legal malpractice defense work.25
This Article will focus on the Author's Study,26 the ABA
Study,27 Oregon's Professional Liability Fund ("PLF") data on 5,928
claims,8 data on 4,704 claims generated under the Florida mandatory
legal malpractice reporting law,29 and statistics intermittently pub-
lished by the nation's two largest legal malpractice insurers, the
Attorneys Liability Assurance Society, Ltd. ("ALAS")o and The Home
Insurance Company ("HOME"),' 1 to try to provide a clearer and more
accurate picture of legal malpractice. Part II will address the
magnitude of the problem: the statistics which suggest the outline of
the submerged "iceberg." Part III will examine the reasons for the
explosion in the frequency and severity of legal malpractice cases,
and, more significantly, will examine how legislators and judges have
opened the gates on liability and damages, while eliminating
traditional defenses, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
defendant lawyer will settle at a high price rather than face a hostile
jury. Part IV will consider whether the legal profession or the
insurance industry can ever successfully regulate lawyers by focusing
only on the individual lawyers, the alleged "few bad apples." Part V
will offer an alternative perspective on lawyer malpractice and
misconduct by focusing on malignant situational effects on lawyers'
psyches and behaviors. Part VI argues for fundamental and radical
situational changes in how lawyers practice law, continued public
25. The Author, a co-founder of Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois and Bisgaard's San Diego branch,
saw the two-lawyer and one-secretary office grow to 51 lawyers and 60 staff persons between
1983 and 1989.
26. See Appendix A.
27. See note 8. See also Appendix A (comparing the ABA Study results with the Author's
Study).
28. Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, Annual Report 1 (1993) (unpublished, on
file with the Author) ("1993 Oregon PLF"). See Appendix B for this data. The Oregon State Bar
Professional Liability Fund (' PLF') is the only compulsory legal malpractice insurance in the
nation. Thus, Oregon is the only state about which one can be confident that information on all
reported legal malpractice claims and lawsuits is available.
29. Florida Department of Insurance, Computer Printouts (May 1993) ("Florida Data)
(unpublished, on file with the Author). See Appendices C-1-C-5 (providing legal malpractice
data for Florida). Florida is the only state with a mandatory legal malpractice reporting law
that has generated substantial data. Florida, California, and North Dakota statutorily require
all legal malpractice carriers to report information on legal malpractice claims or lawsuits. See
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.912 (1984 & Supp. 1993) and upcoming Fla. Admin. Code Ann. § 4-171.003
(regarding new penalties for non-complying insurance carriers); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
6086.8(b) (1990); N.D. Cent. Code § 26.1-01-06 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
30. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6). See also Appendix D (providing statistics on ALAS'
claims between 1979 and 1990).
31. Wangberg interview (cited in note 6). See also the Colorado data in Tables 1 and 3.
1662 [Vol. 47:1657
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regulation of lawyers, mandatory legal malpractice insurance,
effective mandatory legal malpractice reporting laws, and an end to
secrecy in settlements. Self-regulation does not work. The proposed
changes will benefit consumers and the presently unsuspecting
lawyers who believe legal malpractice only happens to others.
Perhaps even the lawyers' tarnished image can be improved by
making the profession more accountable and "consumer friendly."
II. THE EXTENT OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
What is the frequency and seriousness of lawyer malpractice?
Unfortunately, those who have the information, the insurance compa-
nies that handle legal malpractice claims, are reluctant to share it.
Individual lawyers who are sued are reluctant to talk. Even plaintiffs
and their counsel are bound to secrecy by confidentiality provisions
mandated by insurers in virtually all settlement agreements. 2 The
ABA, organized state bars, and the legal profession in general are
eager to put the best "spin!' on any available data, and they, along
with the insurance industry and insurance defense attorneys, do not
want to educate or encourage consumers to sue lawyers.
Nevertheless, the word is filtering out. Legal malpractice
lawsuits are being filed at an ever increasing rate.3 3 Defendants and
their insurers fear that juries will award substantial damages to ag-
grieved clients or even non-clients. 34  Settlements and verdicts in-
crease as more judges allow plaintiffs to have their cases heard by a
jury.35 Public recognition of the high frequency and seriousness of
legal malpractice claims and lawsuits may be the fatal blow to the
legal profession's efforts to continue to self-regulate.
32. See, for example, Doggett and Mucchetti, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 659 n.71-72 (cited in note 7)
(noting that although Texas prohibits confidential settlement agreements, the settlement
amount can still be kept secret). The Author worked with over twenty legal malpractice
insurance carriers. They all had a confidential settlement agreement policy. Plaintiffs, their
attorneys, judges, and defendant attorneys inevitably cooperate in order to resolve the lawsuit
or claim.
33. Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 1.6 at 18 (cited in note 11).
34. Girardi and Keese, Legal Malpractice (cited in note 23).
35. See, for example, Table 5. See also Appendix C-3 and C-4 for Florida's reported average
settlement amounts of legal malpractice lawsuits and claims, respectively.
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A. The Frequency: "A Few Bad Apples" or "The Tip of the Iceberg"?
The exact frequency of either legal malpractice lawsuits or
insurance claims can be determined only in Oregon, the only state
with compulsory legal malpractice insurance. And even in Oregon, as
in other states, a substantial number of the actual legal malpractice
incidents go unreported. The Oregon PLF records each claim and
lawsuit against any Oregon lawyer in private practice.36 Since 1988
the Oregon PLF's annual frequency of claims and lawsuits37 per
lawyer has gradually increased from 8.7 percent to 13.2 percent.38 If
the Oregon statistics are representative of nationwide trends, roughly
81,415 legal malpractice claims and lawsuits are fied each year in the
United States. 9 The actual number is likely to be even higher, as
Oregon is one of the least litigious states in the nation.40
The true annual nationwide frequency rate of legal malpractice
incidents, including unreported incidents, is probably closer to twenty
percent or more, but it is impossible to get an exact figure. Estimates
of the annual frequency of claims and lawsuits against lawyers range
from one4' to twenty42 percent of either "all lawyers," all lawyers in
36. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 9.080 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
37. Although most legal malpractice insurance claims against insured lawyers never
mature into actual lawsuits, many authors unfortunately continue to ignore this distinction.
Claims are made by insured lawyers who must immediately report any potential legal malprac-
tice "claim" or fear losing coverage.
38. See 1993 Oregon PLF at 1 (cited in note 28). See also Oregon State Bar Professional
Liability Fund, Annual Report (1989), (1990), (1991), and (1992) (unpublished, on file with the
Author); Lester L. Rawls, Exploding the Myth of the Oregon 'Bombshell," Natl L. J. 12 (April
13, 1987). Rawls, the then chief executive officer of Oregon's PLF, angrily responded to a prior
article, Gail Cox, Oregon Lawyers Face High Rate of Claims, Natl L. J. 3 (Feb. 9, 1987), that
erroneously quoted him as saying the frequency rate was 20% or twice the 10% national
average. Rawls said the correct percentage was I in 13, or 7.7%, even better than the national
average of 10%. Compare Appendix B (showing that the lowest Oregon frequency rate since
1983 appears to have been 1988's 8.7%. The 1986 rate was actually 10.2%, consistent with the
national average cited by Rawls).
39. See, for example, Research for Marketing, The 1989 Survey of the Economic Condition
of the Oregon State Bar ES-7 (1989) (unpublished, on file with the Author); ABA Membership
Department Data (Oct. 1993) (unpublished, on file with the Author) ("ABA Membership Data");
Appendix B. According to the ABA Membership Data, there are currently 844,905 lawyers in
the United States; multiply that by 0.73 (Oregon's percentage of lawyers in private practice) to
get 616,781 lawyers in private practice, then multiply that number by 0.132 (Oregon's current
annual claims rate), and the 13.2% claims rate translates into 81,415 claims nationally.
40. David Frum and Frank Wolfe, If You Gotta Get Sued, Get Sued in Utah, Forbes 70
(Jan. 17, 1994). (reporting that there were only 8 states less litigious than Oregon, which ranked
43d of 50 states and D.C. in the Forbes study).
41. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6) (estimating the frequency for ALAS insureds).
42. See Letter from Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Yale Law School, to the Author
(February 21, 1994) (on file with the Author) (stating that "the incidence of legal malpractice is
at least five times and probably 20 times that reflected in data about claims made"). Compare
Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing
1664
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private practice, 43 or all insured lawyers." While ALAS's annual
frequency rate for its big law firm insureds has consistently remained
at approximately one percent, 45 and HOME's annual national
frequency rate between 1985 and 1991 was 3.5 percent,46
otherestimates are higher. For example, more than fifteen years ago,
it was estimated that ten percent of all lawyers in private practice
were sued for malpractice each year.47 Still another report noted that
the rate of claims against insured lawyers nationwide tripled from
three to nine percent from 1983 to 1986.48 Finally, presumably using
a ten percent rate, two prominent legal malpractice experts noted in
1989 that "the new lawyer will be subjected to three [legal malprac-
tice] claims before finishing a legal career. 49
Profession in a Changing Society, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 345, 389 Table 2 (1994) (reporting
that there is only a 1 in 20 chance that a tort victim who suffered property damage will hire and
use a lawyer [presumably to file a lawsuit or pursue an insurance claim]); Paul C. Weler, et al.,
A Measure of Malpractice 139 (Harvard U., 1993) (reporting a six-year study by Harvard
researchers of 30,000 New York hospitals which found that "1 malpractice claim was filed by a
New York patient for every 7.5 patients who suffered a negligent injury (that is, a real tort)").
Compare Michael J. Saks, Book Review of Paul C. Weler, et al., A Measure of Malpractice, 35
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 693, 709 n.90 (1994) (stating that, according to Lori Andrews, Medical
Error and Patient Claiming in a Hospital Setting 10 (May 30, 1993) (unpublished paper
presented at annual meeting of the Law and Society Ass'n, on file with the Win. & Mary L.
Rev.), "four times as many [medically] negligent injuries occurred as were reported").
43. Research For Marketing, 1989 Survey at ES-7 (cited in note 39). In Oregon in 1989,
25% of the lawyers were not in private practice, but were employed: by government (12%), by
business (7%), as full-time judges (2%), as referees, administrative judges, and hearing officers
(2%), as law clerks (1%), or as consultants or legal secretaries (1%). A significant number of
lawyers are not in private practice. It is inaccurate to use "all lawyers" as the denominator to
determine the annual percentage rate for legal malpractice claims. By including lawyers who
are licensed, but who do not have a private practice, the percentage of lawyers sued or who have
claims against them appears much smaller.
44. See Debra Cassens Moss, Going Bare: Practicing Without Malpractice Insurance, 73
A.B. J. 82, 84 (Dec. 1987) (stating that up to 50% of lawyers are not insured). Insurance
carriers can only give us statistics on insured lawyers. The ever increasing numbers of
uninsured lawyers do not have "claims" made against them, and rarely are uninsured lawyers
sued for legal malpractice. Thus, adding uninsured lawyers to the denominator will also lower
the annual percentage rate of claims or lawsuits.
45. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6). However ALAS' minimum deductible is $250,000
per claim and many large firms have $1 million deductibles. Thus, the one percent figure does
not include unreported cases with maximum exposure less than the ALAS deductible.
46. Amy Lignitz, State's Legal Malpractice Rate Surges, Denver Post C2 (Aug. 25, 1992)
(noting also that the 5.8% annual frequency for HOME's Colorado insureds is not as high as
HOME's insureds in California, Florida, Montana, and Texas).
47. David F. Pike, Why Everybody Is Suing Everybody, 85 U.S. News & World Report 50,
51 (Dec. 4, 1978) (citing approximately 15,000 legal malpractice cases each year).
48. Ron Avery, New Jersey Lawyers Tasting Their Own Medicine? Malpractice Insurance
Rises Sharply, Phila. Daily News Bus. Mag. 25 (Jan. 13, 1986) (citing Duke Nordlinger Stern, a
member of the ABA committee that oversaw the ABA Study, who is a consultant to over 20
states' lawyer-run legal malpractice insurance companies).
49. Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice §1.1 at 2 (cited in note 11). Mallen and Smith
assume a legal career of thirty years. A 10% rate would mean one legal malpractice claim every
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As shown by Table 1, the intermittently published annual fre-
quency rates for certain states and the District of Columbia are just
as confusing.
Table 1: Frequency of Malpractice Claims and Lawsuits
State Annual Percentage Rates
California 20,50 6,51 more than 5.8,52 or 2.453
Colorado l04 or 5.855
District of Columbia 1.456
Florida more than 5.867 or 1.568
Montana more than 5.859
New Jersey 960
Oregon 8.7 to 13.261
Texas more than 5.862
The published information regarding the frequency of legal
malpractice is obviously unsatisfactory. Some states like California,6 3
ten years or three in one career. If the 20% per year rate predicted by the Author is valid, new
lawyers today can expect to face six legal malpractice claims in their careers.
50. Bishop, N.Y. Times at B7 (cited in note 22).
51. Michael Dorgan, Growing Trend-Lawyers Sue Lawyers: Experts Say Greed,
Incompetence Get Attorneys In Trouble, San Jose Mercury News 1A (Dec. 14, 1992) (noting that
precise data-even the number of cases filed-is not available, but that Robert Chick, president
of Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company in California, estimates that 6 of every 100 lawyers that
his company insures gets sued every year).
52. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
53. California State Bar, Annual Report 5 (1992) (unpublished, on file with the Author).
Insurers reported 1,473 legal malpractice claims for 1992. Of California's 140,000 attorneys,
probably two-thirds are in private practice (92,400) and two-thirds of those are insured (60,984).
Thus the best estimate is that 1,473 claims represents 2.4% of all insured California lawyers.
54. Tom Locke, Colorado Malpractice Claims Rise, 42 Deny. Bus. J. 1 (May 17, 1991).
55. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
56. Linda Himelstein, Tired of Rip-offs,' Bar Enters Self Insurance Biz Most Bar Members
See Advantages, But Risks Loom, 12 Legal Times 10 (June 19, 1989) (noting, however, that
these figures, based on the report of only one carrier, are not always reliable).
57. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
58. In 1992 there were 38,041 in-state members of the Florida Bar. The Florida Bar, Data
Reference Handbook 43 (1993). See also The Florida Bar, Results of the 1993 Membership
Attitude Survey 15 (1993). Seventy-six percent of the lawyers in Florida are in private practice.
See Moss, 73 A.B. J. at 86 (cited in note 44). Twenty-two percent of the Florida lawyers are
uninsured. See Appendix C-1. In 1992 there were 338 closed claims reported to the Florida
Department of Insurance. Thus, assuming closed claims roughly approximate newly opened
claims numbers, the 22,550 insured lawyers in private practice generated 338 claims for an
annual frequency rate in 1992 of 1.5%.
59. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
60. Avery, Phila. Daily News Bus. Mag. at 25 (cited in note 48).
61. 1993 Oregon PLF (cited in note 28). See also Appendix B.
62. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
63. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6086.8(b) (1990).
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Florida, 4 and North Dakota 5 have mandatory reporting requirements
for insurance companies that insure lawyers. However, mandatory
reporting laws elsewhere have been repealed,66 or, where they exist,
ignored and not enforced. 67 The Oregon statistics suggest that
insurers do not comply with the mandatory reporting statutes in two
of the largest states, California 68 and Florida.69  For instance,
according to figures from the California State Bar, insurers reported
675 claims and lawsuits in 1991 and 1,473 in 1992.70 These numbers
translate to 1.1 percent and 2.4 percent of insured California
attorneys having legal malpractice claims against them in the years
studied. These figures are too low to be accurate. 71 Florida has the
most comprehensive, and potentially the most useful, mandatory
reporting statute. As seen in Table 1 above, the Florida data shows
an annual rate of legal malpractice claims and lawsuits of 1.5 percent.
However, HOME, one of Florida's major legal malpractice carriers,
has revealed that its Florida insureds were sued at a rate of more
64. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.912 (Supp. 1994).
65. N.D. Cent. Code § 26.1-01-06 (1989).
66. See, for example, James W. St. Clair, Those Monstrous Malpractice Premiums, 13 Legal
Econ. 24, 26 (Sept. 1987) (reporting that in April 1986, insurance carriers cancelled all liability
insurance polcies for West Virginia lawyers to protest that state's new mandatory reporting
law. The insurers argued that such disclosure would reduce their competitiveness and prevent
them from making a profit. The West Virginia law was quickly repealed in a special session and
the legal malpractice policies were restored).
67. Dwain E. Fagerlund, Note, Legal Malpractice: The Locality Rule And Other
Limitations Of The Standard Of Care: Should Rural And Metropolitan Lawyers Be Held To The
Same Standard Of Care?, 64 N.D. L. Rev. 661, 698-99 n.247 (1989) (stating that "[i]nsurers did
submit 15 [substantially incomplete] report forms to the North Dakota Insurance Department....
[I]t may be that the state does not strictly enforce the statute because the insurance companies
may threaten to pull out of a nominal state such as North Dakota, leaving practitioners with no
insurance protection").
68. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6086.8(b) (1990) (requiring all insurance carriers to notify the
California State Bar anytime one of its insured notifies the carrier of a potential claim or law-
suit). See also Telephone Interview with Gloria Zank, California State Bar Legal Education
Department (April 12, 1993) (reporting that the only information for public consumption is the
number of legal malpractice claims reported by the carriers. No follow-up reports on the claims
are required. For instance, no information is collected on whether the initial claim matures into
a lawsuit or for how much it settles. The California State Bar will not even reveal the name of
the insured lawyer involved in the claim).
69. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.912 (Supp. 1994). Within sixty days of closing a legal malpractice
claim, all insurance carriers must fill out a survey questionnaire identifying whether it was a
claim or a lawsuit, the jurisdiction, the area of law, whether the parties settled, the amount of
settlement, the amount of defense costs, and the name of the insured. See also Appendices C-1-
C-5 for the Florida data.
70. California State Bar, Annual Report at 5 (cited in note 53).
71. See, for example, Zank interview (cited in note 68). Zank conceded that the 1991
figures are not accurate because the new law was just coming into effect and there was not full
compliance. She expected that the 1992 figures would be more accurate, and the 1993 figures
still more accurate. However, such optimism seems unwarranted given Florida's long,
unsuccessful experience with compliance to its mandatory reporting statute.
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than 5.8 percent between 1985 and 1991.72 Since there is no reason to
think that other legal malpractice carriers in Florida have a claims
frequency rate three to four times less than HOME's, full compliance
with the mandatory reporting laws appears to have been a major
problem in Florida.73
The ABA Study, the most ambitious attempt to collect data on
legal malpractice, analyzed 29,227 legal malpractice claims asserted
against insured attorneys nationwide from January 1980 through
September 1985. All legal malpractice insurance carriers initially
agreed to give information on each claim to the ABA's National Legal
Malpractice Data Center. However, as shown by Table 2 below, the
numbers alone suggest that there was significant noncompliance by
the nation's insurance carriers.
72. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
73. Telephone Interview with Bill Bodiford, Florida Department of Insurance (Sept. 9,
1993). Bodiford, who is in charge of determining compliance with the legal malpractice manda-
tory reporting law for the Florida Department of Insurance, conceded that "his gut feeling is
that at least 50% of the insurance carriers are not complying." He recommended to the Florida
legislature that the reporting law be repealed "since only a few journalists and law professors
ever ask for the information." The law has not been repealed. In fact, the Florida Department
of Insurance has proposed regulations which provide for fines of up to $2,500 a day for each
claim that is closed but not reported. See Fla. Admin. Code Ann. § 4-171.003 (1992). Whether
the regulations will be effectively enforced, given the experience of other states, is unlikely.
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Table 2: ABA Study/Frequency of Malpractice
1 ' Lawyers In Insured Expected ABA StudyU ABA StUdy79 ABA
Year the ' Private Attorneys7" Clalms vs. # of Claims % of Insured %tudy0 
Prsctlce 5  Insurd Open Closed Attorneys of Missed
Attorneys '  with Claims claims
1980 542,205 395,810 263,870 28,656 07 37 0.04% 99.63%'
1981 569,000 415,370 276,910 30,072 3276 831 1.18% 89.11%
1982 595,000 434,428 289,615 31,452 5976 1375 2.06% 81.00%
1983 621,000 454,060 302,705 32,873 7176 1615 2.37% 78.17%
1984 649,000 473,770 315,845 34,300 4508 1072 1.42% 86.86%
1985 655,191 478,289 318,827 34,624 2647 607 0.80% 92.36%u
Using the ABA Study figures for claims, at most 2.37 percent
of insured attorneys were targets of legal malpractice claims in any
year between 1980 and 1985 (this figure having been reached in
74. Barbara A. Curran, et al., The Lawyer Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile of the
U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s 4 (American Bar Foundation, 1985); Barbara A. Curran and
Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S. Legal Profession in 1988 1 (ABA,
1991 Supp.) (giving 1985 figure).
75. See Research For Marketing, 1989 Survey at ES-7 (cited in note 39). A 73% figure of all
lawyers in the U.S. was used because approximately 73% of licensed attorneys in Oregon are in
private practice.
76. Moss, 73 A.B.A. J. at 86 (cited in note 44) (reporting the following percentages of
uninsured lawyers for the 1985 to 1987 time period: California (43-50%); Florida (22%);
Washington (30%); Alabama (21%); Arizona (11%); Alaska (30%); Kentucky (6%); Montana
(23%); Wisconsin (15%); Nevada (24%); and Nebraska (12%)). See also Public Can Receive Data
About Lawyers' Malpractice Standing, Richmond News Leader 25 (Nov. 30, 1989) (reporting
that the Virginia State Bar found in a mandatory study of all lawyers that 13% were
uninsured); Craig A. Morgan, Malpractice Insurance: What You See Isn't Always What You Get,
8 Tex. Law. 28 (Nov. 30, 1992) (noting that between 30% and 50% of all solo practitioners in
question are without insurance); Locke, 42 Den. Bus. J. at 56 (cited in note 54) (reporting that
35% of Colorado lawyers are not insured); Ostberg and Rudy, If You Want to Sue a Lawyer at 47
(cited in note 15) (claiming that approximately 40% of lawyers are not insured). Thus, for the
"Insured Attorneys" column in Table 2, the "Lawyers in Private Practice" figures were reduced
by one-third.
77. See Appendix B. Between 1983 and 1985 Oregon's annual frequency rate averaged
10.86%, so this percentage was used for the expected number of claims against insured private
attorneys.
78. ABA Standing Committee On Lawyers' Professional Liability, Characteristics of Legal
Malpractice: Report of the National Legal Malpractice Data Center vii (ABA, 1989) ("ABA Study
Data'). Unlike the previously cited ABA Study, see note 8, this publication, published three
years later, contains all the raw data compiled from the 29,227 legal malpractice claims
reported to the ABA's National Legal Malpractice Data Center between 1980 and 1985.
79. Open claims numbers from 1980 to 1985 in "ABA Study # of Claims" column are divided
by the number of"isured Attorneys" and multiplied by 100 to calculate the percentage.
80. The number of open claims in "ABA Study # of claims" column is subtracted from the
number of "Expected Claims vs. Insured Attorneys," divided by the number of "Expected Claims
vs. Insured Attorneys" and multiplied by 100.
81. ABA Study Data at vii (cited in note 78) (pre-test only, so this percentage is not
accurate).
82. ABA Study at 3 (cited in note 8). The ABA Study ran through September 1985, so this
was an incomplete year.
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1983). However, the frequency of malpractice claims nationwide in
the early 1980s was probably closer to the Oregon PLF's 10.86 percent
per year average between 1983 and 1985.83 If this is true, roughly
30,270 claims were made against insured attorneys nationwide in
1983-not the 7,176 reported in the ABA Study.
The ABA Study's final findings, when first published, left the
erroneous impression that all legal malpractice claims from all of the
nation's legal malpractice insurance carriers over a five-year period
had been analyzed." As seen in Table 2 above, if the Oregon ten per-
cent figure is correct, over three-fourths of the actual claims made
were missed, even in the ABA Study's best year for compliance, 1983.
In 1986 an article hinted that the ABA Study was having data collec-
tion problems;"5 however, it was not until 1989 that the seriousness of
the problems was detailed.8 6 Three of the nation's largest legal mal-
practice insurance carriers, and the Oregon PLF, either did not pro-
vide data or provided unsatisfactory data.87
As shown by Table 2 above, the ABA and the insurance carri-
ers ignored a potentially seventy-eight to eighty-nine percent non-
compliance problem with the ABA Study. Possible reasons for
noncompliance vary: some might point to overworked insurance
claims adjusters, handling between 150 and 400 claim files, whose
lowest priority would be to fill out the ABA questionnaires, on each
case; others might say there was a conscious effort by the ABA and
the insurance carriers, motivated by self-interest, to keep the number
of claims as low as possible. If insurance carriers and adjusters
ignore Florida's and California's mandatory reporting laws, it should
83. See Appendix B.
84. William H. Gates, Charting the Shoals of Malpractice, 73 A.B-.A J. 62, 62 (July 1987)
(stating that "Itlhe ABA's Standing Committee on Professional Liability has completed its five-
year collection of statistics on legal malpractice claims.... [Ihe data reflects reports from
insurance companies that underwrite this kind of coverage. Almost 30,000 claims were ana-
lyzed').
85. Duke Nordlinger Stern, Reducing Your Malpractice Risk, 72 A.B-.A J. 52, 52 (June
1986) (stating that the "[ABA Study] statistics were incomplete-not all insurers submitted
claims reports, and dollars at risk are only tabulated after claims are closed. Still, the data
center's statistics can help in understanding the causes of claims and in creating a risk man-
agement program").
86. ABA Study Data at vii (cited in note 78).
87. Id. at vii-viii (stating "Unfortunately, one major insurer, American Home, notwith-
standing its regular financial contributions... never supplied more than a small amount of
satisfactorily reported data. The Home Insurance Company, a major insurer.., declined to
contribute data. Another major insurer, Shand Morahan, never supplied closed claim informa-
tion. Prior to the end of this study the Professional Liability Fund in Oregon quit supplying
data from its claims").
88. See Appendix A for the ABA Study Questionnaire.
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not surprise anyone that they also might fail to comply with the vol-
untary ABA Study.
B. The Nature and Characteristics of Legal Malpractice: Just the
Small Firm Personal Injury Attorney?
Both the Author's Study and the ABA Study considered the
nature and characteristics of malpractice claims and lawsuits-such
as whether the insured lawyer is in a large or small firm, practices a
certain type of law, or has experience-and the data in the two stud-
ies appear to be remarkably consistent.8 9 In this respect, the data
generated by the ABA Study is not necessarily unreliable. A major
89. See Appendix A. The Author's Study does not pretend to be representative of all
lawyers. The study includes only the legal malpractice cases against Southern California
lawyers insured by one insurance carrier. However, almost ten years after the ABA Study, the
Author's Study found nearly identical percentages for certain characteristics of legal malpractice
claims as those found in the earlier ABA Study. For instance, as seen in Appendix A, there
were several statistical "matches" between the ABA Study and the Author's Study: (1)
percentage of claims by size of firm, see ABA Study at 21 (cited in note 8) and Appendix A (the
ABA Study/Author Study figures were 38%/35% for solo practitioners and 50%/43.6% for two- to
five-lawyer firms); (2) number of years admitted to practice, see ABA Study at 20 and Appendix
A (the ABA Study/Author Study figures were 4%/4.7% for lawyers under four years; 30%114.3%
for lawyers between 4-10 years; and 66%/81% for lawyers over 10 years); (3) missed deadlines,
see ABA Study at 21 and Appendix A (both the ABA Study and the Author's Study found that
21.4% of all claims arose from lawyers missing deadlines); (4) the type of lawyer activities, see
ABA Study at 22 and Appendix A (the ABA Study/Author Study figures were: commencement
of action 24.8%/38.1%; preparation of documents 21.1%14.3%; consultation and advice
11.1%/7.1%; pretrial hearing 8.0%/9.5%; settlement and negotiation 7.9%121.4%; trial or hearing
6.8%0%; title opinion 4.6%/0%; and other 15.5%/9.6%); and (5) litigation activities, see ABA
Study at 23 and Appendix A (the ABA Study found that 52.8% of all claims arose from litigation
activities, while the Author's Study of legal malpractice cases found the figure to be 69%). As
further seen in the Footnote Table, the types of error that gave rise to the claims in the ABA
Study were almost identical to the types of error that formed the basis of the legal malpractice
lawsuits in the Author's Study:
TYPES OF MISTAKES
ABA Study Author's Study
Substantive Errors 43.9% 45.2%
Administrative 25.9% 26.2%
Client Relations 16.4% 16.7%
Intentional 11.7% 11.9%
All Other 2.7% 0%
See ABA Study at 7 and Appendix A. Substantive errors include: a failure to know the correct
deadlines, procedure, tax consequences, or applications of law; failure to avoid conflicts of
interest; failure to successfully perform a public record search; and mathematical errors.
Administrative errors include: failure to calendar or react to the calendar; failure to file docu-
ments or follow-up; losing documents or evidence; and clerical errors. Client relations errors
include: failure to follow a client's instructions; failure to obtain consent or inform; and im-
proper withdrawal from representation. All other errors include libel, slander, malicious prose-
cution, fraud, and violation of civil rights. Without accurate demographic data on lawyers'
activities in general, however, these findings are interesting but of limited usefulness.
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concern, however, is that the ABA and, unfortunately, scholars 90 have
overlooked the ABA Study's shortcomings.91
If the Oregon figures are accurate and representative of the
rest of the nation, at most twenty-three percent of claims against in-
sured lawyers were reported to the ABA.92 In addition, between
eleven and fifty percent of lawyers in private practice do not even
carry malpractice insurance.93 There is no data on how many actual
incidents of legal malpractice occur that never result in insurance
claims or lawsuits94 The ABA Study, from a statistical perspective,
may well be unrepresentative of the actual patterns of legal malprac-
tice, even for the period of the study.
For instance, the ABA Study found that thirty-five percent of
all legal malpractice claims are filed against solo practitioners.95
However, solo practitioners appear to be under-represented. In 1980,
forty-nine percent of all lawyers were solo practitioners,96 while more
recent surveys indicate that forty-six percent of lawyers in private
practice are solo practitioners.97 Demographic comparisons that
include law firms show that the ABA Study findings which report that
90. Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice at 21 (cited in note 11) (noting that "the overall
[ABA Study] data was verified as statistically valid"). The ABA Study itself states that "the
major findings of this study were validated by examining claims from Oregon." ABA Study at 5.
However, the ABA Study Data mentions Oregon as not being cooperative and pulling out of the
ABA Study. ABA Study Data at viii (cited in note 78). See also Letter from Barbara S.
Fishleder, Esq., Director of Loss Prevention, Oregon's PLF, to Author (January 20, 1994) (on file
with the Author) (stating that "Oregon was not very involved in the ABA's Study.... rThe
ABA consulted with us on claims coding issues and... discussed their findings with us....
[No formal report was sent to the ABA").
91. American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability, The
Lawyer's Desk Guide to Legal Malpractice 16 (1992) ("ABA Study Desk Guide"). This is the
ABA's latest and third book on the ABA Study. It is aimed at practicing attorneys. The ABA
itself has noted four general shortcomings: (1) data is only on insured lawyers; (2) in the ABA
Study 78% of claims were arguably nonmeritorious-claims or lawsuits where there was no
payment to the claimant; (3) due to a lack of demographic information on the legal profession,
there was no way to determine how the statistics compare to the general practice of law; (4) the
data are somewhat dated, but "nevertheless [it] remains, as far as the American Bar Association
is aware, the most current source of information on the causes of legal malpractice claims." Id.
(emphasis added).
92. See Table 2 and text accompanying notes 74-83. See also ABA Study Data at 5 (cited in
note 78).
93. Moss, 73 A.B. J. at 84 (cited in note 44).
94. The Author's former clients, legal malpractice defendants, often noted that it was ironic
that a particular client sued for such a minor legal malpractice incident when other more
meritorious claims for legal malpractice were never pursued.
95. ABA Study at 20 (cited in note 8).
96. Curran, et al., The Lawyer Statistical Report at 13 (cited in note 74).
97. Curran and Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report at 6 (cited in note 74) (based on 1988
figures).
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97.8% of legal malpractice claims were against lawyers in firms of 30
or fewer attorneys may not be that significant.98
Without accurate demographic information it is difficult to
suggest, as the ABA Study and scholars initially did, that lawyers in
small firms are more vulnerable to legal malpractice than lawyers in
big firms.99 For instance, William H. Gates, Project Chairman of the
ABA Study, initially stated in the ABA Journal: 'What information is
available suggests that about 50% of lawyers practice in firms of five
or less. Accordingly, with some 80% of claims being made against
lawyers in this group it appears that their malpractice risks are
greater."100  However, Gates later retracted that statement: "An
important limitation on the interpretation of this [ABA Study] data
must be mentioned. The Data Center has very little information
about overall characteristics or activities of lawyers.... Accordingly,
the Data Center cannot conclude with certainty that the number of
claims associated with such [small/2-5 lawyer] firms and that field of
law [25.3% of personal injury/plaintiff] are disproportionate."101
Unfortunately, it is Gates' ABA Journal article, not the later retrac-
tion in the Mercer Law Review, that continues to be cited by the lead-
ing scholars. 0 2
98. See ABA Study at 20 (cited in note 8). The 1980 figures suggest that 90% of lawyers
practice in firns of 30 or less. See also Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems Of Law Firm
Associates, 26 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 259, 311 (1985) (reporting that 84% of associates in Illinois
worked in one to ten lawyer firms, 13% worked in firms of between eleven and forty attorneys,
and 3% worked in firms of over forty lawyers, as of the 1983 edition of Martindale Hubbell);
Susan K. Robin, Attorney Malpractice and Preventative Lawyering: Are Attorneys Safer In
Large Firms?, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 1101, 1102 (1986) (citing another 1984 study done by the
Florida Bar which showed that 89.4% of Florida attorneys worked in law firms smaller than 25
lawyers, a Nebraska State Bar Study which showed only 9% of lawyers in 1985 worked in firms
of more than thirty attorneys, and a 1984 Tennessee Bar Association Survey which found that
only 6% worked in law firms of more than thirty lawyers).
99. ABA Study at 20 (noting that "firms of 2-5 lawyers produce a larger proportion of
reported claims asserted against attorneys.. . "). See also Robin, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. at 1102
(citing the ABA Study and concluding that, since only 2.2% of claims were against firms with
more than 30 lawyers, big firms were "safer").
100. William H. Gates, The Newest Data on Lawyers'Malpractice Claims, 70 A.B.A. J. 78, 84
(April 1984).
101. William H. Gates, Lawyers'Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a Growing Problem,
37 Mercer L. Rev. 559, 566 (1986).
102. See, for example, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal Profession:
Responsibility and Regulation 499-500 (Foundation, 2d. ed. 1988). See also Wilkins, 105 Harv.
L. Rev. at 831 n.129 (cited in note 12).
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C. The Severity: Seventy Percent Settle For Less Than $1000?
The most glaring difference between the ABA Study and the
Author's Study is in the severity of legal malpractice claims.
Demographic comparisons are not needed: Either claims and law-
suits are settled or not settled, for either increasingly larger or
smaller sums. Because 3,719 claims, or sixty-seven percent of the
5,537 closed claims in the ABA Study, resulted in no monies paid, one
might conclude that sixty-seven percent of all legal malpractice claims
and lawsuits are not meritorious or are too difficult to prosecute.1°3
Similarly, Colorado, 0 4 Florida,0 5 and Oregon'06 report that
approximately two-thirds of all legal malpractice claims and lawsuits
are dismissed or abandoned with no indemnity paid to the claimant.
But industry practice can inflate this figure: fearing a denial of cov-
erage if any potential claim is not reported before the expiration of the
annual "claims made" insurance policies, insured lawyers routinely
report any and all potential claims, even though a claimant may never
discover or pursue the claim. Thus, "no indemnity claims" are not
necessarily frivolous claims. Similarly, claims or lawsuits against
lawyers are not always made after each incident of legal malpractice.
Only meritorious claims should be studied in developing a
legal malpractice prevention program. But studying only meritorious
claims can be difficult: a careful analysis of each claim is needed to
determine whether it is meritorious. Often triable issues of fact and
law stand in the way. Moreover, for every meritorious claim actually
filed against an attorney there are several more that were meritorious
but were not perceived by the insured attorney, were not reported to
the insurer, or were not discovered or pursued by an aggrieved party,
either because the potential recovery was low, or because of the pre-
vailing thought that lawyers almost always win.0 7 Legal malpractice
lawsuits prepared and pursued by an attorney (the basis of the
Author's Study) are more likely to be meritorious than mere potential
or even actual insurance claims.
103. ABA Study Data at 23 (cited in note 78).
104. Locke, 42 Denv. Bus. J. at 1 (cited in note 54) (reporting that HOME's 1,084 claims by
Colorado insureds between 1985 and May 1990 resulted in two-thirds being abandoned or
dismissed with no indemnity paid to the claimant).
105. See Appendix C-1.
106. Letter from Kirk R. Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Oregon's PLF to Author (March 2,
1994) (on file with the Author) (stating that "for 1993, 40 percent of claim files resulted in an in-
demnity payment while 60 percent did not").
107. Ostberg and Rudy, If You Want To Sue a Lawyer at 7 (cited in note 15) (commenting
that "[miost lawyers won't take cases unless they have a good chance of winning at least
$50,000").
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As seen in Table 3, insurance carriers,08 and even the Oregon
PLF,1°9 are eager to say that two-thirds of all claims are disposed of
without an indemnity payment, but they generally are not willing to
publicize data on the indemnity amounts paid for claims or lawsuits
that actually settle or go to judgment."0
Table 3: Disposition of Malpractice Claims and Lawsuits
ABA Author's California Florida Oregon Colorado ALAS[Big
Study Sudy[U.S.] [Ca.J
Claims 29%111 100%112 N/A 15%113 33%114 33%115 N/A116With
Payments
Lawsuits 40%117 88%118 N/A 49%119 N/A N/A N/AWith
Payments
Amount
Paid ForClaims
a. $0- 78.9%
120  N/A Average 8 7%= 83%
1
= 82%124  Average
25,000 $90, 00 0121 between $5,000
and$539,0001M5
108. Locke, 42 Deny. Bus. J. at I (cited in note 54).
109. Hall letter (cited in note 106).
110. See, for example, 1993 Oregon PLF (cited in note 28); 1989-1992 Oregon PLF (cited in
note 38). These annual reports give the frequency of claims, but not the severity or settlement
amounts. See also O Malley interview (cited in note 6); Wangberg interview (cited in note 6).
111. ABA Study Data at 40 (cited in note 78). Seventy percent of the insurance carriers'
5,537 closed legal malpractice files consisted of claims in which no lawsuit had been filed. The
ABA Study Data did not analyze claims dispositions separately from actual lawsuit dispositions.
However, out of the 1,061 legal malpractice lawsuit dispositions in the ABA Study, 40% were
settled, 57% were dismissed and 3% were cases where payments were made after the plaintiff
obtained a judgment. In the ABA Study, the disposition of the claims showed that 28.6% of
them were settled and 71.4% were abandoned.
112. There were forty-two lawsuits and only one claim..
113. See Appendix C-4.
114. See 1993 Oregon PLF (cited in note 28).
115. Locke, 42 Deny. Bus. J. at 1 (cited in note 54).
116. OMalley interview (cited in note 6). ALAS would not provide any data other than
Appendix D.
117. See ABA Study Data at 40 (cited in note 78).
118. See Appendix A.
119. See Appendix C-3.
120. See Appendix A. Claims included lawsuits, but by reworking the data the Author was
able to break out the claims-only dispositions.
121. Dorgan, San Jose Mercury News at 1A (cited in note 51) (reporting figure for 1991).
122. See Appendix C-5.
123. Hall letter at 2 (cited in note 106). Hall also stated that "[w]e attempted to come up
with average settlement figures for claims in litigation versus non-litigation status, but found
that our claims data was not set up for this. Given the mandatory and ongoing nature of the
Fund, this particular figure has not been of much concern to us." Id. at 4.
124. There was only one claim. Locke, 42 Deny. Bus. J. at 1 (cited in note 51). HOME's
actual data showed that for 82% of the claims on which payments were made, less than $20,000
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Table 3 (cont'd)
ABA Author's California Florida Oregon Colorado AASBigStud S[U .T. Study Fr s
b. $2 01- 8.1% 1126 5% 8% 6.5%
c. $50,001- 5.3% N/A 4% 5% 6.5%100,00
d. over 7.6% N/A 4% 4% Average$100,000 Average Average $35,000.27$26,777 $25,625
Amount
Paid For
Lawsuits
a. $0- 72 .1%M8 18 .0 %M
2  N/A Average N/A N/A131  Securities
25,000 $65,740'3 Lawsuits!
average
settlement$6,688,888132
b. 125 001- 10.5% 27.3% N/A50,00
c. $50,001- 6.1% 33.3% N/A
100,000
d. over 11.4% 12.1%$100,000 Average$60,393
The ABA and the nation's legal malpractice insurance carriers
publish the positive message that most of the legal malpractice claims
against lawyers are frivolous or are dismissed without any payment.
However, as explained above, the dismissal of a claim or potential
claim does not necessarily mean that it was frivolous. Also, while
lawsuits tend to be more meritorious than claims, even frivolous
lawsuits will often be settled for "nuisance value" or for the
anticipated cost of defense, which frequently reaches into the tens of
thousands of dollars. Thus, quick generalizations based on the
disposition of claims or lawsuits are suspect.
For instance, law firms with over thirty lawyers in 1980 and
1988 employed fewer than ten and eighteen percent, respectively, of
all lawyers in private practice.133 ALAS only insures firms with over
forty lawyers, and boasts of an annual claims rate of only one per-
was paid; for 13%, indemnity payments between $20,000 and $100,000 were paid, and for 5%,
over $100,000 indemnity was paid. Id.
125. See Appendix D.
126. There was only one claim.
127. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
128. See Appendix A. Lawsuits were included as claims, but by reworking the data the
author was able to break out the lawsuits-only dispositions.
129. See Appendix A.
130. See Appendix C-3.
131. Locke, 42 Deny. Bus. J. at 1 (cited in note 54).
132. See Appendix D.
133. Curran, et al., The Lawyer Statistical Report at 13 (cited in note 74) (reporting the 1980
figure); Curran and Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report at 12 (cited in note 74) (reporting the
1988 figure).
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cent.5 4 However, large firms with over thirty lawyers, which the ABA
Study says accounted for fewer than 2.1 percent of all claims,1 5 incur
an overwhelming percentage of both the indemnity and defense costs
paid for legal malpractice claims.136 As shown by Appendix D, the
average settlement paid on behalf of ALAS insureds for a securities
claim was $5,668,888. Even before the $500 billion savings and loan
scandal, and the multi-million dollar legal malpractice settlements
paid by big law firms to governmental agencies such as the Resolution
Trust Corporation ("RTC"), 137  the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC"), and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"),38
lawyers in big law firms collectively paid out more in total dollars for
legal malpractice settlements than other lawyers.3 9
Since the savings and loan scandal, big firms have been paying
significantly more to settle legal malpractice claims 14 in order to
avoid having the cases decided by hostile juries. For instance, the
$75 million settlement on behalf of the large Cleveland-based firm,
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, insured by ALAS, for the 1989 collapse of
Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan Association in
California, 4' totaled more than the $73,695,120 paid in all of Florida's
1,121 reported legal malpractice lawsuits in which indemnity
payments were made from 1981 to May 1993.142
As seen in Table 3 above, if the analysis is shifted from legal
malpractice claims to legal malpractice lawsuits, a different picture
emerges. The ABA Study found that almost seventy percent of claims
were disposed of for $1,000 or less. The Author's Study portrays a
much different scenario, based on the fact that eighty-eight percent of
134. O Malley interview (cited in note 6).
135. ABA Study at 19 (cited in note 8).
136. Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Symposium, To What Extent Can a Disciplinary Code Assure
the Competence of Lawyers?, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 1211, 1216 (1988) (stating that as of 1988 over
half of all legal malpractice settlement dollars were paid by firms of over 30 lawyers). Spaeth
cites as his source for this information the unpublished Discussion Draft of Report on the ALI-
ABA Conference on Law Practice Quality Evaluation at 8. Id. at 1216 n.40.
137. Mark Hansen, Yet Another S&L Settlement, 80 A.B.A. J. 28 (Jan. 1994) (giving the
latest figures for big firms' RTC settlements).
138. Himelstein and Newdorf, The Recorder at 1 (cited in note 10). In 1990 the FDIC
recovered $373 million from professional liability claims. Four of the six largest legal malprac-
tice settlements in history, totaling $100 million, stem from savings and loan work.
139. Spaeth, 61 Temp. L. Rev. at 1216 (cited in note 136).
140. Id. See also Hansen, 80 A.B.A. J. at 28 (cited in note 137).
141. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6) (confirming the law firm was insured by ALAS).
See also Henry J. Reske, Firm Agrees to Record S&L Settlement: Shifting Standards Require
Lawyers to Disclose More to Regulatory Agencies, 79 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (July, 1993). The $75
million settlement consisted of a $24 million payment to Lincoln investors and $51 million to
OTS. Id.
142. See Appendix C-3.
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the legal malpractice lawsuits considered in the study settled, for an
average value of $60,393.143 Why is there such a difference? Is legal
malpractice litigation a "gold mine" for claimants, plaintiffs
attorneys, and insurance defense attorneys?
Between 1979 and 1986, not only did the number of legal mal-
practice cases double, but the average settlement nationally soared
from $3,000 to $45,000.144 In 1991 the average legal malpractice in-
surance claim in California settled for $90,000, and insurance carri-
ers' legal expenses added another $45,000 in each case.145 Between
1985 and 1991 HOME paid an average settlement of $35,000 for
claims against its insured Colorado lawyers. 146 Another study, con-
ducted during the same time as the ABA Study, found that the aver-
age legal malpractice verdict was $43,575.147
As seen in Table 4 below, the average Florida legal malpractice
settlement paid on behalf of insured lawyers is considerably higher
than the ABA Study suggests, and is steadily rising.
143. See Appendix A.
144. Mary Ann Galante, Insurance Costs Soar; Is There Any Way Out?; Firms Seek Creative
Solutions, Natl L. J. 1 (March 10, 1986). There was no citation for the source of this informa-
tion. See also Avery, Phila. Daily News Bus. Mag. at 25 (cited in note 48) (quoting Duke
Nordlinger Stern in 1986: 'The average settlement is about $50,000, including defense costs").
145. Dorgan, San Jose Mercury News at 1A (cited in note 51).
146. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
147. Castle, 71 A.B.A. J. at 122 (cited in note 23).
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Table 4: Florida Data: Claim/Lawsuit Settlement Amounts By Year 148
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Total Average
Average Amount Paid
For Claims149
$ 9,568
9,128
18,633
19,308
26,654
25,413
26,236
34,720
18,544
47,081
24,946
51,178
38,064
$ 26,777
Average Amount Paid
For Lawsuits' 50
$ 36,916
27,553
35,744
40,166
39,163
73,439
58,050
95,459
72,337
123,132
153,873
80,792
79,951
$ 65,740
Unfortunately, more complete data from insurance carriers
and states regarding the average settlement amounts in legal
malpractice claims and lawsuits are not available. 151 The Florida
data, however, do illustrate a significant trend of higher settlement
amounts for legal malpractice claims and lawsuits, and are probably
representative of the national trend.152  ALAS, while refusing to
provide specific information, has acknowledged receiving
progressively more claims, settling more claims, and paying higher
settlement amounts.1 53
The severity of legal malpractice claims has been devastating
not only to attorneys who are sued, but also to the insurance indus-
148. Bodiford interview (cited in note 73). See also Appendices C-3 and C-4. Lawsuits were
distinguished from claims in the Florida data by segregating claims in which zero dollars were
reported for defense counsel from those claims where more than one dollar was reported.
Although there are serious doubts as to whether Florida is receiving reports from even a
majority of the actual claims, there is no reason to think that the unreported claims would
necessarily differ from these figures. According to Bodiford, noncompliance usually occurs with
certain insurance carriers that fail to report few if any of their claims. However, there are other
insurance carriers that report all of their claims.
149. See Appendix C-4.
150. See Appendix C-3.
151. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6). See also Wangberg interview (cited in note 6); Hall
letter (cited in note 106).
152. Galante, Natl L. J. at I (cited in note 144). See also Dorgan, San Jose Mercury News at
Al (cited in note 51); Avery, Phil. Daffy News Mag. at 25 (cited in note 48); Locke, 42 Denv. Bus.
J. at 1 (cited in note 54).
153. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6).
1994] 1679
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1657
try.'5 While insurance carriers, the organized bar, and individual
insurance defense attorneys are reluctant to discuss the "iceberg,"
plaintiffs' attorneys are eager to brag.155 Insurance carriers often pay
top dollar to settle a legal malpractice case once it is obvious that it
may go to the jury. 56
Despite the trend to curtail confidential settlement agree-
ments,157 almost all legal malpractice settlement amounts are still
confidential.58 Insurance carriers' "hide and seek" approach to dis-
seminating statistics frustrates any attempt to get an accurate pic-
ture. However, we now have enough information to demonstrate that
legal malpractice has become a major problem for the profession, and
that it is not just a problem for solo practitioners, personal injury, or
154. Mike Stone, Reliance Enters State's Lawyer Malpractice Market, L.A. Bus. J. 5 (June
12, 1989) (citing Robert Chick, president of Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company, California's
lawyer-owned legal malpractice carrier: In 1987, legal malpractice carriers in California were
paying, for every $1.00 received in premiums, $1.64 for the claimants and $1.19 for defense
costs, or a total of $2.83. The total paid out by insurance carriers in California for 1987 was $83
million compared to $56 million paid in 1986). See Mary Ann Galante, Malpractice Rates Zoom;
Legal Insurance Crisis, Natl L. J. 1, 25-26 (June 3, 1985). Catastrophic losses forced twenty-
five legal malpractice insurance companies to leave California in a seven-year period. Id. at 25.
Nationwide, eighty to ninety percent of the companies writing legal malpractice insurance in
1981 were no longer writing it in 1985. Id. at 26. See also Darrell Preston, Legal Malpractice
Woes Mounting For Lawyers Hit With Huge Claims, Dallas Bus. J. 1, 21 (April 16, 1990)
(reporting that in Texas the average legal malpractice claim increased from less than $20,000 in
the early 1980s to several million dollars in the late 1980s. In March 1990, the London-based
London United Investments PLC, one of the largest legal malpractice carriers in Texas and
other states, stopped writing new business and suspended trading on the London Stock
Exchange pending an analysis of its reserves); Judy Greenwald, Home Chairman Says Insurer
'Out From Under,' Bus. Ins. 90 (Feb. 18, 1991) (reporting that HOME, the nation's largest legal
malpractice insurance carrier with 70,000 insured lawyers, was on the brink of insolvency in
February 1991 before being rescued by a group of European investors).
155. Jane Baird, Lawyer's Specialty: Suing Lawyers; Malpractice Attorney Says He Isn't
Shunned By Members of Profession, Houston Post 1D (Jan. 31, 1988) (reporting that Houston
lawyer Larry Doherty sued well over 100 lawyers for legal malpractice in a three-year period).
See also Dorgan, San Jose Mercury News at 1A (cited in note 51) (quoting San Diego attorney
Dan Stanford, former head of California's Fair Political Practices Committee: "All I do is sue
lawyers." His law business is "booming." He handles 30 to 35 cases per year involving lawsuits
ranging from $100,000 to $3,000,000); Paul D. Rheingold, Legal Malpractice: Plaintiffs'
Strategies, 15 Litigation 13, 14 (1989) (noting that "virtually all" of his twenty-five legal mal-
practice cases have been settled. A recent case settled for $1.5 million. Rheingold, a New York
lawyer, will not take any case under $100,000, or under $500,000 if the liability is in doubt).
156. Rheingold, 15 Litigation at 16 (stating- "I do, however, want to reveal a little secret...
insurance companies apparently believe that lawyers make poor defendants.... Mhe carriers'
view, in turn, shapes their willingness to settle even marginal malpractice claims..
157. See generally Doggett and Mucchetti, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 643 (cited in note 7).
158. Except in savings and loan legal malpractice cases where the government is a plaintiff,
or bankruptcy cases, almost all legal malpractice cases settle with confidentially agreements.
Despite numerous "Sunshine Acts," no state prohibits lawyers as parties from agreeing to
confidentiality as to the amount of settlement. Florida, through the mandatory reporting stat-
ute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.912, is the only state where one can determine (if a case is reported)
the settlement amount and the name of the settling insured attorney.
1680
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
real estate lawyers. Based on current trends, the frequency and
seriousness of legal malpractice claims and lawsuits will only con-
tinue to increase.
III. WHY =H LEGAL MALPRACTICE EXPLOSION?
Why, since 1970, has there been such an explosion in the num-
ber of legal malpractice claims and lawsuits?159 Why are legal mal-
practice settlement amounts steadily increasing?160 There are many
answers that, taken together, give a broad picture of how the status
quo changed so quickly. Two factors especially deserve attention: (1)
the increase in the public's and jurors' hostility toward lawyers, and
(2) the greater chance that a jury, not a judge, will decide issues of
credibility,161 liability, damages, and defenses in legal malpractice
lawsuits.
Perhaps the most obvious and most publicized change regard-
ing the legal profession has been the growing hostility of the public
toward lawyers.'62 Images of lawyers as dishonest, self-interested,
greedy individuals inevitably impact on the attitude and reactions of
not only hostile jurors, but legislators, judges, and policymakers.'63
Traditional barriers that have served to keep legal malpractice cases
away from juries have quickly eroded. Reasons to treat lawyers
differently from others fall on deaf ears. More lawyers are willing to
sue lawyers.'6 More clients and nonclients are willing to sue lawyers.
More settlement monies are being paid out to those who sue law-
yers.165
159. Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice at 22 (cited in note 11).
160. See Table 4. See also Appendices C-3 and C-4.
161. The Author's experience is that if it is the defendant lawyer's word against the client's,
then unless the lawyer has a writing corroborating his version, the client usually is believed by
the jury.
162. Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up; But NJ/West Poll Also Shows More
People Are Using Attorneys, Natl L. J. 1 (Aug. 9, 1993) (WLJ/West Poll') (reporting that,
according to a National Law Journal/West Publishing Co. poll, "the widely held perception that
resentment of lawyers-ranging from lawyer-bashing jokes to outright vilification-is running
at a fever pitch. And it is especially high among better-educated, higher wage earners in
society").
163. Gary A. Hengstler and R. William Ide, III, Vox Populi, The Public Perception of
Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 B.A. J. 60, 64 (Sept. 1993) ("ABA Poll') (reporting that, according to
the ABA poll done by Peter Hart Research Associates, Inc., lawyers are not caring or
compassionate, not easily understood, not honest and ethical, not putting clients first, and not
dedicated to rights. Lawyers are smart/knowledgeable and solve problems, but make too much
money, and are too greedy).
164. Ostberg and Rudy, If You Want To Sue a Lawyer at 3 (cited in note 15).
165. See Table 4. See also Appendices C-3 and C-4.
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A. Lawyers, Greed, Burn Out, and Hostile Jurors
In the movies, 166 television,167 the tabloids,16s the mainstream
press, 69 and the public opinion polls,170 lawyers are increasingly seen
as dishonest, greedy, and selfish. Perhaps most disturbing, recent
polls show that, although greater numbers of nonlawyers are having
business or social contact with lawyers, the more contact a person has
with a lawyer, the greater the likelihood that the person comes away
with a negative impression of lawyers in general.' 7' Lawyers appear
to have a better image among the poor and minority groups-people
who have less contact with lawyers.7 2
166. In 1993 the two top grossing movies, 'The Firm" and "Jurassic Park," fed the public's
negative image of lawyers. In 'The Firm," greedy lawyers killed each other for money. The
dinosaur's first victim in "Jurassic Park" was a lawyer, and audiences cheered.
167. It's A Laugh-Hate Relationship, Lawyer Complains, St. Petersburg Times Bus. Mag. 8
(July 12, 1993) (reporting criticism of two popular commercials by the president of the California
Bar, Harvey Saferstein. In a Miller Lite Beer ad, a rodeo cowboy lassos an overweight, white,
middle-aged male tax lawyer. A Reebok ad shown during the 1993 Super Bowl reminded
viewers, on a "perfect planet there would be no lawyers." Saferstein said "the lawyer-bashing
that is going on is vastly more pervasive and intense than it was 10 or 15 years ago. On a
regular, mean-spirited basis, lawyer-bashing tends to dehumanize lawyers and to make it easier
for someone to act like this [referring to the unhappy client who shot and killed eight lawyers
and other employees at the San Francisco law firm of Petit and Martin on July 1, 1993]').
168. Larry Haley, Bribes, Lies and Forgeries-That's How Sleazy Lawyers Drum Up
Business: They Pay Off Cops And Doctors And Even Sneak Into Funeral Homes To Get Clients,
The Nat'l Enquirer 41 (June 22, 1993).
169. Robert J. Samuelson, Go Ahead, Bash Lawyers; The People Who Should Make the
System Better are Making it Worse, Wash. Post A21 (April 22, 1992) (arguing, in an opinion-
editorial, that "[wlhat's wrong with lawyers is that they have an economic interest in cultivating
and prolonging confliit.... [Ildeally, the system should minimize conflicts by insuring that the
rules are clear and that disagreements are resolved rapidly. The trouble is that lawyers' well-
being runs in the opposite direction. The more conflict, the better. The more cumbersome and
ambiguous society's rules, the better.... [Llawyers simply won't face the contradiction between
their incomes and their professional responsibilities. The only real hope for change comes from
a small but rising number of (yes) legal malpractice suits. If enough lawyers become victims of
today's system, they may grasp the wisdom of changing it").
170. Ted Gest, Why Lawyers are in the Doghouse, U.S. News & World Report 38 (May 11,
1981) (reporting that an ABC News-Harris Survey showed law firms were last on the list of 13
institutions in which Americans had high confidence, below even Congress, the press, and labor
unions). See also J. Gallup Jr., The Gallup Poll of Public Opinion 191-93 (July 12, 1985)
(finding that only realtors, labor union leaders, advertisers, insurance salesman, and car
salesman were viewed as having lower honesty and ethical standards than lawyers); NLJI Weat
Poll at 1, 20 (cited in note 162) (reporting that during the past seven years the number of
persons believing that lawyers were "less honest" increased from 17% to 31%. The number of
adults who would recommend that their child become a lawyer decreased from 12% to 5%); ABA
Poll at 64 (cited in note 163).
171. NLJ/West Poll at 20 (reporting that in 1986 only 52% of the poll respondents had any
business or social contact with a lawyer. In 1993 it rose to 70%. The lawyers' image was worse
with persons earning between $50,000 and $75,000).
172. Id. (reporting that lawyers' image was better with minorities and persons earning less
than $20,000). See also ABA Poll at 61 (cited in note 163).
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Greed is the most common reason for legal malpractice cited by
academic and lay writers. For lawyers, money is increasingly the be-
all and end-all. 173 Solo practitioners are criticized, 174 as are the law
firms. 75  Chris Coley, the president of an association comprised of
lawyer-owned legal malpractice insurance companies, explains that
"malpractice claims have increased in part because attorneys are
taking on too many cases.... [T]he legal profession has become more
competitive . . . forcing lawyers to work harder for their money."' 76
Dan Stanford, a leading San Diego plaintiffs' legal malpractice attor-
ney, says the number one cause of legal malpractice is greed: "Legal
malpractice occurs when lawyers accept either too many cases or
cases outside of their area or beyond their ability."1 77 Thus, even the
struggling lawyer who takes any case that walks in the door in order
to pay the overhead is vulnerable. 178
Many would dismiss the contention that greed is the cause of
legal malpractice, or that lawyers are any greedier than non-lawyers,
but would admit that when lawyers are placed in situations where
their own self-interest is up against their clients', it is naive to expect
that their clients' interests will always prevail."79 Increased competi-
173. Darrell Sifford, A Lawyer's Worried View of Lawyers, Phil. Inquirer Il (Dec. 29, 1991)
(citing Norman Perlberger, head of his own law firm, a practicing lawyer for 20 years, and an
a4junct professor at Temple University Law School, who also believes that "there has been a
rise in legal malpractice cases. Maybe this will force lawyers to clean up their act...').
174. Robert A. Burt, Conflict And Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 Georgetown L. J.
1015, 1021 (1981) (noting the pervasive and inherent conflict of interests, ignored by traditional-
ist scholars, fueled by lawyers' greed and motivation for profit. The solo practitioner focuses on
fees rather than results).
175. Frederick Rosenberg, Legal Practice: Taking the Bite Out of Lawyers' Fees, Wash. Post
C3 (June 11, 1989) (stating that "[t~he past decade has seen legal costs at large firms skyrocket
at nearly three times the rate of inflation .... At the core of this development is a profession
concentrating itself into massive business organizations focusing primarily on profits, personal
gain and power). See also Ruth Marcus, Risk of Ethics Litigation Raises Ante for Blue-Chip
Law Firms, Wash. Post BI (May 26, 1987) (quoting Professor Ronald Rotunda of the University
of Illinois School of Law: "'The reason they don't see the conflict or they ignore it is that when
they have two lucrative clients, they are reluctant to tell one of them to go home . .. [tihe
problem is the love of the almighty buck at a time when lawyers' salaries ... are getting to be
much higher than normal').
176. Katheryn Kahler, Legal Malpractice Suits Increased, But Not All Lawyers Are Insured,
Oregonian R13 (Aug. 25, 1991).
177. Jonathan Gaw, Lawyers Shed Reluctance To Sue Their Own, L.A. Times (San Diego
County ed.) B1 (Dec. 14, 1992).
178. Research For Marketing, 1989 Survey at ES-17 (cited in note 39) (reporting that 42% of
Oregon's lawyers had all the work they could handle, 27% had more than they could handle, and
27% had less work than they could handle).
179. See Alan R. Marks, Where is the Real Conflict of Interest? Examining Underlying Issues
in Client Relationships, 79 A.B.A. J. 112 (Feb. 1993) (explaining that often an attorney's self-
interest is opposed to the client's interest). See also Alan R. Marks, Conflict of Interest, 79
A.B.A. J. 15 (Aug. 1993) (clarifying his thesis by stating- "I was not saying that lawyers are
motivated primarily by self-interest [as suggested by Judge Herrell's letter, in 79 A.B.A. J. 14
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tion reduces profit margins, and to maintain the same standard of
living lawyers become more concerned with money and more receptive
to cutting corners, focusing on quantity instead of quality.
Lack of professionalism is also a major problem.180 To some,
the increase in competition, especially the increase in lawyer advertis-
ing, was the beginning of the end for the profession.181 Others see
competition as the only way to keep the legal profession acting in the
public interest.182 There is no disagreement, however, that competi-
tion has taken over the profession, and that there are practically no
limits to lawyer advertising and solicitation of business.183 The final
irony is that some lawyers now advertise for victims of legal malprac-
tice.'4
(May 1993)], although obviously lawyers, as human beings, cannot escape the long-accepted
combination of human motivations, to which they are necessarily subject. It is the self-interest
portion of this combination, of course, that brings about the requirement for ethics rules in the
first place. The underlying pervasive conflict I described should be thoughtfully recognized and
analyzed-not denied....").
180. ABA Poll at 1 (cited in note 163) (explaining that a 1992 ABA Survey of Lawyers
"ranked improving the standing of the profession in the eyes of the public as one of the highest
priorities they want the ABA to address'). Texas Supreme Court Justice Eugene A. Cook has
written that "[t]his was the topic that lawyers wanted to talk about and address. At the
National Conference of Bar Presidents, on August 4-5, 1989, in Honolulu, Hawaii, an issues
update indicated that 'professionalism continued to dominate the concern of bar leaders. ."
Eugene A. Cook, Professionalism and the Practice of Law, 23 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 955, 987 (1992).
181. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 Am. Bar Found. Res.
J. 773 (1987) (reviewing ABA Commission on Professionalism, In The Spirit of Public Service: A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (ABA, 1986) and taking the ABA's
position that competition contributed to the decline of the profession. If there had been less
competition and more direct bar regulations it would have prevented the decline in professional-
ism and the quality of work).
182. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 239-45 (Oxford U., 1989).
183. Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, in an April 1993 speech at the University of
Tennessee, criticized "the outrageous breach of professional conduct we see in the huckster
advertising of some attorneys. Perhaps huckster is not strong enough a word; shyster is more
appropriate." "Shyster"Ads?, 79 A.B.. J. 45, 45 (Aug. 1993). See also Fax Poll, 13 Cal. Law.
108, 108 (June 1993) (stating that 86% of California attorneys thought that lawyer advertising
negatively contributed to the public's perception of lawyers); Don J. DeBenedictis, Ad
Controversy Erupts: Newspaper Appeals Seeking Burger Bacteria Victims Decried, 79 A.B.A. J.
34 (May 1993) (discussing a recent newspaper ad which was run in the Northwest and which
read: "Important Notice: If you or someone you know has been stricken by the recent outbreak
of E. Coli 0157:H7 Bacterium DUE TO UNDERCOOKED HAMBURGER you may have a
valuable legal claim for DAMAGES. To find out about your claim call THE LAW OFFICES OF
D. SCOTT BLAIR, 527-2000 for a free consultation or appointment.... All cases taken on a
contingency basis. No recovery, no fee'. Compare Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.12(d),(g),(h)
(Vernon 1994) (making certain types of direct solicitation by a lawyer a misdemeanor for a first
offense, or a third-degree felony, punishable by up to ten years in prison and a maximum
$10,000 fine for subsequent offenses).
184. During the fall of 1983 the Author saw a St. Petersburg, Florida local cable television
advertisement urge viewers to call if a settlement amount negotiated by a prior lawyer for their
accident was too small. Call 1-800-LAWYERS, the ad went on, to see if you have a good legal
malpractice claim.
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The need to work harder, in order to make more money, has
also been blamed for the increase in the number of dissatisfied,
"burned-out" lawyers.185 One study found that billable hour require-
ments have doubled in the last fifteen years. 86 Another study found
that in 1982 average associates in law firms were billing 1,723
hours. 187 From 1984 to 1990 the percentage of lawyers in private
practice who billed more than 2,400 hours a year jumped from one-
third to one-half.18 8 In order to honestly bill 2,400 hours a year, or
roughly fifty hours a week, one would have to work sixty to seventy
hours a week, with no holidays or vacations. Thus, it is not surprising
that lawyers experience more mental health problems, 189 alcohol
use,190 and drug use' 91 than the population at large.
Whether lawyers are less honest, more greedy, more competi-
tive, more "burned-out," or more in need of treatment by psychiatrists
or public relations professionals than the public at large is certainly
debatable. After all, the largest and most comprehensive survey of
private morals ever undertaken indicates that Americans believe that
"the United States has become a greedier, meaner, colder, more
selfish, and more uncaring place."192 Lawyers may only be as
dishonest, greedy, selfish, and burned-out as nonlawyers. However, it
is clear that the negative image of lawyers, even if erroneous, is a
185. American Bar Association Young Lawyers Division, The State of the Legal Profession
1990 1, 4, 24, and 52 (ABA, 1991) ("ABA State of the Legal Profession).
186. American Bar Association Commission on Women and the Profession, Lawyers And
Balanced Lives: A Guide to Drafting and Implementing Workplace Policies for Lawyers 5 (ABA,
1990).
187. Altman & Wel, Inc., The 1982 Survey of Law Firm Economics, 23 Law Off. Econ. &
Mgmt. 351, 354 (1982).
188. Nancy D. Holt, Are Longer Hours Here To Stay?: Quality Time Losing Out, 79 A.B.A. J.
62, 64 (Feb. 1993).
189. G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Elaine J. Darling, and Bruce Sales, The Prevalence of
Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 Int'l. J. L. &
Psych. 233,234 (1990).
190. Ted Rohrlich, National Perspective; Attorneys Report Big Jump in Drinking in ABA
Survey, LA. Times A5 (Dec. 5, 1990) (quoting Ronald L. Hirsch, who directed the 1990 survey of
3,248 lawyers on behalf of the ABA Young Lawyers Division: "The data reflect... the concern
of many that increases in hours worked and the resulting decrease in personal time have
become a major problem ... the legal profession has in recent years become a less pleasant
place to work").
191. Benjamin, Darling, and Sales, 13 Int'l J. L. & Psych. at 241 (cited in note 189).
192. James Patterson and Peter Kim, The Day America Told the Truth 239 (Prentice Hall,
1991). See also id. at 45, 49, and 155 (claiming that 91% of Americans admit lying regularly,
mostly to those they know best; only 31% believe that honesty is the best policy; the so-called
Protestant work ethic is a myth; almost half of American workers admit to chronic malingering,
only 10% of Americans are satisfied with their work; 17% of them drink or use drugs at work;
and 70% of Americans have no sense of loyalty to their company).
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critical factor with jurors, judges, and legislators. Perceptions, right
or wrong, often become the reality.
B. Legislators and Judges Open the Gates
It is easy to understand that insurers, defense lawyers, and
lawyer defendants increasingly settle legal malpractice lawsuits be-
cause of potentially hostile jurors, but public opinion has also affected
the judiciary and the state legislatures, two institutions historically
controlled by lawyers and the organized bar associations. As the
public's opinion of lawyers' competence and ethics wanes, there ap-
pear to be corresponding increases in legislative and judicial decisions
which liberalize the legal malpractice rules and allow legal malprac-
tice actions to reach hostile juries.193
Both the legislatures and the courts, state and federal, caught
in the throes of the consumer movement, 194 have made it easier for
clients and nonclients to sue for legal malpractice. Legal malpractice
actions, judicially imposed sanctions, and government regulations
have become the predominant methods of controlling lawyers, 195
largely because of ambiguous ethical codes and shortcomings in
lawyer self-regulation.196
193. Martin D. Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning-Youve Got To Know
When To Hold Up, When To Fold Up, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 193, 273-74, 280-81 (1990) (arguing
that "[t]he decisions removing the barriers to actions for legal malpractice will continue... It]he
defenses of privity and the statute of limitations have been routed... [t]he malpractice revolu-
tion has benefits for both lawyers and the public").
194. Gary Blankenship, Scanlon: Change Lawyer PR Efforts, 20 Fla. Bar News 1, 20 (1993)
(reporting that ABA Consultant Mike Scanlon, who was hired to direct the ABA's $750,000
communications efforts, launched after the ABA Poll (cited in note 163), told the Florida Bar
Board of Governors on Oct. 1, 1993, in Tampa: 'Most people think one in three lawyers is a bad
apple.... The problem is one I call consumer relations. The whole consumer movement
bypassed the legal profession and now they're coming back to get you. The public does not see
you as a profession, they see you as a consumer service. They don't see you as consumer-
friendly").
195. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L. J. 1239, 1279 (1991)
(stating: "'Legalized' regulation will undoubtedly continue to dominate the normative structure
of the legal profession, through court-promulgated rules, increasingly intrusive common law,
and public statutes and regulations.... The bar has become too large, diverse, and balkanized
in its practice specialties for the old informal system to be effective as an irtitution of govern-
ance.... [The courts will continue to be an indispensable instrument for ordering and clarify-
ing norms .... ).
196. See Ostberg and Rudy, If You Want To Sue a Lawyer at 11 (cited in note 15) (stating.
"The attorney discipline system is riddled with flaws. More than 90,000 complaints are filed
each year with these agencies, but only two percent of the complaints result in more than
private reprimand. Clients often don't file complaints because the process takes too long, it
takes place in secret, it limits clients' rights to present their own cases or to appeal decisions
and it does not provide any compensation").
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Legislators, more often than not, are taking away or ignoring
the legal profession's claim for self-regulation. 197 Legislation is ex-
panding lawyers' liability. For instance, most states have consumer
protection laws with treble damages which can potentially be invoked
against lawyers. 198 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act 99 ('FIRREA") federal legislative scheme,200 which
preempts traditional state legal malpractice actions and defenses,201 is
also representative of the trend toward increasing liability for
lawyers. The ABA has strenuously objected to this legislative trend
toward regulating the profession.202
197. Hazard, 100 Yale L. J. at 1279 (cited in note 195).
198. Lis Wiehl, Lawyers Find New Ways to Sue Other Lawyers, N.Y. Times B4 (June 16,
1989) (reporting that at least six states, including Texas and Massachusetts, hold lawyers
accountable under state consumer protection statutes designed to prohibit deception and the
providing of consumer goods and services). The criticism is that the profession has been too
slow to regulate itself. Lisa Richards of (HALT) has said that "[u]ntil better disciplinary
avenues are available we favor the innovative use of these statutes to make lawyers
accountable." Id. All states and Washington, D.C., have laws to prevent consumer fraud, but
lawyers are usually exempt from the treble damages and attorneys fees provisions because state
courts are deemed the exclusive regulators of the legal profession. See, for example, Rousseau
v. Eshleman, 128 N.H. 564, 519 A.2d 243, 245 (1986) (holding that New Hampshire's consumer
protection statute did not apply to an attorney). But several other courts have held that lawyers
can be sued under these laws. Paul Marcotte, New Threat to Attorneys?: N.J. Court: Lawyers
Liable For Consumer Fraud, 74 A.B.A. J. 17, 18 (Dec. 1988) (noting that courts in New Jersey,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Texas have applied consumer protection statutes to
professionals).
199. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1422 et seq. (1989).
200. FIRREA allows federal agencies such as the Resolution Trust Corporation ('RTC") and
the Office of Trust Supervision ("OTS") to impose sanctions on the large law firms which
represented defunct savings and loans associations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (Supp. 1993).
The OTS quickly brought attention to FIRREA when it filed an administrative complaint and
froze the assets of the large New York law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handier,
claiming $275 million in damages for Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan Association's
$2 billion fraud. Amy Stevens and Paulette Thomas, Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was
Brought to Knees By Zealous Regulators, Wall St. J. Al (March 13, 1992).
201. See, for example, FDIC v. Martin, 770 F. Supp. 623, 627 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that
FIRREA allows for an assignment of a legal malpractice claims by the failed bank to the FDIC,
preempting Florida law which prohibited the assignment). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B)
and (d)(5)(C)(i) (holding that potential attorney defendants have to file an administrative claim
within ninety days of the Receiver's publishing "notice to the depository institutions creditors to
present their claims or waive any affirmative defenses to a federal regulatory agencies' lawsuit
for a failed savings and loan"); FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1367, 1373 (M.D. La. 1992)
(finding no subject matter jurisdiction over affirmative defenses in FIRREA action); FDIC v.
Rusconi, 796 F. Supp. 581, 589 (D. Me. 1992) (same).
202. Thomas C. Rice and Blake A. Bell, Liability of Lenders Counsel in ALI-ABA Committee
on Continuing Profesional Education, Lender Liability and Other Complex Litigation Involving
Financial Institutions 273, 304 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 1991) (stating that federal
"regulators are urging the adoption of untested legal theories calculated to expand exponentially
the scope of duties owed by attorneys and other professionals who represent financial
institutions'). Despite the availability of new FIRREA actions, it is interesting to note that
almost all savings-and-loan-related lawsuits against lawyers, including the well-publicized RTC,
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While it is true that some legislatures are listening to con-
sumer groups, becoming more anti-lawyer, °3 and regulating lawyers
more readily,2 4 organized attorney groups are still a powerful lobby.
Certain legislatures continue to put up obstacles for plaintiffs in legal
malpractice lawsuits.205 Lawyers, who comprise significant numbers
in Congress and most state legislatures, on occasion still protect their
assets.206
While the legislative trend to publicly regulate lawyers and
hold them accountable to consumers has moved slowly, the judiciary's
response to the consumer movement and the public's distaste for
lawyers has been quicker-indeed almost revolutionary. The judici-
ary has dramatically changed the rules to favor claimants. For exam-
OTS, and FDIC lawsuits, involve only the traditional legal malpractice negligence theory. See
id. (noting that "in pursuing actions against attorneys and other professionals, the government
typically utilizes more traditional causes of action, particularly malpractice").
203. See Myrna Oliver, State Bar Urged to Hire Independent Judges; Legislature May Act on
Lawyer Discipline Otherwise, Van de Kamp Warns, L.A. Times 3 (Sept. 20, 1987) (reporting that
only three out of forty state senators in California are active attorneys, the legislature could be
described as "hostile," and that State Senator Nicholas C. Petris (D-Oakland) told the California
Bar's state convention that lawyers need to run for more legislative seats: "Most of my
colleagues in the legislature are not only non-lawyers ... they are down right hostile to
lawyers").
204. See, for example, Mark Hansen, Texas Makes Solicitation a Felony, 79 A.B-. J. 32
(Sept. 1993) (discussing Texas' new anti-solicitation statute). See also Ca. Bus. & Prof. Code §
6147(a)(6)(A) and 6148(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring California's lawyers to inform
clients in writing if they have no malpractice insurance); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2018(f) (West
Supp. 1994) (removing an attorney's work product privilege when she is sued by her client for
malpractice).
205. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.10(a) (West Supp. 1993) (allowing for the pretrial dismissal of
conspiracy claims against attorneys). In a recent case an appellate court applied the statute to
an "aiding and abetting" allegation, depriving the claimant of having a jury hear the evidence.
See Howard v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 745, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 575, 576-77 (1992). While
the statute can be justified on reputation concerns, the law and its application appear to be
rather self-serving.
206. See, for example, Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1528n and art. 6132a-1 (West Supp. 1994). A
blatant example of legislative relief can be found in recent statutes such as those allowing
professionals, including lawyers, to create a new legal entities known as "Limited Liability
Partnerships' ("LLP' or "Limited Liability Companies" ("LLC"). A plaintiff who obtained a
legal malpractice judgment against a partner in a firm organized under these statutes would
first seek the lawyer's insurance policy, then the lawyer's personal assets or the firm's, but could
not collect against the "innocent partners" personal assets under the traditional theory of
vicarious liability. See Jonathan Groner, This Tort Reform is Pro-Lawyer: D.C. Council Bill
Would Ease Partners' Malpractice Liability, Legal Times 1, 1 (Nov. 16, 1992) (reporting that the
Washington, D.C. Council considered following Texas' lead and allowing a LLP entity for law
firms). The Washington D.C. Council passed Session Law 10-34, allowing for LLPs, on July 29,
1993, effective Oct. 15, 1993. See 1993 D.C. Stat. 10-34, codified at D.C. Code § 41-146 (1993).
See also Linda Himelstein, S&L Counsel Turn to State Houses for Liability Relief, The Recorder
2 (May 22, 1991) (reporting on attempts by lawyers in Louisiana and Ohio to curb their liability
for. representing financial institutions). The Louisiana state legislature passed a statute to curb
exposure for bank lawyers requiring that any duties and responsibilities for bank and thrift
counsel be defined by the state's Rules of Professional Conduct. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
6:1351 (West 1993).
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ple, New York,2°7 California,20 8 and Pennsylvania 2°9 have all relaxed
the strict privity rules that once required legal malpractice plaintiffs
to be former clients.210  Today, in fact, the most severe legal
malpractice cases are brought by nonclients.211
Traditionally, under the "occurrence" rule of claim accrual,
aggrieved clients often could not sue because the statute of limitations
ran before they had discovered the malpractice (the "discovery"
rule).212 The modern majority approach, however, is to start the clock
when the claimant knew or should have known of the malpractice. 23
207. Prudential In-urance Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood et
al., 80 N.Y.2d 377, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 (1992). In Prudential, a non-client lender detrimentally
relied on a lawyer's typographical error stating the outstanding balance of a first mortgage as
being $92,885, when it was actually $92,885,000. The court stated: 'We now conclude that in
circumstances such as these, a theoretical basis for liability against legal professionals can be
presented.... [Wihere, as here, the negligent acts, i.e., the creation of an opinion letter and the
transmission of that letter to a third party for the party's own use, were carried out by the
lawyer at the client's express direction, the ethical considerations of Canons 4 and 5 [of the Code
of Professional Responsibility] are insufficient reason to insulate attorneys from liability." Id.
208. Heyer v. Flaig, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969) (en banc). The court used a
balancing test to determine a lawyer's liablity. The factors to be considered included: (1) the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm
to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injuries suffered; (5) the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm. Id. at 164.
Compare Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. App. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 767 (1992) (holding that
an accountant's duty of care in the preparation of an independant audit of a client's financial
statements does not extend to nonclient investors).
209. Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was hesitant to embrace the "Heyer factors" as being unworkable and potentially too
expansive, but did require the following two factors: (1) the contracting parties (attorney and
client) must have intended to confer benefit on the third party, and (2) the client must have
intended to give the third party the benefit of the particular performance sued upon. Id. at 750-
52.
210. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 73, comments e, f (ALI, Tentative
draft No. 7, April 7, 1994) ("Restatement 3d Draft") (stating that liability under the erosion of
the privity rule is still confined to a few categories such as will beneficiaries and recipients of
opinion letters).
211. Robert E. O'Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 20 U. Toledo L.
Rev. 325, 328 (1989). O'Malley states:
A majority of the most severe claims [for legal malpractice] are coming not from the cli-
ents themselves, but from various third parties (investors, lenders, purchasers, stock-
holders, regulatory agencies such as FDIC and FLIC, etc.).... [IUn many of the most se-
vere third-party claims, the quality of the defendant lawyer's legal work is not the real
issue; for example, even if the prospectus ... satisfies all of the requirements ... the
lawyer is, nevertheless, likely to be sued and has a high risk of liability if the enterprise
fails.
Id. See also ABA Study at 47-48 (cited in note 8) (showing an increase in nonclient lawsuits,
from 8% in 1977 to 21% in 1985).
212. See, for example, Chapman v. Alexander, 307 Ark. 87, 817 S.W.2d 425, 427 (1991)
(finding that a change to the discovery rule would be unfair because the occurrence rule had
been relied upon by professionals, and because of possible insurance coverage problems).
213. Mallen and Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice §18.14 at 132-34 (cited in note 11) (noting that
"[n]otwithstanding the rapid, recent acceptance [of the discovery rule], the departure and
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Accordingly, lawyer defendants, adjusters, and defense counsel are
hesitant to go before hostile jurors on a technical statute of
limitations defense, preferring instead to settle.214
In order to get her case before sympathetic jurors, a plaintiff
need only find one lawyer to take the case and another lawyer who,
for a fee, is willing to testify that the defendant lawyer's conduct fell
below the standard of care. Former clients are increasingly allowed to
sue their prior counsel for negligently settling a civil case.215 In the
securities field, defendant lawyers' pleas for zealous advocacy, confi-
dentially, and client loyalty are falling on deaf ears.216 Ethical rules
are increasingly used as a sword,27 even though they are either con-
ultimate abandonment of the occurrence rule was a slow and deliberate process, such as would
be expected before overturning 140 years of precedent.... In no instance, however, has a court
critically analyzed why a [prior occurrence] rule which forecloses a remedy before the client, or
even a lawyer, could be expected to discover the error, should be continued"). See also, for
example, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.6 (1982) (creating a one-year statute of limitation from
discovery); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a) (1982) (creating a two-year statute of limitation from discov-
ery). Other states have legal malpractice statutes of limitations that run up to six years from
the date of discovery because any legal malpractice case can be pled as a breach of contract
action. See, for example, Lee Houston & Assoc., Ltd. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 855 (Alaska 1991)
(applying a six year statute of limitation to claims for ecomonic loss arising out of professional
service relationships); Oleyar v. Kerr, 225 S.E.2d 398, 400 (Va. 1976) (applying a three-year
statute of limitations).
214. For example, in 1989, the Author was told by the claims manager of a major legal mal-
practice insurance carrier that if there were no dispositive motions prior to a jury trial, such as
on the statute of limitations, then authority to settle for $20,000 or less would automatically be
forthcoming. The carrier averaged more than $20,000 per year for each legal malpractice
lawsuit expended in defense costs alone.
215. See, for example, Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250, 607 A.2d 1298, 1304 (1992)
(insisting "that the lawyers of our state advise clients with respect to settlements with the same
skill, knowledge, and diligence with which they pursue all other legal tasks"). See also
Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstrom, 957 F.2d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that assuring
that a settlement is reasonable is one of a lawyer's duties). The Author handled an appeal for
the lawyer defendants in Mutuelles Unies, where malpractice was found against an insurance
defense counsel who rejected a settlement demand for $2.2 million prior to an award of $4
million in the underlying case. Id. Compare Muhammad v. Straussburger, McKenna, Messer,
Shilobod and Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1991) (stating that "to allow [negligent
settlement cases] will create chaos in our civil litigation system. Lawyers would be reluctant to
settle a case .... We refuse to endorse a rule that will discourage settlements and increase
substantially the number of legal malpractice cases").
216. Stevens and Thomas, Wall St. J. at Al (cited in note 200). Timothy Ryan, then Director
of the OTS, responded that the lawyer who artfully dodges his duties in order to put off an
inevitable seizure of an institution is a "garden variety accomplice." Harris Weinstein, former
chief legal counsel of the OTS, advocates a "whole law" advocacy: 'The rules do not require you
to disclose everything you know. ... But if you make a statement, you cannot tell a misleading
or partial truth." Id. at A6.
217. Michael J. Hoover, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Lawyer Malpractice
Actions: The Gap Between Code and Common Law Narrows, 22 New Eng. L. Rev. 595, 612
(1988) (noting that the violation of an ethical rule usually leads to civil liability to a client or a
third party).
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fusing,218 or inappropriate in certain contexts such as securities 2 9 or
estate planning work.220
While most agree that liability for lawyers has expanded, some
scholars believe that the "case within a case" approach to legal mal-
practice damages-that the defendant lawyer's mistake does not
produce liability when the plaintiff would have lost the underlying
case anyway-is still skewed in favor of lawyers.221 However, in prac-
tice this technical defense, or "excuse," is difficult for lay jurors to
accept: A "bad" underlying case becomes a winner; insignificant
damages suddenly grow to two, three, or four times the true value of
the underlying case. Moreover, states are increasingly allowing jurors
a blank check in awarding emotional distress222 and punitive damages
in malpractice cases,223 neither of which are typically covered by
insurance. 224
218. O'Malley, 20 U. Toledo L. Rev. at 355 (cited in note 211) (noting that "[t]he honest
lawyer, struggling with the question of what he or she can or must do upon discovering a prior
client fraud, will be thoroughly bewildered by the contradictory interplay between and among
Model Rules 1.6 (confidentiality), 1.13 (organization as a client), 1.16 (withdrawal), and 4.1
(truthfulness in statements to others), and the mysterious portion of the Official Comment
under Rule 1.6 dealing with withdrawal: 'Seek independent counsel if you are in this position"').
219. Richard M. Phillips, Client Fraud and the Securities Lawyer's Duty of Confidentially, 49
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 823, 828-89 (1992) (discussing how corporate and securities members of the
ABA have tried in vain to amend Rule 1.6 to add an exception for economic injury caused by a
client defrauding others). See also Philadelphia Reserves Supply Co. v. Nowalk & Associates,
No. 91-0449, 1992 US Dist. LEXIS 12745, *28 (E.D. Pa. August 25, 1992) (discussing the New
Jersey rule that revises the duty of confidentiality to oblige lawyers to reveal privileged informa-
tion when the attorney becomes aware that a client's fraud threatens severe financial harm).
220. ABA Committee On Significant New Developments in Probate and Trust Practice Law,
Developments Regarding The Professional Responsibility Of The Estate Planning Lawyer: The
Effect Of The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 Real Prop. Prob. and Tr. J. 1, 2 (1987)
(noting that "Model Rules [as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility] do not deal
effectively with some of the most important and difficult problems of professional conduct in the
practice of estate planning'.
221. Joseph H. Koffier, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Trial Within a Trial-A Critical
Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 Marq. L. Rev. 40, 75 (1989) (stating
that the "trial within a trial" approach to causation in legal malpractice cases is "skewed enor-
mously in favor of the attorney and against the client .... Frequently several years have
elapsed [due to the malpractice] and evidence needed to establish the claim has been lost or
diluted by the passage of time ... [thus] the attorney derives a benefit'). See also Joseph J.
Fleischman and Margaret M. Monaco, Tough Standards Hold in Malpractice Cases, N.J. L. J. 6,
6 (Nov. 2, 1992) (stating: "Whereas a first-year law school Torts book in 1970 would be an
inadequate resource for assessing 1992 [legal] malpractice causes of action, it would suffice for
1992 proof of damages" and discussing the use of the "suit within a suit" approach as one
method of presenting proof of loss in New Jersey).
222. See, for example, Gore v. Rains & Block, 189 Mich. App. 729, 473 N.W.2d 813, 818-19
(1991) (holding that recovery for mental anguish arising from legal malpractice was not barred
by lack of proof of physicial injury); Salley v. Childs, 541 A.2d 1297, 1300-01 (Me. 1988).
Compare Quezada v. Hart, Cal. App. 3d 754, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820 (1977) (holding that dam-
ages for emotional distress are not recoverable for mere negligence in a legal malpractice case).
223. See, for example, Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 261, 265 (Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that an attorney who charged excessive fees, misrepresented breakdown of workers
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The traditional legal malpractice defenses are disappearing as
well. Lawyer defendants often plead numerous defenses, even though
they present triable issues of fact for hostile jurors.225 Accordingly,
such defenses fail to significantly reduce the settlement value of the
case. Moreover, some defenses, such as judgment immunity, that
were historically decided by judges in favor of defendant lawyers, are
no longer available.226 Furthermore, the opportunity to better defend
a case by asserting the "absolute" work product privilege27 in order to
withhold any damaging evidence is also being taken away.228
compensation award, and settled the claim without the client's consent was liable for punitive
damages); Fillion v. Troy, 656 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a client could
recover punitive damages from an attorney who committed fraud, misrepresentation, and undue
influence). See also Merenda v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 93 (1992)
(holding that a client may recover.as compensatory damages the amount of punitive damages
she would have won in the underlying case). Compare Restatement 3d Draft § 75, comment h
(cited in note 210) (advocating the rejection of this type of recovery).
224. ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers Professional Liability, Coverage Quest (1994).
This computerized database contains forty-five currently available legal malpractice policies and
an analysis of each. See also HOME, Lawyers' Liability Errors and Omissions Policy (1993)
(unpublished, copy on file with the Author). The typical legal malpractice insurance policy
excludes emotional distress and punitive damages.
225. See, for example, Keegan v. First Bank of Sioux Falls, 519 N.W.2d 607, 615 (S.D. 1994)
(holding that a statute of limitations defense is a triable issue of fact for the jury); Sutton v.
Mytich, 197 11. App. 3d 672, 555 N.E.2d 93, 98 (1990) (holding that a client's alleged
contributory negligence in failing to discover the lawyers' drafting error is a question of fact for
the jury); Mali v. Odom, 295 S.C. App. 78, 367 S.E.2d 166, 169 (1988) (holding that when a client
denies knowledge and assumes the risk of a restrictive covenant, the issue becomes one of fact
for the jury); Mauldin v. Weinstock, 201 Ga. App. 175, 411 S.E.2d 370, 372-73 (1991) (holding
that a client can waive his right to complain if he failed to authorize the lawyer to proceed with
wrongful termination claim, however, the issue is normally a matter for the jury); Levine v.
Gross, 177 A.D.2d 290, 575 N.Y.S.2d 864, 864-65 (1991) (dealing with a res judicata defense);
Ziegelheim, 607 A.2d at 1305 (holding that a client is not collaterally estopped by her statement
in open court that her divorce settlement was "fair and equitable"); North Carolina Federal Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Ray, 95 N.C. App. 317,382 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1989) (refusing to allow a defense of
equitable estoppel because the client's ambiguous instructions should have been clarified by the
lawyer before securing a loan). See also Joe Holloway, The Claim Repair System, 52 Fla. B.J. 94
(1978) (stating that it is best not to miss an opportunity to mitigate or avoid the loss. Often the
lawyer's liability carrier will cooperate with a former client, now the potential plaintiff, to
"tmdo" the malpractice through a motion or appeal).
226. See, for example, Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662-65 (Tex. 1989). The modern
trend is illustrated by this Texas Supreme Court case, in which the attorney sued the wrong
defendant. The court acknowledged that "[i]n some instances an attorney is required to make
tactical or strategic decisions," but held that allowing the continued use of professional
judgment immunity created "too great a burden for wronged clients to overcome." Id. at 664-65.
However, if the judgment is one "which a reasonably prudent attorney could make in the same
or similar circumstances, it is not an act of negligence even if the result is undesirable." Id. at
665 (emphasis deleted).
227. Mallen and Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice § 27.30 at 711-13 (cited in note 11).
228. See, for example, Platt v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. App. 3d 779, 214 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1989)
(which the Author litigated). Neither side briefed or argued that the word "absolute" meant
anything different. However, the opinion explained how the word "absolute" really did not
mean "absolute." Id. at 39. While the case was pending before the California Supreme Court,
the California legislature passed a statute retroactively mandating the production of work
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The overall pattern seems unmistakable. The consumer
movement has hit the legal profession. Several important fac-
tors-who is able to sue, the limitations period in which a suit may be
brought, the areas of liability for which attorneys may be sued, the
nature and the type of damages that can be recovered, and the erosion
of traditional defenses-all seem to point toward greater numbers of
legal malpractice claims and lawsuits. More significantly, the law is
allowing hostile jurors, as opposed to perhaps more sympathetic
judges, to decide issues of credibility, liability, damages, and defenses.
The frequency and severity of legal malpractice claims and lawsuits
will no doubt continue to spiral upward.
IV. CAN THE PROFESSION REGULATE ITSELF:
'WEEDING OuT" THE 'BAD" LAWYERS?
Law school admissions committees, state bar boards of exam-
iners, and prospective law firm employers all try to ensure that future
members of the legal profession are both moral and competent.
Similarly, law schools, organized bar associations such as the ABA,
sponsors of continuing legal education programs, disciplinary
systems, alcohol/drug related lawyer assistance programs ("LAPs"),
and the courts all have the individual attorney as their focus.
Sanctions, education, and rehabilitation are the legal profession's
typical response to legal malpractice, while insurance underwriters
similarly focus on the individual, attempting to find the "good risk"
lawyers to insure. With such an enormous amount of time and money
being spent on "weeding out," sanctioning, educating, and rehabilitat-
ing the "bad apples," observers are at loss to explain why legal mal-
practice is becoming even more widespread.
product to the former client who sues for legal malpractice. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2018
(Supp. 1994).
1994] 1693
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1657
A. Sanctions: Bar Examiners, Disciplinary Agencies,
and Judicial Fines
Every state currently requires a certification of character as a
prerequisite to obtaining a license to practice law.29 The number of
individuals actually denied admission remains minimal. 230 A major
underlying purpose of the moral fitness requirements is to preserve
the self-image of the legal profession, rather than to ferret out
potential "bad lawyers."231 Higher-echelon law school graduates
apparently receive cursory investigations when compared to
graduates of regional law schools. 2 2 Women are reviewed more
lightly, but minorities are strictly reviewed.233 There is no generalized
pattern emphasizing any one characteristic over another, and the
practices among the fifty states are inconsistent.234  The ABA
Commission on Professionalism, discussing ways to increase the
competence and image of the legal profession, has criticized the
investigations as too cursory and has stressed the need to be more
thorough. 35 However, it is unlikely that any investigation, no matter
how thorough, can predict which lawyers will commit malpractice ten
years later.
229. For example, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners sends out a form letter [1ZD, revised
December 1992] (on file with the Author) to prospective bar admittants' references. The letter
states that it is investigating the applicant's "character and fitness." The following questions
are asked:
Would you recommend the applicant for a position of trust?... Is the applicant honest?
... Is the applicant thorough in fulfilling obligations?... Has the applicant ever been:
accused of a violation of the honor code or student conduct code, warned, placed on
scholastic or disciplinary probation, suspended, requested or advised to discontinue
studies.... (and) otherwise subjected to discipline for academic or personal conduct rea-
sons by any educational institution?; A party to legal or administrative proceedings?;
Arrested for any traffic or criminal charge?; Accused of a violation of trust?; Denied ad-
mission to the bar of any other state?; Excessive in the use of alcohol within the past ten
years?; Involved with the use of (or used) unlawful drugs within the past ten years?;
Addicted to or dependent upon the use of prescription drugs within the past ten years?;
Afflicted with or received treatment for emotional disturbance, mental or nervous disor-
der; [or] delinquent in any financial obligations?
230. Rhode, 94 Yale L. J. at 502 (cited in note 12).
231. Id. at 509. See also MA. Cunningham, Comment, The Professional Image Standard:
An Untold Standard of Admission to the Bar, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1015, 1026-32 (1992).
232. See Cunningham, id. at 1040-41.
233. Id. at 1040-42.
234. Id. at 1022-24.
235. ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, In the Spirit of Public Service; Report by
the Commission on Professionalism: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism
46 (ABA, 1986).
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Every lawyer takes an oath of admission before receiving her
license.236 If such oaths were strictly enforced, most practicing law-
yers would be disbarred. As is acknowledged by anyone who has ever
practiced law, the oath of admission is wholly unrealistic, though it
sounds good for public consumption. But with more than 90,000 com-
plaints received by disciplinary agencies,23 7 and probably another
90,000 legal malpractice claims made every year,238 the bar examiner's
technique of "weeding out" potentially bad lawyers through character
certification and oath administration is highly suspect.
The huge numbers of disciplinary complaints and legal mal-
practice claims fied each year are sobering. And these numbers are
certainly lower than they might be-clients often do not even bother
to file disciplinary complaints because the process takes too long, it is
done in secret, and there is no money for the claimant after the
prosecution of the case.239 Note that the large numbers of complaints
and claims do not necessarily mean that every year forty percent of
lawyers are subject to either a claim for malpractice or a disciplinary
action. Nor will each lawyer necessarily face six formal disciplinary
complaints and six legal malpractice claims in her career. Perhaps
some lawyers are cited or sued repeatedly-we simply do not know
236. See, for example, The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar and Ideals and Goals of
Professionalism; A Handbook for Florida Law Students 11 (The Florida Bar, 1993). Florida's
Oath of Admission states:
I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: I will support the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Florida; i will maintain the respect due to Courts of Justice
and Judicial Officers; I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceedings which shall
appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly debat-
able under the law of the land; I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never
seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law; I will
maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my clients, and will accept
no compensation in connection with their business except from them or with their
knowledge and approval; I will abstain from all offensive personality and advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which I am charged; I will never reject, from any consideration
personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay anyone's cause for
lucre or malice. So Help Me God.
35 Fla. Stat. Ann., Bar and Judiciary Rules 754 (West 1994) The oath is prefaced by the
statement:
The general principles which should ever control the lawyer in the practice of his pro-
fession are clearly set forth in the following Oath of Admission to the Bar, which they
are sworn on admission to obey and for the willful violation of which disbarment may be
had.
Id.
237. Ostberg and Rudy, If You Want To Sue a Lawyer at 11-12 (cited in note 15).
238. See text accompanying notes 37-44. See also Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice §
1.6 at 17-19 (cited in note 11).
239. Ostberg and Rudy, If You Want To Sue a Lawyer at 11-12 (cited in note 15). See also
Deborah L. Rhode and David Luban, Legal Ethics 939-41 (Foundation, 1992).
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the exact frequency. We do know that only about two percent of
disciplinary complaints result in anything more than a private
reprimand.240
Disciplinary codes and their enforcement cannot assure that
lawyers will be ethical and competent.241 Theoretically, the states'
disciplinary systems proceed analogously to criminal cases, with
similar goals of protecting the public, deterring future misconduct,
and rehabilitating offenders,242 but the systems are highly ineffective.
For instance, the California State Bar, subsequent to a directive from
the state legislature in 1987 to "clean up its own house" or have its
authority to discipline lawyers stripped, found that almost 1,000 law-
yers charged with crimes "at the felony level" were still practicing
law.243
Whether California, with over 140,000 lawyers, now has its
house in order is debatable. Three times as many California lawyers
were disciplined in 1991 as in 1985. Since the publication of a toll-
free complaint hotline, the California State Bar has been inundated
with 8,000 calls per month.2" The dues for lawyers jumped from $276
to $470 per year in order to create a new California State Bar court
for lawyer discipline, but there is no evidence that this $35,000,000 a
year effort is working.245 The main criticisms are that most discipli-
nary infractions, like legal malpractice, are still not reported, and that
the State Bar never goes after partners in big law firms. 246 In fact, big
law firm lawyers are almost never disciplined.247 The only available
statistics indicate that eighty percent of those disciplined are solo
240. Ostberg and Rudy, If You Want to Sue a Lawyer at 11-12.
241. Spaeth, 61 Temp. L. Rev. at 1235 (cited in note 136). See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Disciplinary Strategies Can Pay Off, Nat'l L. J. 13, 14 (July 10, 1989) (stating that "[d]isciplinary
enforcement resources inevitably will be 'inadequate,' because there is more lawyer misbehavior
than any reasonable system can fully prosecute").
242. H. Patrick Furman, Punishing Ethical Violations: Aggravating and Mitigating Factors,
20 Colo. Law. 243, 243 (1991).
243. William Overend, Passage of Measure to Improve Discipline by State Bar Urged, L.A.
Times § 2 at 4 (April 2, 1988).
244. Dorgan, San Jose Mercury News at 1A (cited in note 51).
245. Id.
246. Id. (reporting that "[a]n insurance executive who has filed numerous overbilling
complaints to the State Bar ridicules the special court as 'an absolute joke.' 'They'll go after the
solo practitioner who cheats an old lady out of $50, but they never go after the big firms,' said
the executive, who asked not to be identified, 'they say, that's too big for us-we can't handle
it" .
247. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 19-20
(1991) (stating that the law firm entity itself should be disciplined since it is often difficult to
determine which of the individual partners or associates are at fault).
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practitioners.248  In one study, no disciplinary cases were found in
firms of over seven lawyers.249
The frequency of disciplinary complaints varies widely from
state to state. For example, in 1986 there was one complaint for every
two lawyers in rural upstate New York.250 There was only one com-
plaint for every forty-two lawyers in Washington, D.C., where most
attorneys practice in large firms and government agencies.251 Given
the high disciplinary dismissal rates, in the eighty-five to ninety-five
percent range,252 legal malpractice lawsuits remain the most common
method of regulating the legal profession. The organized bar simply
does not have the resources or the motivation to regulate effectively
through various disciplinary proceedings. 253
In contrast to disciplinary actions, sanctions by judges have
had a tremendous effect on the behavior of litigators. 254 In numerous
published and unpublished decisions,2 55 courts have granted signifi-
cant monetary awards.26 Judicially enforced sanctions have become a
powerful means of defining the scope of litigation. 257  However, the
United States Supreme Court, bowing to lawyers' protests, has re-
248. Abel, American Lawyers at 145 (cited in note 182) (using 1981-82 statistics from
California, Illinois, and the District of Columbia).
249. Id.
250. Martha Middleton, 54,600 Complaints Filed Against Lawyers, Nat'l L. J. 19, 19 (Dec. 7,
1987).
251. Id.
252. Symposium, Weighing Public, Private Needs In Discipline Process, N.J. L. J. 15, 28
(Jan. 27, 1992) (quoting John V.R. Bull, Assistant to the Executive Editor of the Philadelphia
Inquirer: 'I was particularly disturbed as a member of the public-I am not a lawyer-to find
that 85% of cases you get are dismissed. I recognize that many of them are matrimonial cases
and many of them are probably dismissed. But it raises one hell of a big question in my mind...
I find that not credible as a member of the public").
253. Jonathan L. Kirsch, A Changing Insurance Game Threatens Lawyers, Cal. Law. 30, 31
(July 1985).
254. L. Ray Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance and Role
of the Client, 1 Georgetown J. Legal Ethics 43, 44 (1987) (stating the fact "[tihat a procedural
rule can achieve in just a few months what codes of ethics failed to achieve ... over eight
decades suggests that something is amiss').
255. Stephen B. Burbank, Rule 11 in Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 59 (Amer. Judicature Society, 1989) (noting that fewer
than 10% of Rule 11 decisions are published).
256. See, for example, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 122,
125 (1989) (upholding the district court's award for sanctions of $100,000 for an insufficiently
investigated factual allocation by plaintiffis counsel); Brandt v. Schal Assoc., Inc., 131 F.R.D.
485, 503 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (upholding an award for sanctions of $350,000); In re Disciplinary
Action Boucher, 837 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1988) (imposing a six month suspension), modified
in 850 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1988) (revoking suspension due to lawyer's inexperience).
257. Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959,
985 (arguing that Rule 11 "has tremendous potential for transforming the bar without people
knowing about it.' In our imperfect legal system, fraught with self interest by all parties, a
national standard of lawyering may ultimately be preferable").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
cently approved changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which
now requires a lawyer seeking sanctions to notify the offending party
of the perceived Rule 11 violation and to provide a twenty-one day
"safe harbor" for correcting the offending practice. Without this notice
and opportunity to correct, no sanctions may be awarded. 258 Thus, it
is likely that the change will decrease the frequency of Rule 11
sanctions and their effectiveness as a basis for regulating lawyers,
and will place more attention on legal malpractice actions.
B. Rehabilitation and Education: LAPs, Law Schools, and CLE
In addition to imposing sanctions, the legal profession is mak-
ing some efforts to educate and rehabilitate lawyers so as to prevent
legal malpractice. However, these efforts-by lawyer assistance pro-
grams ("LAPs"), law schools, and CLE programs-are, like discipli-
nary actions, conspicuously ineffective.
LAPs attempt to identify and rehabilitate lawyers who have
alcohol, drug, or mental problems. According to the ABA Commission
on Impaired Attorneys, state "bars have estimated that 40 to 75% of
all [disciplinary] complaints stem from lawyer impairment." 9
Similarly, in Oregon sixty percent of the lawyers who entered the
state bar's LAP had pending legal malpractice cases against them.
After one year of abstinence, the now sober lawyers' legal malpractice
rate dropped, and only two percent had a new legal malpractice claim
made against them.2 60
Consequently, Oregon's LAP was credited for a low seven per-
cent legal malpractice rate in 1986, when the national average was
ten percent.261 However, as shown by Appendix B, the Oregon PLF's
frequency rate since 1983 has never been below 8.7 percent. In 1986
the Oregon PLF's rate was actually ten percent. Moreover, if
Oregon's LAP has been so effective, why has that state's annual rate
for malpractice claims steadily increased from 8.7 percent in 1988 to
258. Henry J. Reske, A New Rule 11: Court OKs Procedural Amendments, 79 A.B.A. J. 26
(July 1993).
259. ABA Commission on Impaired Attorneys, An Overview of Lawyer Assistance Programs
in the United States 1 (1991). See also Nancy Blodgett, Cocaine Blues: Lawyers Said to Be
Vulnerable, 72 A.B.A. J. 25, 25 (May 1986) (citing Norman Honeycutt, president of Employee
Support Systems Co., hired by the California State Bar to assist alcohol and drug dependent
lawyers, "40 percent to 60 percent of those lawyers who appear before disciplinary boards have
drug abuse problems").
260. Michelle Goff, The Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund Attorney Assistance
Program, reprinted in Dale A. Masi, ed., Drug Free Workplace 143, 145 (Buraff, 1987) (citing
former Oregon PLF CEO, Lester Rawls).
261. Id. at 148.
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13.2 percent in 1993?262 The Oregon PLF now notes that "between
1985 and 1988, the claim count actually decreased by twenty-seven
percent. We think the 1980's claim surge was due in large part to the
1982 recession."263 Today little credit is given to Oregon's LAP for the
twenty-seven percent decrease in claims.
Lawyers, some say, experience more mental health problems
than the population at large.64 Compared with persons involved in
104 other occupations, lawyers are almost -four times as likely to suf-
fer from depression as the average person.265 Lawyers' stress, alcohol-
ism, and drug use are also higher than the average.266 One major
problem with LAPs is that lawyers are hesitant to report other
lawyers' ethical violations, mental problems, or physical problems. 267
Lawyers need to improve generally their ability to detect and
promptly deal with attorneys who are having dependency and mental
problems.268 Another major problem with LAPs is that, as with any
treatment to cure non-lawyer alcohol, drug, or mental problems, indi-
vidual intervention is not enough, especially when "cured" persons are
sent back to the same malignant situations that created the prob-
lem.26 9
Education, both in law schools and in optional CLE programs,
is another method of reducing legal malpractice that focuses on
changing an individual's knowledge, behavior, and attitude. Although
262. 1993 Oregon PLF at 1 (cited in note 28). See also Appendix B.
263. 1993 Oregon PLF at 4. See also Appendix B. Compare Hall Letter at 2 (cited in note
106) (stating that "[tihere are many factors other than lawyer assistance issues which push
frequency and severity rates up and down.... In any event, we know for certain that our
lawyer assistance efforts have avoided numerous malpractice claims which otherwise would
have arisen").
264. Benjamin, Darling, and Sales, 13 Int'l J. L. & Psych. at 235-36 (cited in note 189).
265. William W. Eaton, et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder,
32 J. Occupational Med. 1079, 1083, 1086 (1990).
266. Benjamin, Darling, and Sales, 13 Int'l J. L. & Psych. at 240-41 (cited in note 189).
267. Michael A. Bloom and Carol Lynn Wallinger, Symposium, Lawyers and Alcoholism: Is
It Time for a New Approach, 61 Temp. L. Rev., 1409, 1428-29 (1988) (noting that the rules to
report fellow drunk lawyers are already in place, but "[wihat is lacking is a major commitment
on the part of the entire bar to effectively self-regulate.... The conspiracy surrounding lawyers
and alcoholism must be broken"). See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes, The
Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 939 (Prentice Hall,
2d ed. 1990) (stating that the enforcement of the duty to report the misconduct of other lawyers
"is virtually non-existent").
268. O'Malley, 20 U. Toledo L. Rev. at 360 (cited in note 211) (arguing that law firms should
require that an attorney certify that she has filed her latest income tax return. The idea is that
a partner will seek help if the problem is such that she would neglect to file a tax return).
269. See David F. Musto and Manuel R. Ramos, Notes on American Medical History: A
Follow-Up Study of the New Haven Morphine Maintenance Clinic of 1920, 304 New Eng. J.
Med. 1071, 1076 (1981) (suggesting that situational factors are more important in explaining the
fate of drug users than is the mere physiological dependency on drugs).
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the ABA mandates that professional responsibility be taught in law
schools,270 some question the effectiveness of the course.2 71  Even
though most state bars now require multiple-choice professional
responsibility examinations, law schools have been severely criticized
for relegating professional responsibility courses to inexperienced
faculty, and for creating an environment in which students merely
learn to memorize the rules and, when in doubt, to take the moral
high ground.272 Only 1.4 percent of the average law school textbook is
devoted to issues of ethics or discipline.273 Most law professors believe
that professional responsibility is not "their" course or that "[t]heir
course is not about [ethics]." 274 Stetson University College of Law is
the only ABA accredited law school that offers a legal malpractice
course.
275
Even if law professors were to integrate professional responsi-
bility and legal malpractice issues into their substantive courses,
there is still doubt whether such an education could alter a law stu-
dent's later behavior in practice.276 Law students who intern in law
firms can quickly learn the wrong lessons regarding ethical
obligations and legal malpractice from their employer attorneys:
"Many students saw a lawyer lie, cheat, or disserve a client,
frequently doing so as if this were 'business as usual' in the legal
profession."277
The growing disillusionment with required professional re-
sponsibility courses at the ABA accredited law schools is just part of a
larger concern that the law schools are not adequately training future
lawyers. Several law schools, such as William and Mary, the
University of Denver, and the University of Montana, have completely
270. ABA Standards For The Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302(A)(iii) (1974).
271. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. Legal Educ. 31, 40 (1992).
272. Id. at 40-41.
273. Id. at 41.
274. Id. at 52.
275. See Braunstein, Law Line Database at 9 (cited in note 2); Hatcher interview (cited in
note 2); Fleishman, Teaching Avoidance at 3.2 (cited in note 2); U. of Denver Registrar interview
(cited in note 2).
276. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Schools Must Teach Legal Ethics, 14 Nat'l L. J. 17, 17
(Oct. 7, 1991) (stating that "there is good evidence that many beginning lawyers are taught by
example to be indifferent to elementary ethical obligations and are tacitly invited to violate
them. Hence, law school training must not only overcome ignorance but must anticipate that
many students soon will be plunged into work settings that are ethically negligent or malignant.
Programs of continuing legal education in professional ethics should proceed on the same
premise").
277. Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law
Students' Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 Georgetown J. Legal
Ethics 537, 575 (1991).
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restructured their first year programs, dropping the traditional
courses, and placing their first year students into "law firms" that
deal with cases and issues, including ethical and malpractice issues,
as they may actually arise in practice. The professors are the
"partners" and the students are the first year "associates." The stu-
dents interview and counsel clients, conduct negotiations, and work
on appellate briefs and pretrial documents as part of their research
and writing.278 Such a dramatic change in the traditional first-year
curriculum is a recognition that something is fundamentally wrong
with the traditional approach to legal education. For instance, the
ABA, after three years of study and public hearings in Los Angeles,
Ann Arbor, Chicago, and Washington concluded in the MacCrate
Report that:
There was also general agreement that law school graduates are not prepared
to practice law without supervision .... There was less consensus, but cer-
tainly a fair amount of support for the proposition that law school graduates
are not adequately prepared for their first jobs in law practice and that the gulf
is widening as the practice of law becomes more complex and the range of
skills more diverse.
279
At a February 1993 ABA House of Delegates, the Illinois State
Bar proposed that the mission statement of law schools, Standard
301(A) of the ABA accreditation standards, be changed by adding the
italicized language: "A law school shall maintain an educational
program that is designed to qualify its graduates for the bar and to
prepare them to participate effectively in the legal profession."28O The
amendment passed in August 1993.281 If legal education is not
currently designed to prepare students for more than entrance to the
bar-that is, not designed to prepare them for practice in the profes-
sion-then something is desperately wrong. The increasing frequency
and severity of legal malpractice claims and lawsuits, and of discipli-
nary complaints, suggest that the ABA accredited law schools cannot
afford to maintain the status quo.282
278. Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. Legal Educ. 57, 69 (1992).
279. ABA, Legal Education and Professional Development Report of the Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap 386 (1992) ("MacCrate Report).
280. Tom Leahy, The Isolation of Legal Education, 81 Ill. B. J. 512, 542 (1993).
281. Id.
282. See Wade Lambert, Margaret A. Jacob, and Junda Woo, Suit Says ABA Accreditation Is
Out of Date, Wall St. J. B1 (Nov. 24, 1993). After the Massachusetts School of Law, whose
faculty consists of mostly adjunct professors, was denied accreditation, it sued the ABA claiming
that the ABA requirements "result in law school tuitions that are 40% to 50% higher than they
would otherwise be; are biased in favor, of programs that teach legal theory at the expense of
such practical skills as drafting contracts or negotiating agreements; and [students] in most law
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Mandatory CLE programs now exist in forty states. 283 Many
state bars established mandatory CLE programs during the 1970s,
ostensibly as a result of "an effort to prevent professional obsoles-
cence" and "assure the continuing competence of professionals. ''284
Mandatory CLE requirements were imposed in response to growing
criticism regarding the competence of the legal profession, Watergate,
and scornful comments by highly placed lawyers such as then-Chief
Justice Warren Burger.285 Proponents of mandatory CLE require-
ments argue that it is better to prevent problems than to rely on a
system of legal malpractice or disciplinary measures. 286 Opponents of
mandatory CLE requirements note that there is no evidence that CLE
programs enhance professional competence.287
In February 1992 California became the thirty-fifth state to
adopt a mandatory CLE program. A year later, seventy-nine percent
of California attorneys who responded to a poll were against manda-
tory CLE and eighty-nine percent of them did not think that the CLE
program would reduce unethical or incompetent lawyering.288
Of the forty states that now have mandatory CLE, twenty-
seven have a legal ethics portion; only one, Arizona, has a mandatory
CLE legal malpractice prevention component, only three have a
substance abuse education requirement, only one has an office
management portion, and only one has an elimination of bias
schools today are being taught by people who don't know the life these students will have and
don't have the skills the students will need." Id. But see, John J. Costonis, The MacCrate
Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. Legal Educ. 157,
189 (1993). Costonis, Dean of the Vanderbilt Law School, notes that law schools are not medical
schools and do not have the financial resources to teach lawyers to actually practice law: "[T]he
American law school produces graduates who require post-law-school seasoning to mature their
competence as lawyers." Id.
283. ABA-CLE at 54-55 (cited in note 3) (listing each state's mandatory continuing legal
education requirements). The eleven jurisdictions without any requirements are Alaska,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, and South Dakota. Id.
284. John S. Roth, Note, Is Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Valid Under the United
States Constitution? Verner Vision and the Rationally Related Competence Connection-A
Fortiori orA Lot of Alliteration?, 11 Whittier L. Rev. 639, 640 (1989).
285. Id. at 641.
286. See Toni M. Massaro and Thomas L. O'Brien, Constitutional Limitations on State-
Imposed Continuing Competency Requirements for Licensed Professionals, 25 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 253,258-59 (1983).
287. Tracy Schroth, Critics Say MCLE May Harm Profession: Cost to Bar, Loss of Billable
Hours Cited, N.J. L. J. 29, 29 (Nov. 5, 1987) (reporting that some argue that MCLE may not and
probably will not increase competency). See also Alan Ogden, Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education: A Study of its Effects, J. Prof. Legal Educ. 3, 3 (June 1985) (stating that there is an
inability to determine a relationship between mandatory CLE and professional competence).
288. Fax Poll, 13 Cal. Law. at 108 (cited in note 183).
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course. 289 Most organized state bars obviously believe that there is no
need for CLE courses on these problems. At least legal ethics has
been recognized as important enough to be included in twenty-seven
states' CLE programs. However, the CLE courses in legal ethics are
probably no better than the professional responsibility courses taken
in law school.290
Although only Arizona has a mandatory legal malpractice pre-
vention program, there are several commercial sponsors of such pro-
grams in other states, including in-house programs sponsored by
large law firms or insurance companies. For instance, when the
Reliance Insurance Company agreed with the California State Bar to
become the officially endorsed carrier of the bar, and to write legal
malpractice insurance for six years, Reliance committed itself to an
ambitious malpractice prevention and loss control program, with
extensive seminars and handbooks on how to avoid malpractice.
Although laudatory, the effectiveness of Reliance's anticipated efforts
has been discounted by legal malpractice experts.291
The legal malpractice prevention experts who run the pro-
grams present basically the same list of "Do's and Don'ts," focusing on
education and on changing the individual's behavior.292 One expert
notes that the "best way for lawyers to minimize the likelihood of
malpractice is to screen clients and cases, and to document the
progress of cases they handle."293  The overwhelming focus of legal
malpractice prevention programs is clearly on the individual
attorney,294 and there is no evidence that these programs are effective.
289. ABA-CLE at 54 (cited in note 3).
290. Rhode, 42 J. Legal Educ. at 40 (cited in note 271).
291. Stone, L.A. Bus. J. at 5 (cited in note 154) (quoting Ronald Mallen, a leading legal
malpractice expert: 'There are only a handful of legal malpractice experts in the country. I
don't know how they are going to increase that number").
292. Ronald E. Mallen, Tips on Minimizing Your Malpractice Exposure, Mich. Law. Wkly. S5
(July 15, 1991). Mallen's Do's and Don'ts are: (1) do not promise a specific outcome; (2) advise
regarding fees; (3) do not ignore the client; (4) do not prejudice the client; (5) do not represent
adverse interests unless disclosed in writing, (6) calendar; (7) obtain a client's prior consent to
associate another attorney; (8) get help if you are out of your field of regular practice; (9) do not
criticize prior lawyers without all the facts; (10) do not reveal that you have malpractice
insurance; and (11) do not defend your own legal malpractice claim. See also Victor R. Levit, 17-
Point Checklist for Malpractice Prevention, Mass. Law. Wkly. 38 (Dec. 21, 1992). Levit,
Mallen's law partner and another legal malpractice expert, adds a few more to Mallen's list:
(12) maintain complete and detailed time records; (13) let the client know of any problems; (14)
confirm all instructions or conversations by letter; and (15) do not talk down to your client.
293. Sandy Goldsmith, By the Letter: Writing Around Potential Malpractice Hazards, 79
A.B.A. J. 103, 103 (July 1993) (quoting Stephen M. Blumberg).
294. Stephen M. Blumberg, Risk Management: Preventing Malpractice Claims, 13 Legal
Econ. 52, 52 (Sept. 1987). Blumberg states:
Many malpractice claims can be avoided by identifying and refusing to work with prob-
lem clients. Experienced practitioners recognize the following characteristics as "red
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C. The Insurance Carriers'Answer: Restricting Coverage
Despite a wealth of experience and analysis of data from
claims, insurance underwriters are still unable to accurately predict,
or even come close to predicting, which lawyers will have claims
brought against them.295 Some insurance carriers are involved in
efforts to improve their insured attorneys' risk through prevention
programs 296 or incentive premium pricing.297 However, given high
defense costs and indemnity payments,298 it appears that most legal
malpractice insurance carriers have focused on limiting coverage or
avoiding involvement with legal malpractice claims.299
flags": The client is changing attorneys in the middle of a case; The case already has
been rejected by one or more firms; The client wants to proceed with the case out of
principle, regardless of cost; The client already has contacted numerous government
representatives; The case has an element of avoidable urgency, such as when a client
with 30 days to respond to a pleading visits the attorney on the 29th day.
Id.
295. Darrell Preston, Lawyers Find Tables Turned in Liability Suits, Dallas Bus. J. 1, 21
(June 20, 1988) (citing Joe Barnard, president of a Dallas-based legal malpractice carrier, who
admits that although his company has been scrutinizing applicants for legal malpractice
insurance for many years, it is difficult to predict who will be sued).
296. Stone, L.A. Bus. J. at 5 (cited in note 154). See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How to Cut
the Cost of Malpractice, Nat'l L. J. 15, 16 (Dec. 17, 1990). Hazard states that "[ilsurers now
have systematic education and training programs, trying to get lawyers to adopt appropriate
preventive measures. Larger firms have a 'compliance' lawyer who's responsiblity is to make
sure that these measures are actually followed." Id. The measures usually employed are: an
adequate conflicts-checking system; an adequate system for handling funds; a written
employment letter with every client; avoiding bad clients; and not representing doctors in
business deals. Id.
297. Anthony E. Davis, Law Practice Management: Preventing Massive Money Claims, N.Y.
L. J. 1, 7 (Nov. 12, 1992) (arguing that insurers should "develop incentive pricing schemes,
designed to accelerate the process towards improved risk and practice management.... [The
insurers can sponsor studies to help determine the optimum forms and structures for effective
risk prevention"). Thus, if a law firm agrees to implement certain techniques such as a conflict
review process, continuous monitoring and review, opinion letter reviews, dealing with problems
and potential claims, appointing an "ethics" partner, and using training programs and policy
manuals, the carrier should charge less in premiums as an incentive. Id.
298. David Z. Webster, Insuring the High Professional Risk Law Firm, 20 Mass. Law Wkly.
923 (Feb. 3, 1992). Specifically, Webster states that "[bjecause malpractice claims are
technically two complex cases (malpractice and the underlying case), defense costs can equal up
to 35 percent of an insurers total cost.... I estimate less than 29 percent of premium dollars
paid by lawyers for malpractice insurance reach injured clients because of the result of the legal
malpractice." Id. at 923. He then gives the following breakdown of the premium dollar:
administrative costs are between 120 and 300; defense costs are between 26o and 35o; the
plaintifis attorney's fees are between 29o and 50o. Id.
299. Galante, Nat'l L. J. at 1 (cited in note 154) (stating "Insurers have increasingly nar-
rowed coverage... insurers are talking about wanting to exclude coverage for defense of claims
involving alleged violations of consumer protection statutes, or organized crime and racketeer-
ing laws [RICO]. [There are] industry-wide trends to attempt to exclude coverage for punitive
damage claims and malicious behavior such as abuse of process.... Other methods ... include
subtracting defense costs from policy limits, recovering damage claims only from lawyers clients
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There is no way around the fact that insurance carriers are in
the business of making money. It is much easier and more economical
to deny claims that are made late00 or that are precluded by a prior
acts exclusion,301 or to enforce "related acts" limits on multiple claims,
than to engage in full-scale prevention programs.30 2 Unfortunately for
most attorneys, the coverage problem is discovered only after the
claim is made. The general trend in the courts has been toward strict
interpretations of contract language and away from extrinsic rules
that might expand coverage.303 Some attorneys would be surprised to
find that activities they consider "lawyering" are not covered by legal
malpractice insurance304 These "gaps" in coverage are not always
addressed by the experts. 30 5
The insurance industry has been badly hit by the savings and
loan scandal. Eight-figure legal malpractice settlements with the
FDIC, RTC, and OTS have become common. 0 6 Insurance commis-
as opposed to third parties such as investors or will beneficiaries and refusing to cover bad faith
sanctions and awards under Rule 11 for vexatious litigation).
300. See, for example, Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d
1348, 270 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781-82 (1990) (holding that policy language limiting coverage to claims
made and reported during policy period does not violate public policy); Hirsch v. Texas Lawyers'
Insurance Exchange, 808 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding carrier's denial of
coverage because of late notice of claim); National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Talcott, 931 F.2d
166, 167 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding denial of coverage where notice was not timely); St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance Co. v. Estate of Hunt, 811 P.2d 432, 435 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
mental incapacity does not excuse timely notice in a "claims made" policy).
301. Sparks v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 100 N.J. 325, 495 A.2d 406 (1985). A prior acts ex-
clusion means that any acts that occur before the beginning of the policy are excluded. Thus,
the Sparks court held the clause unenforceable because the insurance was illusory: the act, the
discovery, and the making of a claim rarely would occur in the first year of the policy. Id. at
414. However, by 1990 courts decided that they could not avoid the clear language of the
insurance contract agreed to by the parties. See, for example, Merrill and Seeley, Inc. v.
Admiral Insurance Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 624, 275 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1990) (denying the
"insured" attorney coverage due to the prior acts exclusion).
302. See, for example, Gregory v. Home Insurance Co., 876 F.2d 602, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the related acts doctrine). When lawyers buy insurance there are two limits, such as
$500,000 for the individual claim and a $1,000,000 policy limit of all aggregate claims within a
given year. However, if two or more claims arise from a "related act," they will be covered by
the single limit and not a separate $500,000 limit. For instance, when the lawyer prepares only
one securities offering, and two investors sue, they have to share the maximum single-occurence
limit of $500,000.
303. Roger Raphael, Pressure Points for Professional Liability; Malpractice Policies Cost
More and Cover Less, The Recorder 8 (Mar. 13, 1992).
304. Lawyering Acts Not Covered By Malpractice Can Surprise, Mich. Law. Wkly. S8 (July
15, 1991) (reporting that "[almong the activities not covered are: conservatorship, guardianship,
serving as a distributee and work as an executor or executrix ... investment advisors... deal
makers').
305. ABA Study Desk Guide at 199-200 (cited in note 91). Conspicuously missing from the
ABA's malpractice insurance checklist of important "key issues to consider" is the standard
exclusion for emotional distress damages. There are thirty-five other items on the exclusion
issue checklist.
306. Hansen, 80 A.B. J. at 28 (cited in note 137).
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sioners in six states are allowing legal malpractice carriers to write
policies that specifically exclude any action or claim made by those
federal regulatory agencies.30 7 Similar efforts are pending in all other
states.0 8 Though the FDIC has fought these exclusionary clauses, the
clauses have been upheld in seven of eighteen cases.30 9 Lawyers who
have represented or continue to represent savings and loans and
banks now face a big insurance "gap."310
The insurance industry has largely given up on education and
prevention programs to reduce the risk of malpractice. Instead, they
write insurance policies that cost more and cover significantly less.
Thus, an insured lawyer, while having peace of mind, often may not
be better off than one who is uninsured.311 Ironically, the growing
number of uninsured lawyers 31 2 may actually be more careful and
prevention-oriented than "insured" lawyers. Nonetheless, if a
mistake is made by an insured lawyer, the aggrieved client has a
higher probability of being compensated.
There is no way to completely prevent legal malpractice. Law
schools try to "weed out" unethical or incompetent students, but do
not teach courses on legal malpractice. State bar boards of examiners
similarly try to eliminate unethical and incompetent law graduates
through arbitrary moral fitness checks and questionable bar examina-
tions. The legal profession attempts to regulate itself through grossly
ineffective and inefficient disciplinary systems that punish lawyers
who turn bad. A few states try to rehabilitate lawyers through LAPs,
but the lawyers are sent back to the same malignant situations that
caused their problems. Forty states now require mandatory CLE,
reportedly to increase the level of competence in the profession, but
the programs are largely ineffective and have only served to create a
profitable bureaucracy and a new "cruising for credits" image
problem.313 But because legal malpractice prevention programs do not
307. Linda Himelstein, Insurers Dodge S & L Claims Against Lawyers; But Regulators,
Eyeing Deep Pockets, Resist Carriers' Tack, Legal Times 1 (April 29, 1991).
308. Id.
309. Himelstein and Newdorf, The Recorder at 1 (cited in note 10).
310. Id. (reporting that Keith Fisher, chair of the ABA task force studying lender liability,
notes that "[t]he kind of cases Filed by the FDIC aren't any different from any other garden-
variety malpractice," but are excluded simply because the plaintiff is a regulatory agency).
311. Andrew S. Hanen and Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Exclusions, Selected
Coverage and Consumer Issues, 33 S. Tex. L. Rev. 75, 78-111 (1992) (identifying the "multitude
of exclusions and other provisions in legal malpractice policies that can negate coverage).
312. See Moss, 73 A.B-A. J. at 84 (cited in note 44) (reporting uninsured lawyer rates of up to
50% in California and 30-35% in most other states).
313. Mark D. Killin, Professor Seeks BAN on Exotic' CLE Seminars, Fla. B. News 22 (May 1,
1993) (reporting that while CLE Committee Chair John Edward Alley cited Florida's CLE "most
profitable year in history, which helps to avoid the specter of dues increases," University of
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work, insurers do everything to avoid expensive claims, leaving
lawyers with only the illusion of coverage. Despite the continued
massive effort at social and behavioral control, and millions of dollars
being spent every year, all available evidence suggests that the status
quo is not working. Legal malpractice claims and lawsuits are
becoming more widespread. The image of the legal profession
continues to fall.
V. LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND MALIGNANT SITUATIONS
Unethical 314 or incompetent 15 lawyers are not necessarily the
source of legal malpractice. The focus too often is on identifying,
eliminating, educating, and rehabilitating only the "bad" lawyers.
However, Ronald E. Mallen, the nation's most recognized "lawyers'
lawyer," notes, "I get to defend some of the finest lawyers in the coun-
try."3 16 Similarly, Lester L. Rawls, the former chief executive officer of
Oregon's PLF, writes: "Of the 1,000 Oregon lawyers who have had
claims made against them, I venture to say that very few of those
lawyers would be considered bad lawyers.... [M]ost are among the
finest lawyers in Oregon, and certainly would rank among the finest
lawyers in the United States."3 7
Legal malpractice prevention should not only focus on the bad
lawyer; it also needs to ask why good lawyers malpractice. Good
lawyers, on occasion, deviate from established social norms and regu-
lations. People in general also deviate from social norms in certain
situations.318 In the fields of philosophy,3 9 sociology,320 psychology,321
Florida law professor David M. Richardson warned against a future headline in the Miami
Herald which would be, "Lawyers Take Deductible Vacation With Aid of the Florida Bar"). See
also Good Terms, Easy Credit: (California State Bar's minimum continuing legal education
program course offerings), 13 Cal. Law. 56 (Sept. 1993) (including. "When Fans Hit The Ship,
For 13 Days in September, the Crystal Harmony cruises the Mediterranean. There's Venice,
Rome, the Greek Islands and James M. Kierspealghgon 'Ethics and Law Office Management',
Seven MCLE credits; $4,425, including airfare" or "It's a Med, Med, Med World, Exchange views
with Superior Court judges at Club Med, Sonora Bay, Mexico, the $1,499 fee includes airfare, all
the amenities of the Club and 5 CLE credits").
314. See Peter Caws, On the Teaching of Ethics in a Pluralistic Society, 8 Hastings Center
Rep. 32, 33-38 (Oct. 1978) (asserting that moral education may affect moral values but not
necessarily moral conduct. One study found that there was no difference in the moral beliefs of
ministers and prison inmates).
315. Cheryl Morrison, Malpractice Suits on Rise; Anyone Can Make a Mistake, Nat'l L. J. 8
(March 28, 1983).
316. Id.
317. Rawls, Nat'l L. J. at 12 (cited in note 38).
318. Patterson and Kim, The Day America Told the Truth at 45, 49 (cited in note 192).
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criminology,32 2  engineering,323 and legal theory,324  and in
literature3 25 and the mass media,326 more attention is being given
319. See generally Daniel McNeill and Paul Freiberger, Fuzzy Logic (Simon & Schuster,
1993). The "fuzzy logic" movement began with philosopher Bertrand Russell. It is a significant
departure from the Aristotelian logic accepted by most Westerners: the all or nothing;, a, or not
a; the idea that one can make sharp distinctions in life; good people, bad people; good lawyers
and bad lawyers. Temperature, distance, beauty, friendliness, greenness, pleasure, all come on
a sliding scale. Such sliding scales often make it impossible to distinguish members of a class
from non-members. Easterners, in the traditions of Buddha revel in the gray areas, see the
world filled with contradictions, and use the world's impreciseness to their advantage.
320. Stuart H. Traub and Craig B. Little, eds., Theories of Deviance xvi (F.E. Peacock, 1975)
(stating- '"The common thread linking all these [sociological] theories [on deviance] is a
movement toward an understanding of deviance as more than the bizarre, idiosyncratic,
pathological behavior of individuals which must be treated and cured like one would a disease...
[One must attempt to] understand deviance in the context of class, status, conflict, and power in
American society").
321. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View 34-35, 188 (Harper &
Row, 1974) (discussing a study in which two-thirds of participants obeyed white robed "scien-
tists" and shocked others despite the pain. The author notes: "Each individual possesses a
conscience.... But when he merges his person into an organizational structure, a new creature
replaces autonomous man, unhindered by the limitations of individual morality, freed of
humane inhibition, mindful only of the sanctions of authority"). See also Bruno Bettelheim,
Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations, 38 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 417, 433-
43 (1943) (discussing World War II concentration camp inmates' changes in behaviors and
attitudes, such as identifying with the aggressor, were attributed to obvious situational factors);
Justin Aron Freed, Conduct and Conscience: The Socialization of Internalized Control Over
Behavior 30-31, 40, 263 (Academic, 1968) (listing various studies showing the strong influence of
situations on human behavior).
322. See Musto and Ramos, 304 New Eng. J. Med. at 1072 (cited in note 269) (discussing
drug addiction as a self-limiting process for two-thirds of addicts). See also Manuel R. Ramos,
The Hippies: Where Are They Now?, in Frank R. Scarpitti and Susan K. Datesman, eds., Drugs
and the Youth Culture 223, 244 (London Sage, 1980) (stating that: "[a]s society continues,
however ineffectively, to deal with the 'drug problem,' one thing is certain: The perseverance of
adolescent deviant behavior, be it drug use, delinquent gangs, burglary rings, or car thefts, to
the extent that it is encouraged and supported by an adolescent peer group, becomes suspect.
When young criminals and youthful deviants do leave the confines and influence of their peer-
oriented, nonconventional world, their baggage-the characteristic deviant and anti-social
attitudes, behaviors and beliefs-are also left behind for the next generation of young criminals
and youthful deviants').
323. See generally McNeill and Freiberger, Fuzzy Logic (cited in note 319). By seizing on
the "fuzzy logic" movement, and not ignoring it like Americans have, the Japanese have incorpo-
rated it in a multimillion dollar industry of "smart" computers, washing machines, cameras,
toasters, and subway systems that do not just turn on/off but automatically adjust to the world's
lack of precision. Engineers fear that the United States' inability to seize on the quasi-logic
movement will place it at a competitive disadvantage.
324. Juan Martinez, Book Review of Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights:
Diary of a Law Professor (Harvard U., 1991), 9 Harv. BlackLetter J. 163, 165-66 (1991) (stating.
"Chaos theory therefore suggests that legal decisions are not arrived at through the application
of doctrine to facts, that doctrine is not determined by standards of judicial review, that such
standards are not determined by normative models, and that such models are not determined by
philosophical conceptions of value. Instead, it suggests that legal decisions are the
manifestations of dynamic §ystems--courts, legislatures, or popular voting-whose processes
are not orderly. 'Law,' in Chaos terms, is both a product and a manifestation of society-a
society that is chaotic, not determined. Williams operates from a similar thesis about the legal
system. . . . 'Most scholarship in law is rather like the 'old math': static, stable, for-
mal-rationalism walled against chaos"'). See also Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the
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to how solutions to problems may not necessarily lie within an
individual and her willpower or logical and analytical abilities, but
instead within the less flattering and less popular3 27 situational
approach to human behavior.
The situational approach to legal malpractice pays more atten-
tion to the nurture portion of the age-old nature/nurture controversy
regarding human behavior. Both individual traits and environmental
factors play a role in human behavior. This nature/nurture debate,
however, is often ignored in the legal malpractice area. The "bad
apples" approach looks for diseased, malignant, or bad individuals,
and either tries to cure them or cut them out of the profession.
Instead, the situational approach to legal malpractice looks for the
diseased, malignant, or bad situations (environmental, bureaucratic,
or societal), and attempts to determine how changing those bad
situations may facilitate the desired individual behavior.
The "Christian-romantic" view of the self, the traditional view
of moral behavior, is the more flattering one: We are in charge, we
confront a temptation and use our virtue and willpower to make the
right choice.328 Not surprisingly, the situationalist perspective has
found very few adherents among Western lawyers.329 A few legal
Justice Paradox, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 329, 348-50 (1993) (stating- "Chaos theory tells us to
accept the contradictions, the disorder, in our legal system. All systems, including the legal
system, are unpredictable and erratic.... Chaos in law describes human life").
325. D.J. Taylor, Getting Inside the Outsider; Franz Kafka, London Sunday Times, Culture
Magazine 9 (June 20, 1993) (citing J.G. Ballards, who notes that '"Kafka may be the most
important writer of the 20th century ... [hie describes the fate of the isolated man who is sur-
rounded by a vast and impenetrable bureaucracy, and begins to accept himself on the terms the
bureaucracy imposes on him. Human beings today are in a very similar position. We are
surrounded by huge institutions we can never penetrate: the City, the banking system, political
and advertising conglomerates . . . they're rather subtle, subservient tyrannies, but no less
sinister for that").
326. The Last Laugh, Parade Magazine 5 (July 18, 1993) (quoting Jay Leno of the popular
NBC television program The Tonight Show as saying he re-reads Charles Dickens "A Christmas
Carol" at least once a year "[b]ecause it's sort ofthe first book where what happens to people is a
product of their society .... Dickens showed that people's fate grew out of their [social]
circumstances, and they couldn't get out by themselves. We try to lead a good life. But it's that
knowledge of our weakness that gives us compassion").
327. See Maria D. Vesperi, Exploring the 'Universe of the Undiscussed,' St. Petersburg Times
7D (Aug. 22, 1993). The concept of "the universe of the undiscussed" was introduced by social
theororist Pierre Bourdieu. It means that there are thoughts and ideas that people simply will
not entertain. Such avoidance is usually a clue to a deeper social problem. Whether it is the
focus of the war on drugs on drug dealers as opposed to poverty, or the war on tuberculosis as
opposed to poverty, the idea of working to end poverty is considered "off topic" and beyond the
scope of either drug or tuberculosis control. Many professionals are aware of the real situation
but quickly learn that professionalism "means remaining silent on the issues that are most
embarrassing (for whites) and speaking softly on issues which are unavoidable." Id.
328. Roberto M. Unger, Passion, An Essay on Personality 24 (MacMillan, 1984).
329. Larry Richard, The Lawyer Types, 79 A.B.A. J. 74, 77 (July 1993) (noting that law
attracts relatively few sensor-feeler [SF] personality types because the 'meat and potatoes' law
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scholars have embraced it, 33° but law students, lawyers, bar leaders,
law professors, judges, and legislators are likely to resist the situa-
tionalist perspective for a variety of reasons. One of the most impor-
tant may be that "it diminishes the role of law in behavior and hence
the authority of legal reasoning." 1r
Individuals, even rational lawyers, will concede that they be-
have differently and exhibit different attitudes depending on the
situation. A lawyer may be one person to his law firm partners, an-
other to the firm's associates, another to the judge, another to his
practice involves analytical thinking about broad legal principles, the domain of the intui-
tive/thinker [IT], personalty type. The individual with an SF preference enjoys mastering facts
and details in the service of helping individuals. SF's may find their niche in estate planning,
pension and ERISA advising, or education of law. However, IT personality types are found in
90% of all the lawyers). See also Raymond B. Marcin, Psychological Type Theory in the Legal
Profession, 24 U. Toledo L. Rev. 103, 118-119 (1992) (criticizing and exploring why SF types
never become lawyers or leave the profession: "What will the law and the legal system lose in
the way of feeling and people-oriented values [if SF types are not lawyers]?... [There is the
persistent intrusion into jurisprudence of the phenomenon of 'equity,' a conceptual system that
does seem to be guided by a responsible attention to intuitions, feelings and values. When those
[Sensor/Feeler] personality types .. . are subtly steered away from the law, the effect on the
profession and on the legal system itself is not difficult to surmise.... Law professors have, for
generations, routinely advised beginning law students that their task is to learn to 'think like a
lawyer' . . . stress[ing] attention to facts, rules and logic [and creating an] atmosphere that
motivates [Sensor/Feeler] types to have second thoughts...2).
330. Rhode, 42 J. Legal Educ. at 42 (cited in note 271) (arguing that a well constructed
course in law school should "focus on the structural conditions underlying moral dilemmas. So,
for example, in addressing issues such as abuse of discovery procedures, it is useful to consider
not only codified rules and case law but also the incentives arising from hourly billing practices,
law firm promotion pressures, under-financed disciplinary systems, and over-burdened judici-
aries"). See also Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into
Lawyers'Responsibility for Clients'Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75, 118 (1993) (stating that conclu-
sions "based on pervasive situationalism, will never be broadly embraced, no matter how well
they are established empirically.... In judging others, we look for dispositional flaws that
explain why things went wrong, rather than acknowledging the complex presence of situational
factors that make the action more ambiguous.... [L]awyers [are not] likely to take a strong
situationist perspective. From the first day of law school, the legal profession celebrates
hyperrationality, and so will hardly endorse a widespread characterization of attorney behavior
in which ego-driven thought processes interfere with mindful scrutiny of the available facts and
circumstances. That characterization is too threatening to the profession's self-esteem"); David
Luban, Alan Strudler, and David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 2348, 2391-92 (1992) (stating: "Our argument, however, has been that discrete
and bounded episodes of moral challenge arise in a moral world far different from that of
bureaucratic organizations in which modern men and women lead their lives. . .. The
organizational setting changes the contours of moral challenge and thus of moral virtue....
The institutionalization of everyday life may demand fewer of the virtues of a soldier or saint
and more of the virtues of a detective, a scientist, or a trial lawyer aiming to reconstruct shards
of evidence into a coherent theory'); Hazard, 14 Nat'l L. J. at 17 (cited in note 276) (arguing that
"law school training [and continuing legal education] must not only overcome ignorance but
must anticipate that many students soon will be plunged into work settings that are ethically
negligent or malignant"). Professors Rhode, Langevoort, Luban, and Hazard, of Stanford,
Vanderbilt, Maryland, and Yale, respectively, have published other works that bring in the
situationalist perspective.
331. Langevoort, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 118 n.171.
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adversary, another to a spouse, another to his mother, and then an-
other to his children. Who the real person may be is not as important
as recognizing that the lawyer is different in each situation. The
situation, not necessarily the individual, is evoking the appropriate
behavior.
The few empirical studies that have been done on lawyers'
conduct show how important situational factors can be. Based on
over one hundred interviews, sociologist Jerome E. Carlin's study of
Chicago's solo practitioners in 1957 shows how little some aspects of
the practice of law have changed. In his study Carlin noted that solo
practitioners, accounting for over half of the lawyers in Chicago, were
"generally at the bottom of the status ladder . . . at the margin of
[their] profession, enjoying little freedom in choice of clients, type of
work, or conditions of practice. ''3 2 Moreover:
[B]ecause of the residual character of his practice, the individual [solo] lawyer
generally finds it difficult if not, in some instances, impossible to conform to
the ethical standards of practice. In his efforts to obtain business, and in his
dealings with clients and various public officials, he is frequently exposed to
pressures to engage in practices contrary to the official norms.33
In his second study, of the New York City bar, performed in
1960 and based on a sample of 800 lawyers, Carlin also found
"nothing to suggest that what I found to be true about individual law-
yers in Chicago is unique to Chicago."' 4 Carlin noted that:
['The practicing lawyer is constantly confronted with contending interests and
conflicting loyalties. He may not only find himself in situations where his own
interests run counter to those of his clients, but where service to clients may be
inconsistent with his responsibilities as [an] officer of the law. A critical
research task, therefore, is to explore the conditions supporting and impairing
the lawyer's capacity to carry out his ethical obligations.335
Carlin identified the following situational factors that serve as
threats to the lawyer's integrity: the highly competitive market for
legal services,336 lawyers becoming captive to their clients (or their
clients' money) and finding it extremely difficult to exercise independ-
332. Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own 206 (Rutgers U., 1962).
333. Id. at 209.
334. Id. at ix.
335. Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers'Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar 4 (Russell Sage
Found., 1966).
336. Id. at 7.
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ent judgment or authority, 37 and weak bureaucratic courts and gov-
ernmental agencies.338
In addition to Carlin's work on urban lawyers, studies on
small-city,33 9 rural,34° and in-house lawyers 341 also conclude that
unethical and errant behavior increasingly depends on situational
factors such as the degree of exposure to temptations, work-place
demands, and attitudes of clients and peers. For instance, Joel F.
Handler, using the same questionnaire used by Carlin, found that:
The same factors that were related to ethical behavior of Prairie City [a mid-
sized city of 90,000] lawyers were also related to the ethical behavior of the
New York City lawyers. In other words, when the lawyers in Prairie City were
faced with pressures similar to those faced by the New York City lawyers, they
tended to respond in the same way.
34 2
Country lawyers, according to Donald Landon, were far from
zealous advocates for their clients: "Excessive zeal becomes deviance.
Thus, while the rural lawyer's conduct may be informed by the profes-
sional code, it is ultimately shaped by the day-to-day necessities
implicit within the containing community. ''343
Contrasting Landon's findings on country lawyers to his and
Edward Laumann's study on Chicago lawyers, 344 John Heinz noted
that "we argued that the social structure of the Chicago bar was
'client driven,' Landon finds that the country lawyers are 'community
driven.' What the two bars have in common is that neither is 'lawyer
driven.' Both respond to social forces that are external to the profes-
sion, and neither appears to be greatly governed by professional
norms."345
After studying corporate managers and in-house lawyers,
Robert Jackall also found that "independent morally evaluative judg-
ments get subordinated to the social intricacies of the bureaucratic
337. Id. at 8.
338. Id.
339. Joel F. Handler, The Lawyer and His Community: The Practicing Bar In A Middle-
Sized City 155 (U. of Wis., 1967).
340. See generally Donald D. Landon, Country Lawyers: The Impact of Context on
Professional Practice (Praeger, 1990).
341. Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers 105, 122-23 (Oxford U.,
1988); Telephone interview with Professor Robert Jackall, Williams College (Nov. 1, 1994)
(confirming that his study included lawyers who are managers and managers who are lawyers).
342. Handler, The Lawyer and His Community at 155 (cited in note 339).
343. Landon, Country Lawyers at 145 (cited in note 340).
344. John P. Heinz and Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the
Bar (Russell Sage Found., 1982).
345. Landon, Country Lawyers at xiv (cited in note 340) (Foreword by John P. Heinz).
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workplace. Notions of morality that one might hold and indeed prac-
tice outside the workplace... become irrelevant .... "3 6
The solo practitioner, the lawyer in a small firm, and even the
big firm lawyer cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. As noted in a study
of criminal lawyers by Abraham S. Blumberg, done almost thirty
years ago, individual solo practitioners are part of a greater situ-
ation-society itself and a judicial system, a bureaucracy of enormous
proportions where the clients' interests often give way to the lawyers'
need to conform or to develop good relations with other clients, oppos-
ing counsel, judges, prosecutors, probation officers, the police, regula-
tory agencies, insurance companies, and the organized bar.37
Thus, even though a solo practitioner may not be technically or
legally associated with a group of other lawyers, situationally she is
part of a bigger organization: society and the judicial system. 4 8 The
studies of lawyers by Carlin, Handler, and Blumberg were done prior
to 1970, when legal malpractice claims and lawsuits started to rise
exponentially. 9 Society, and the practice of law, have changed since
1970, significantly exacerbating the malignant situations described by
Carlin, Handler, and Blumberg.
A situationalist analysis of legal malpractice must first include
the larger situation or social environment: the society in which the
individual lawyers, their families, their friends, and their colleagues
live.= And, as noted in Part III, lawyers may only be as cold, unethi-
cal, or greedy as other Americans.351 There may even exist in America
346. Jackall, Moral Mazes at 105 (cited in note 341); Jackall interview (cited in note 341).
347. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 Law and Society Rev. 15, 20-21 (June 1967) (reporting a study of
criminal lawyers which showed that the lawyers routinely sacrificed their clients' interests in
order to remain part of a system or bureaucracy).
348. See generally Richard T. DeGeorge, The Status of Business Ethics: Past and Future, 6
J. Bus. Ethics 201 (1987) (arguing that before promoting ethics, beyond socialization, such as
law firm ethics committees, or sensitization, such as continuing legal education courses on
ethics, there is a need to understand the extent to which the actual structures of practice affect
the ability of the individual to comply with ethical norms).
349. Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 1.6 at 17-19 (cited in note 11).
350. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Doing the Right Thing, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. 691, 694, 701
(1992) (stating that "[ilt is the ethics of such real-world people that should be compared with the
ethics of a real world lawyer.... A parent will protect and lie for a child.... An employer will
defend an employee.... Fellow employees cover for each other... Trying to do the right
thing, when it is impossible to do so without conflicts in values, is one of society's dirty jobs.
However, no one is compelled to become a lawyer, and many who have originally chosen the
profession find it repugnant and leave").
351. Patterson and Kim, The Day America Told the Truth at 239 (cited in note 192).
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a culture of litigations2 and a legal system that at times appears fo-
cused on greed and vindictiveness rather than justice.353
The rate of civil litigation, however, has increased faster than
the population only in the areas of divorce, prisoners' and
discrimination lawsuits, and, during the early 1980s, in lawsuits
against the Social Security Administration by recipients denied
benefits by the Reagan administration.3" Product liability lawsuits,
which increased in number in the early 1980s, have actually fallen in
the past five years. 55 California's civil lawsuits have declined despite
dramatic population gains.356 Thus, the increase in the frequency and
seriousness of legal malpractice is not merely a result of more litiga-
tion in general.
If a culture of litigation does exist, the legal profession and
individual lawyers should be reaping the benefits and lawyers should
be in a financial and psychological state of well-being. However, there
are too many lawyers serving too few people, and only large
corporations are able to pay the high attorneys' fees. As noted by
Attorney General Janet Reno, eighty percent of the poor and working
poor "don't have access to legal services .... ,,357 The competition for
352. Peter Carlson, Legal Damages, Wash. Post Sunday Mag. § W, at 11 (March 15, 1992)
(stating that the culture of litigation "has skewed the American psyche, tilting it away from
taking responsibility for one's misfortune (or cursing the fates) and toward blaming it all on
somebody else, preferably somebody with deep pockets or good insurance coverage. A shift from
'c'est la vie' to 'Sue the bastards!' ... The culture of litigation produces the fear of litigation,
which causes people to hire lawyers for defense purposes, which causes a greater demand for
lawyers, which produces more lawyers, who produce more lawsuits, which cause more fear of
lawsuits, which causes a greater demand for lawyers, which produces more lawyers, who
produce more...").
353. Bruce Vielmetti, We May Not Like Lawyers, But We Use Them, St. Petersburg Times
Bus. Mag. 9 (Aug. 9, 1993) (reporting that, in response to the National Law Journal/West
Publishing Company poll [see NLJ/West Poll, cited in note 162] and the recent "lawyer bash-
ing," Patricia Seitz, Florida's state bar president, said "[tihe legal system is also driven by the
greed and vindictiveness of some in society, by people's willingness to sue rather than settle, to
demand rights rather than exercise responsibility, and to win at all costs rather than obtain
justice. Maybe it's time for lawyers to take an insightful look at prospective clients and their
causes... and not take the case or the money-a decision weighted by the lawyer's responsibil-
ity to the courts, the profession and the entire justice system').
354. See Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; Or, the Federal Courts Since the
Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 921, 925.
355. Marc Galanter and Charles R. Epp, A Beginner's Guide to the Litigation Maze, Bus.
Econ. 33, 35-38 (Oct. 1992) (noting that "[t]he available evidence... suggests a more benign
reading of our current [litigation] situation).
356. Dorgan, San Jose Mercury News at Al (cited in note 51) (reporting that in fiscal 1987
California, had 137,458 tort lawsuits filed in Superior Court. In 1991, there were only 117,088
tort lawsuits filed in California's Superior Courts).
357. Steve Marshall, Poor Legal Services, USA Today A3 (Aug. 2, 1993).
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high-paying clients is stiff, and usually lawyers are willing to take in
more business than they can handle competently.358
A. The Nature of Law Practice
Whether there exists a culture of litigation, a culture of greed,
or too many lawyers in too few places, lawyers often pile on too much
work and bill too many hours in order to make more money. Over
half of the lawyers in one survey report billing at least 2,400 hours a
year.359 Too much work may be one significant situational factor that
leads to a greater incidence of malpractice. In a study by the ABA
Young Lawyers Division, lawyers complained of intolerable daily
stress, work overload, time pressures, poor interpersonal
relationships at work, inadequate support, and too much
competition.36° As many as fifty-five percent of the men and sixty-one
percent of the women said they had no time for themselves or their
families.361 Ronald L. Hirsch, who directed the 1990 survey states:
The profession has lost its roots . . . the data reflect ... the concern of many
that the increases in hours worked and the resulting decrease in personal time
have become a major problem [and] that the legal profession has in recent
years become a less pleasant place to work.3 6 2
Up to one-third of lawyers in another survey doubted whether
they would remain in the profession.363 There are currently 40,000
lawyers leaving the profession every year.364
Whether we speak of attorneys working in large firms or solo
practitioners, there may be a disproportionate number of attorneys
suffering from either depression, alcohol or drug use, or who are
358. Kahler, Oregonian at R13 (cited in note 176) (reporting that Chris Coley, president of a
group of 25 lawyer-owned legal malpractice insurance companies believes that malpractice
claims have increased because lawyers, facing a more competive economic environment, are
taking on too many cases). See also Research For Marketing, 1989 Survey at 17 (cited in note
39) (reporting that 69% of the Oregon lawyers stated they had either all the practice they could
handle [42%] or more than they could handle [27%]).
359. Holt, 79 A.B.A. J. at 64 (cited in note 188).
360. ABA State of the Legal Profession at 24 (cited in note 185).
361. Id.
362. Rohrlich, LA Times at A5 (cited in note 190).
363. Survey Reveals Disturbing Truth: Lawyers Unhappy With Profession, Bar Leader 22,
22-23 (March/April 1989) (reporting that a study of 270 Maryland lawyers cited the reasons for
dissatisfaction as the negative public image, high costs, case overloads, no time for personal life,
and excessive business orientation of law firms). See also Rosalind Resnick, Too Many Lawyers,
Florida Bar Members Say, Miami Herald Bus. Mag. 15 (Aug. 2, 1993) (reporting that a survey of
Florida lawyers found that 13% plan to leave the profession).
364. David Margolick, Alienated Lawyers Seeking--and Getting-Counsel in Making the
Transition to Other Careers, N.Y. Times B7 (Feb. 10, 1989).
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merely dissatisfied with their careers or their lives36 5 The rate of
alcoholism and depression among lawyers is two to three times the
national average.6 6 Sharee Swetin, the staff director of the ABA's
Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability, believes that "a high
percentage of legal malpractice problems are caused by . . . alcohol,
chemical dependency and stress. [But] we don't have any statis-
tics. '367 Some research, however, has noted that hard work alone does
not account for the negative symptoms found among practicing law-
yers. For instance, it has been found that law professors work as
hard as practicing lawyers, but do not exhibit the same symptoms of
"burn out. ' 368
If it is not simply overwork, why do so many lawyers '%urn
out," increasing their exposure to legal malpractice? Amiram Elwork
and G. Andrew H. Benjamin, in a forthcoming article, "Lawyers in
Distress,"3 69 acknowledge the lack of hard empirical evidence, but
make three hypotheses: (1) the adversary legal system itself encour-
ages suspiciousness, hostility, aggression, and cynicism-traits that
researchers have confirmed as being more prevalent among law-
yers;3 70 (2) there is an emphasis on detail-oriented rational analysis,
and a strong preference for "logical" thinking as opposed to value
laden "feeling-helping behavior;' 371 (3) there exists role conflict and
ambiguity, whether one is an officer of the court, an advocate, or a
365. Just One For the Road, 13 Cal. Law. 17 (July 1993) (reporting that "[a] new study
shows that one-third of the nation's attorneys suffer from either depression, alcohol or drug use.
And 60% of California lawyers who are sued for malpractice have a related mental health or
substance abuse problem").
366. Eaton, et al., 32 J. Occupational Med. at 1081 (cited in note 265). The reasons given
are: the sputtering economy; making less money; increased competition; the pressure of billable
hours and bringing in new clients; making the practice of law seem solely a business; forcing
many lawyers into becoming salesmen (something many lawyers are uncomfortable with);
working longer hours, with less time for families; the drudgery of legal work; dashed expecta-
tions of becoming an "equity" partner; greater depersonalization of the legal profession; the
waning of congeniality; mounting paper work; and the growing threat of legal malpractice
claims. See Jack Z. Smith, Able Attorneys Pressured Out of Profession, St. Paul Pioneer Press
Dispatch 6D (March 2, 1992).
367. Rohrlich, L.A. Times at A5 (cited in note 190).
368. Brian S. Gould, Beyond Burnout: You Can Withstand the Heat of Ambition, 10
Barrister 4, 4-6 (Summer 1983).
369. Amiram Elwork and G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Lawyers in Distress (forthcoming, copy on
file with the Author).
370. G. Andrew H. Benjamin, et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological
Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 225, 246. See also
Richard Francis, et al., Lawyers' Alcoholism, 4 Advances in Alcohol and Substance Abuse 59
(Winter 1984) (discussing a study of twelve alcoholic lawyers).
371. Debra Cassens Moss, Lawyer Personality: Logical Problem Solvers Happiest,
Consultant Claims, 77 A.B.A. J. 34, 34 (Feb. 1991). See also Richard, 79 A.BA J. at 77 (cited in
note 329) (applying the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator to a sample of lawyers); Marcin, 24 U.
Toledo L. Rev. at 118-19 (cited in note 329) (discussing psychological type theory).
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counselor, whether one is forced to hurt people or help them, and
whether one's job is prestigious or ridiculed by the public. 372
B. The Solo Practitioner and Small Firm Lawyers
Some believe that legal malpractice is more prevalent among
lawyers in solo practice or small firms.37 3 However, as seen in Part II,
we do not know whether there are disproportionately more legal
malpractice claims and lawsuits among this group of lawyers.374
Those contending that solo practitioners and small-firm law-
yers commit a disproportionate amount of malpractice give certain
reasons to explain the phenomenon. For example, the quality of cer-
tain "non-repeating" business, such as writing a will, handling a di-
vorce, defending a misdemeanor, or helping a client buy a house-this
type of work, "combined with the small fees encourages a mass proc-
essing of cases" which inevitably leads to lower quality375 As noted by
another scholar:
[Ilt is not far wrong to say that lawyers for big corporations are the only
practitioners regularly afforded latitude to give their technical best to the
problems they work on. The rest of the bar ordinarily has to slop through with
quickie work or, as one lawyer put it, make good guesses as to the level of
malpractice at which they should operate at in any given situation.3 76
In an American Bar Foundation study of trial attorneys, more
than one-third believed that economic considerations affected the
amount of time spent on a case, and that excessive case loads created
less time to adequately prepare the cases for trial.3 77 Many lawyers
who take on a matter for a friend, or take work on a "loss leader"
basis, quickly realize that a good deed never goes unpunished. A "no
372. American Bar Association, The Report of At the Breaking Point: A National Conference
on the Emerging Crisis in the Quality of Lawyers' Health and Lives-Its Impact on Law Firms
and Client Services 12-13 (Airlie House, 1991). See also Benjamin, Darling, and Sales, 13 Int'l
J. L. & Psych. at 240-41 (cited in note 189) (discussing stress and alcohol and drug use among
lawyers); Sam Benson, Why I Quit Practicing Law, Newsweek 10 (Nov. 4, 1991) (discussing the
difficulties with the adversarial system).
373. Robin, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. at 1102-04 (cited in note 98).
374. Gates, 37 Mercer L. Rev. at 566 (cited in note 101).
375. Jerome E. Carlin and Jan Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 UCLA L.
Rev. 381, 385 (1965).
376. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law 152-53 (Yale U., 1978).
377. Dorothy Linder Maddi, Improving Trial Advocacy: The Views of Trial Attorneys, 1981
Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 1049, 1068.
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fee" or "low fee" situation increases the chances of not doing a
competent job. 78
Many lawyers in solo or small firm practice-those who make
up the majority of lawyers--could avoid malpractice by merely creat-
ing a situation that allows for more time spent on each client and
each case. However, it is unlikely that such situations can be created
if one's paramount goal is the maximization of profit. Many small-
firm lawyers do not have the luxury of well-heeled clients that the
large law firms enjoy, and therefore face the situational determinant
of having to take on too much work in an effort to increase income and
prestige. If the high stress, overwork situation of the majority of
lawyers does not change, neither will the high incidence of malprac-
tice.
C. The Big Law Firms
Perhaps it is easier to accept the situationalist perspective
when looking at big law firms. One scholar notes: 'To say that the
bulk of unethical conduct in law firms has organizational rather than
individual roots may exaggerate the case. Yet, it would be foolhardy
to suppose, especially for the larger firms, that bureaucratic failings
and collective decisions do not play a significant causal role. 3 79
Although lawyers who work in large firms are still in the mi-
nority, an increasing percentage of today's legal work is done by large
firms. In the 1940s only a handful of law firms had over seventy law-
yers. Today there are over 250 law firms with more than 125 lawyers,
and 60 law firms with more than 300 lawyers.380
Partners in big firms have a tremendous incentive to overwork
associates. Each additional associate hour billed after meeting the
overhead is pure profit for the partners, who are all too eager to base
yearly bonuses and promotions on hours billed over "minimums" of
378. Gerald P. Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning and General Practice, 17
Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 521, 528-30 (1987). Professor Johnston, a former practitioner, argues that
the "loss leader" approach does not provide sufficient incentive for most practitioners to take the
time and effort necessary to do a thorough, competent job of estate planning and that this
situation should be avoided by charging by the hour for routine matters and not taking work
outside of one's competence. However, there is a tendency at least among general practitioners
not to refer estate planning work to others, perhaps due to a concern that the attorney to whom
work is referred will, in the future, be asked to undertake work for the client in areas where the
referring attorney previously had rendered services. Id. at 530.
379. Schneyer, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 20 (cited in note 247).
380. Roger C. Cramton, The Changing Legal Profession, in Timothy W. Floyd and W. Frank
Newton, eds., The Lawyer as a Professional 29, 35 (Texas Center for Legal Ethics and
Professionalism, 1991).
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1,800 to 2,000 hours. Average billable hours have grown, and the
trend is to hire fewer lawyers to do more work.381 In a recent ABA
poll, fifty percent of the 3200 lawyers surveyed reported annual billa-
ble hours of 2400 or more, sometimes as high as 2500 to 2700.382 The
pressure to bill hours is reflected in the monthly reports of associates'
billable hours published by some law firms. Salary and partner
status depend on the number of hours billed.38 3 Partners or senior
associates do not supervise the younger associates, because clients
will not pay for it, and because such supervisors will themselves fall
short of billable hours requirements for bonuses or promotions. Pro
bono and bar activities are not favored by big firm lawyers, because
they do not result in billable hours.38
Rewarding high billable hours in a law firm, to the extent that
the attorney is able to be thorough with a "deep pocket" client's work,
should actually reduce the frequency of the malpractice claims. The
lawyer has the luxury of being thorough, "looking under every rock,"
and even billing for what could only be seen as malpractice preven-
tion. Moreover, institutional clients serve to remind the lawyer of the
potential for future business, which further inspires quality work.3 5
However, sophisticated institutional clients are refusing to pay for
legal malpractice prevention, and are more willing to switch law firms
or go in-house to reduce fees.cs6
381. Holt, 79 A.B.A. J. at 64 (cited in note 188).
382. Id.
383. Paul Marcotte, Hours Way Up: 2,500 Now Magic Number, 74 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (Dec.
1988) (reporting that lawyers in the most demanding firms average 2500 billable hours, up from
2210 in 1982).
384. O7ialley, 20 U. Toledo L. Rev. at 361 (cited in note 211). O'Malley, head of the ALAS
prevention program, notes that:
[s]some firms' compensation formulas overemphasize client-getting and client billings,
and deal unfairly with partners who are in the trenches doing first-class legal work for
clients brought in by rainmakers. Occasionally, individual and institutional greed
aggravates the situation. The bottom-line mentality takes over. This type of atmo-
sphere has an adverse effect on the quality of the clients and the work. In some cases
this atmosphere threatens the stability of the firm, and in some well-publicized recent
cases has destroyed the firm.
Id.
385. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 375,
392-93 (1990).
386. Don J. DeBenedictis, Growing Pains, 79 A.B.A. J. 52 (March 1993) (citing a 1992 Price
Waterhouse survey of 140 Fortune 500 companies which showed that the median amount of
$9.8 million in fees paid to outside counsel in 1990 dropped 24% to $7.4 million in 1991). See
also Lawyer Glut, 13 Cal. Law. 19 (May 1993) (discussing Chevron Corporation's ability to
reduce its outside legal fees annual budget by $10 million from its prior $60-$75 million by
"developing billing guidelines, seeking out inexpensive small law firms and finagling rate
discounts" from existing big law firms).
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The frequency of malpractice claims by clients is often not as
significant a statistic for large law firms as is the severity of claims by
third parties, such as investors and regulatory agencies. 387 A first-
class job for the client may not head off the legal malpractice claim
from a noncient 38 For instance, as of October 31, 1993, the RTC had
received $202 million in settlements from thirty-one large law firms
stemming from the failure of only twenty-two savings and loans.389 As
noted in Part II above, ALAS-insured law firms' average settlement
amount for a securities' claim was $5,688,888.390 As shown in Appen-
dix C-3, one ALAS-insured law firm's $75 million settlement 391 was
more than was paid to settle all reported Florida legal malpractice
lawsuits between 1981 and 1993. Thus, legal malpractice is, in at
least one sense, worse in the big law firms.
Perhaps the problem with big law firms is that no one person
is in control. Even though a particular law firm's culture can be char-
acterized as "friendly mania," "sweat shop," or "clubby,''392 a firm is
still a bureaucratic culture where young lawyers look for unwritten
mores and try to emulate the successes of senior partners. The
messages that are conveyed by the "power partners" to the rest of the
firm regarding case handling, client relations, and ethical and mal-
practice concerns cannot be over-emphasized. 393 In many cases, prof-
its are high priority; ethics are a luxury that only academics can af-
ford.
The costs of running the large law firms have increased dra-
matically.394 During recessionary times, when work slows down,
lawyers can either churn the files and pad the bills or put their jobs at
risk and reduce their chances of partnership. 395 A recent study of
large law firm lawyers found pervasive deception in client billing.396
The scholar noted:
337. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6) (citing ALAS' one percent annual claims rate).
388. O'Malley, 20 U. Toledo L. Rev. at 328 (cited in note 211).
389. Hansen, 80 A.B.A. J. at 28 (cited in note 137).
390. See Appendix D.
391. Reske, 79 A.B. J. at 16 (cited in note 141).
392. Barbara Buchholz, Melting Pots: Redefining Law Firm Cultures in Changing Times, 79
A.BA J. 62, 63 (March 1993).
393. Michael G. Trachtman, Malpractice Avoidance and Professional Responsibility, in PLI,
440 Commercial Law and Practice: Course Handbook Series 371, 378 (Practising Law Institute,
1987).
394. Rosenberg, Wash. Post at C3 (cited in note 175).
395. Steven Brill, The End of Up-Or-Out, Am. Law. 3 (Dec. 1988).
396. Lerman, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 665 (cited in note 12).
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The legal profession is becoming increasingly competitive and intense. This
makes it more difficult for lawyers to be honest. . . They must work
outrageous hours [and] face intense pressures to bring in business ...
[Elarning money is valued above all else.... The structure of the work in
large firms places large finns on an institutional collision course with many
humanistic values such as truthfulness and altruism.3 97
The largest and most prestigious law firms in the country,
with the top lawyers from the top law schools, became so embroiled in
the savings and loan scandal that they were forced to pay the largest ever
legal malpractice settlement awards. 398 The lawyers involved in
thisscandal were not necessarily bad, venal, or stupid.399 The confus-
ing and contradictory legal and ethical rules regarding the reporting
of a client's fraud perhaps encouraged the lawyers to rationalize their
continued involvement. 4°° However, more importantly, research in
social psychology shows that "there are reasons . . . to doubt that
lawyers will be very good gatekeepers once they have committed to
representation and built a positive [social psychological] schema re-
garding the client and the situation."4°1
The situational perspective is particularly helpful in showing
how, in big law firms, legal malpractice is as much a product of the
nature of the practice, where profit is king, as of any trait of the indi-
397. Id. at 759.
398. Hansen, 80 A.B.A. J. at 28 (cited in note 137), provides the following chart:
TOP FIVE SETI'LEMENTS BETWEEN LAW FIRMS AND
THE RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. (through Oct. 31,1993)*
DATE FIRM AMOUNT
April 1993 Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue $51 Million"
September 1993 Paul, Weiss, Rilkind, Wharton & $45 Million
Garrison
March 1992 Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler $41 Million
February 1993 Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & $20 Million
Ashmore
February 1992 Richard Swandon; Dorsey & Whitney, $8.75 Million
And Other Nonlawyer Defendants
*Does not include separate settlements between law firms and the Office of Thrift
Supervision. Source: Resolution Trust Corp.
**Another $24 Million was paid directly to the investors. See Reske, 79 A.B. J. at 16
(cited in note 141).
399. Langevoort, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 114 (cited in note 330).
400. Id. See also O'Malley, 20 U. Toledo L. Rev. at 354-55 (cited in note 211) (criticizing the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as incomprehensible and contradictory in their effort
to address the client fraud issue).
401. Langevoort, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 117. Langevoort also notes that "[i]n all likelihood,
individual lawyers will never be resistant to commitment-generated biases unless and until they
see their relationship with a client as something different from a commitment. Given the ABA's
celebration of loyalty and commitment, it may be impossible to generate more perceptive, as
opposed to more ethical, lawyers." Id. at 114 n.156.
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vidual lawyers. All the situational factors suggest that lawyers in
large law firms should have the luxury of being thorough and avoiding
malpractice, but the requirement of higher billable hours, and an
intense pressure to cut corners leads lawyers to sacrifice
thoroughness to efficiency in order to make more money.
The twin factors of too much work and too little money are
situational determinants that can explain much of the exponential
rise in legal malpractice in solo, small, and big firm practice. Thus, by
looking at the situational determinants of legal malpractice, the prob-
lem becomes significantly more complex. Curtailing legal malpractice
is not merely an issue of getting rid of a "few bad apples." Switching
the focus from the individual to the situation also shifts the emphasis
from making ineffective cosmetic changes to making more fun-
damental changes in the situations that nurture legal malpractice
claims and lawsuits.
VI. REGULATING LAWYERS: THE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES
The ABA, the "world's largest voluntary professional organiza-
tion," and the most vocal supporter of self-regulation, is decreasing in
size despite the increasing numbers of lawyers,40 2 and probably counts
fewer than one-third of the nation's lawyers as active fee paying
members.40 3 ABA members are not representative of lawyers.4 4 In
California, only twenty-six percent of the 140,000 lawyers belong to
the ABA.40  The same California lawyers, by almost eighty percent,
would prefer to disband the integrated California Bar due in part to
soaring fees for the new State Bar Court Disciplinary System and a
402. James Podgers, Head Count: ABA Membership Levels Remain Steady in Difficult Year,
79 A.B.A. J. 105, 105 (Aug. 1993) (noting that ABA membership for 1992-93 dropped 1.4%).
403. See ABA Membership Data (cited in note 39) (noting that for 1992-93 there were
357,032 ABA members out of 844,905 lawyers-but approximately 40,000 first year lawyers are
automatically enrolled free and a significant number of others, such as this Author, whose
employers automatically pay the dues would probably not be members).
404. See James E. Brill, What Have You Done For Me Lately? How the ABA Can Be of Help
to Solo Practitioners, 79 A.B.A. J. 97, 97 (Aug. 1992) (positing that the ABA may sometimes
neglect solo practitioners and small firms). See also ABA Membership Data. The ABA member-
ship is approximately 25% women, but no statistics are kept on the racial or ethnic composition
of its members. It would probably be fair to guess that the ABA has relatively few members of
color since its membership is more representative of large law firms, who, in turn, have almost
no partners and few associates of color. See, for example, Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Racial
Injustice and American Justice (After the Verdict), 78 A.B.A. J. 58, 59 (Aug. 1992) (noting that
only 1.7% of lawyers in the 250 largest law firms are black; only 49 of the 250 firms had more
than one minority partner).
405. ABA Membership Data (reporting that California and Florida have 36,312 and 18,226
lawyers, respectively, who are members of the ABA).
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widespread sense of over-regulation.4's A similar move to disband
Florida's mandatory bar has gained ground.40 7
The ABA recommends only cosmetic changes to the existing
system. The McKay Report, for example, recommends expedited
procedures on "minor misconduct" disciplinary cases if the lawyer
agrees to give up expenses and time-consuming due process proce-
dures.4 8 It also calls for voluntary arbitration of legal malpractice
cases, mediation, mandatory arbitration of fee disputes, substance
abuse counseling, and practice assistance. 40 9
The ABA's interest in protecting its member lawyers is obvi-
ous, but its attempts to "tweak" the existing system simply are not
enough. Lawyers are unlikely to give up their due process rights in
disciplinary proceedings. Clients are unlikely to give up their right to
go before juries hostile to lawyers in legal malpractice cases.
Robert E. O'Malley, loss prevention counsel and vice chairman
of ALAS, the nation's largest insurer of lawyers,410 believes "that the
courts, the various bar associations and the disciplinary boards can-
not deal with most of the problems."411 OMalley's proposed solutions
for legal malpractice at least acknowledge, in part, the importance of
the situation: (1) insurance carriers should recognize their self inter-
est and serve as a catalyst requiring structural changes in law
practice; (2) there should be more sharing of information regarding
legal malpractice claims and lawsuits;412 and (3) there should be more
legal malpractice education of lawyers. 43
406. Fax Poll, 13 Cal. Law. at 109 (cited in note 183).
407. Bruce Vielmetti, Lawyers Unite to Cast Off the Bar, St. Petersburg Times 1B (Oct. 25,
1993) (reporting that the newly formed Attorneys' Bar Association of Florida wants to abolish
the Florida Bar because of mandatory CLE programs, mandatory pro bono programs, and
advertising restrictions, and wants to move from self-regulation to public regulation by the
same state agencies that regulate doctors, accountants, architects, and other professionals).
408. ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement, American Bar Association Report to the House of Delegates 13 (1991) ("McKay
Report').
409. Id. at 13, 18.
410. Hansen, 80 A.B.A. J. at 28 (cited in note 137). See also O'Malley interview (cited in
note 6).
411. O'Malley, 20 U. Toledo L. Rev. at 363-64 (cited in note 211).
412. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6). However, O'Malley refused the Author's request
for information to supplement and update the ALAS Table duplicated at Appendix D.
413. O' Malley, 20 U. Toledo L. Rev. at 363-64 (cited in note 211).
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O'Malley, in advising large law firms, has identified certain
"Dangerous Situations" and matched them up with
recommendedstructural changes in a law firm, or a "Responsible
Committee."'414 Some firms, instead of adopting the committees
suggested by O'Malley, have hired a full-time "quality assurance
manager" to create and oversee calendaring, conflict checks, in-house
education, work allocation, and a peer review system for associates
and partners, and to develop a practice manual.415
While these situational changes look good, and some insurance
companies like ALAS may be able to convince insured lawyers to
implement them, there is nothing to force large law firms to set up
effective committees where supervision is rewarded as much as billa-
ble time, or to have quality assurance managers who are not merely
traditional office managers with added responsibilities.
Others have argued that disciplinary boards should target the
law firm entity itself, and have it pay fines or restitutions and suffer
probation or adverse publicity. "For example if a firm was disciplined
because an associate had padded her hours, the firm could decide for
itself whether its policy of requiring associates to bill 2300 hours a
414. Id. The "dangerous situations" and the type of committees are:
DANGEROUS SITUATIONS RESPONSIBLE COMMITEE
A. New clients in financial
B. Entrepreneurial activities
C. Litigation
D. Trusts and estate practice
E. Opinions
F. Transactional practice
G. Involvement in a matter outside
the lawyer's area of expertise
H. Year-end crunch
CAUSE OF CLAIMS
A. Deficient procedures with respect
to new client/new matters
B. Decline clients
C. Client fraud or other misconduct
D. Lack of attention to ethics rulings
and opinions
E. Conflicts of interest
F. A suit against a client for unpaid fee
G. Branch offices, lateral partners,
mergers and vast growth
H. Health problems
I. Poor client relations
J. Attitudes
New business committee
Management committee
Practice committee
Practice committee
Opinions committee
Practice committee and new
business committee
Practice committee and new
business committee
Practice committee and new
business committee
RESPONSIBLE COMMITTEE
New business committee
New business committee
Legal ethics committee
Legal ethics committee
Legal ethics committee
Management committee
Management committee
Management committee
Practice committee
Management committee
415. Stephen G. Hirsch, At Long & Levit, Quality is Job One, The Recorder 2 (Dec. 23, 1991)
(noting that Long & Levit, at the insistence of its partner and well known legal malpractice
expert, Ron Mallen, hired a full-time quality assurance manager).
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year posed unacceptable ethical risks.' 416 The problem with this solu-
tion is that underfunded disciplinary agencies simply will not do
battle with the big law firms.417  But something must be
done-changing the law, or the names of law firm committees or office
managers, is not enough. Such cosmetic institutional reforms are
suspect, especially with the large law firms' moral culture saying one
thing but doing another.418
Legal malpractice claims and lawsuits will continue to plague
the profession in even greater numbers unless lawyers, whether prac-
ticing in big firms, small firms, or on their own, make fundamental
changes. Consumer groups will continue to lobby legislatures to take
regulation of the profession away from self-interested lawyers and
their organizations. Public regulation of lawyers is not only beneficial
to consumers, but eventually may improve the image of lawyers.
When lawyers are treated like everyone else, they will not invite the
public's scorn as they do now.419
A. Mandatory Reporting and Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance
Lawyers cannot be effectively regulated without credible in-
formation regarding the causes of malpractice. The regulation of
lawyers and the attempt to determine the causes of legal malpractice
are extremely difficult when the lawyers' insurance carriers refuse to
share information.42° Even when there are mandatory legal malprac-
416. Schneyer, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 30-31 (cited in note 247) (stating that there is nothing to
prevent a law firm entity itself from being disciplined in states that have adopted ABA Model
Rule 5.1(a)). See also Hazard and Hodes, The Law of Lawyering at 456 (cited in note 267)
(stating: "Mlodel Rule 5.1(a) theoretically could apply to all partners in the firm for having no
structural mechanism for realistic supervision or conflicts checks. However, realistically,
disciplinary agencies will not proceed unless they feel the individual partner can be found.
Sometimes in a large firm the guilty person in charge cannot be found").
417. Dorgan, San Jose Mercury News at Al (cited in note 51).
418. Luban, Strudler, and Wasserman, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 2389-90 (cited in note 330).
(using the following corporate example: Exxon Corporation requires employees who notice
misconduct or dangerous situations to notify superiors in writing. Superiors must respond in
writing, and if no response, the employee must go over that superior's head. However, these
preemptive obligations may well have a moral culture that discourages such whistle blowing,
employees fearing going over superiors heads will "take the fall" when things go wrong, insulat-
ing the superiors. So it serves as a liability screen rather than whistle blowing).
419. NJI/ West Poll (cited in note 162). See also ABA Poll (cited in note 163).
420. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6). See also Wangberg interview (cited in note 6);
Fishleder letter (cited in note 90) (stating: "All [Oregon] PLF claims information is kept confi-
dential, and all claims information is exempt from the public records law'.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tice reporting laws, such as those in Florida, California, and North
Dakota, states seem powerless against the insurance industry.421
Moreover, there is no reason, from the consumer's point of
view, to allow parties in legal malpractice cases who use the public
court system to settle in secrecy. Under the current system, potential
clients cannot even find out if a lawyer has been sued for malpractice
or has had disciplinary complaints filed against him. Every state in
the nation allows parties to keep secret the amount of the settlement
in a legal malpractice case.422 Consumers, lawyers, judges, legislators,
law professors, and the general public need to accurately determine
the frequency and seriousness of legal malpractice claims and law-
suits, an impossible task when settlement amounts are kept secret.
Since probably only one to two percent of legal malpractice lawsuits
ever result in actual trial judgments, it becomes imperative that
settlement amounts be made public.
If states were to adopt Oregon's mandatory legal malpractice
approach, all legal malpractice information would be retrievable from
one source, barring confidentiality problems. If they choose not to
follow Oregon, states should at least follow the lead of Florida and
adopt mandatory reporting statutes that require insurance carriers to
fill out a detailed questionnaire on each closed legal malpractice claim
or face statutory fines. Such statutes should be strictly enforced to in-
sure full compliance. The data should then, like Florida's, be avail-
able to the public, the insurance underwriters, actuaries, and aca-
demic scholars doing research.
In the late 1970s, the California Legislature passed a manda-
tory malpractice insurance law, but the bill was vetoed by the gover-
nor. Oregon then borrowed the legislation from California and passed
it as its own. Today, Oregon is the only state with mandatory legal
malpractice insurance. Lester Rawls, former chief executive officer of
Oregon's PLF, notes that prior to the mandatory insurance
legislation: "[a]bout 35 percent of our attorneys were not covered by
any insurance at all .... It wasn't because they couldn't afford it,
421. St. Clair, 13 Legal Econ. at 25-26 (cited in note 66). See also Bodiford interview (cited
in note 73); Zank interview (cited in note 68); Fagerlund, 64 N.D. L. Rev. at 698 n.247 (cited in
note 67).
422. Doggett and Mucchetti, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 659 n.71-72 (cited in note 7). Compare
Bodiford interview (stating that only in Florida can one circumvent confidentiality provisions in
legal malpractice settlement agreements, but obviously only if, under the mandatory reporting
law, the insurer reports the case, the amount of the settlement, and the name of the insured
lawyer, as required).
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they just didn't want to pay for it. 'The public be damned' they'd say.
Our bar association didn't think that was an appropriate position.' '423
Mandatory legal malpractice insurance legislation has been
unsuccessfully proposed in Arizona, California (again), Colorado,
Delaware, Washington, and Wisconsin.424 The most recent argument
against mandatory legal malpractice insurance was made by Harry H.
Schneider, Jr., chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Professional Liability. Schneider made the following points: (1)
"IT]here is no reliable data documenting that [legal malpractice] is a
widespread phenomenon"; (2) "[M]andatory malpractice insurance
effectively defers to the insurer . . . who will . . . be permitted to
practice law"; (3) "[P]remiums surely will rise across the board as all
acceptable risks are pooled automatically with those who otherwise
would be considered high-risk lawyers"; and (4) "[Alnnouncing
publicly the availability of funds to pay claims will tend to increase
the frequency of malpractice claims, frivolous and otherwise."425
Others arguing against mandatory malpractice insurance add
that, because the program has to take everyone, careful attorneys will
pay for the mistakes of careless attorneys who have no incentive to
avoid malpractice, rates will increase for all lawyers, and must be
passed on to clients, and there is no data which indicate that a serious
problem exists regarding claims against uninsured attorneys.426
However, legal malpractice is a widespread phenomenon with
both insured and uninsured attorneys. 427 There will probably never be
any data which indicate that a serious legal malpractice problem
exists with uninsured attorneys alone. Legal malpractice cases are
rarely pursued against an uninsured attorney unless that attorney
has significant assets. Because attorneys can hide assets or choose
bankruptcy, plaintiffs and their attorneys are usually willing to settle
a legal malpractice case for the "policy limits," even if the plaintiff is
not fully compensated.428 There may well be more valid claims made
against lawyers once they are all insured.
423. Laurel Defoe, Bill Would Force Malpractice Insurance on Lawyers, Bus. J. Sacramento
§1 at 18 (Aug. 4, 1986).
424. John J. Lynch, The Insurance Panic for Lawyers, 72 A.B-A. J. 42, 46 (July 1986).
425. Schneider, 79 A.B.A. J. at 45 (cited in note 9).
426. Lynch, 72 A.B.A. J. at 42-46 (cited in note 424).
427. See Table 2.
428. Fishleder letter (cited in note 90) (stating that Oregon's PLF has had "between two and
four cases over 15 years which required attorneys to contribute to the settlement from their own
pockets'). It was also exceedingly rare, in the Author's practice, that a plaintiffs attorney would
insist on the insured attorney contributing his own money, other than the insurance deductible,
towards a settlement.
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The Oregon PLF's 1986-1991 annual claims rate of 8.7 percent
to 13.2 percent 429 conforms with the six to ten percent annual claims
rate against insured lawyers in other states,43 even though those
states have significant numbers of uninsured lawyers. 43, While the
Oregon PLF's rate is two to three times HOME's 3.5 percent annual
claims rate for 1985-1991,432 it is closer to, and may be even less than,
HOME's "5.8 percent or more" annual rate for Colorado, Florida,
California, Texas, and Montana.43 Oregon's PLF will give coverage to
any licensed member of the Oregon bar,43 4 whereas private insurance
carriers try to avoid bad risks and will not insure everyone. The
Oregon PLF's annual frequency rate probably more closely reflects the
true "reported" legal malpractice picture, and should be expected to be
somewhat higher than states with high numbers of "insulated," unin-
sured lawyers. However, as noted in Part II above, the actual inci-
dence of legal malpractice, reported and unreported, is probably over
twenty percent annually.
In 1988 and 1989 Oregon lawyers' $300,000 insurance policy
cost $2,500. In 1990 it dropped to $2,300. From 1991 through 1993 it
cost only $1,800. For 1994 it is $2,100.435 Premiums are less than
those charged by commercial legal malpractice insurance carriers,436
and the coverage is broader.437 A full eighty percent of the lawyers in
Oregon support the program.438 And they should-after fifteen years
it clearly works to give all claimants protection at a lower cost than
insured lawyers in other states.
If it works, why has the Oregon PLF, a model mandatory in-
surance program, stayed only in Oregon? Lawyers in other states do
not like it. The ABA is against it. 439 Insurance carriers oppose it.440
429. See Table I and text accompanying notes 41-63.
430. Id.
431. Moss, 73 A.BJA. J. at 84 (cited in note 44).
432. Lignitz, Denver Post at C2 (cited in note 46).
433. Id. (emphasis added).
434. Schneider, 79 A.BA. J. at 45 (cited in note 9).
435. 1993 Oregon PLF at 1 (cited in note 28).
436. Id. at 1-2.
437. Fishleder letter (cited in note 90) (noting that Oregon's 1994 claims made policy has "no
deductible . . . [and] provides free tail coverage for all individuals when they leave private
practice"). See also 1993 Oregon PLF at 2 (stating that "PLF excess rates will drop by 6 percent
next year [1994] because of good claims experience in the excess layer. Standard rates will be
$1,175 per lawyer for excess coverage of $700,000 above the PLF primary limits, and $1,959 per
lawyer for excess coverage of $1.7 million above the PLF primary limits [$300,000]. This is
better than the cost of comparable coverage in neighboring states").
438. 1993 Oregon PLF at 1-2.
439. Schneider, 79 A.B.A. J. at 45 (cited in note 9).
440. O'Malley interview (cited in note 6).
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Many attorneys would prefer not to pay several thousand dollars a
year in premiums, and believe that the best insurance is to be "bare":
it is cheaper and most plaintiffs attorneys will simply not bother to
prosecute a legal malpractice case against them. Insurance carriers
do not like the idea of legislation that might put them out of business.
ALAS, the nation's largest legal malpractice insurer based on pre-
mium income, is opposed to mandatory insurance because "it simply
does not work."' 1 The Alliance of American Insurance is also against
mandatory legal malpractice insurance: "Guaranteeing injured cli-
ents the means to collect gets beyond what the insurance product is
designed to do."2 Because any mandatory legal malpractice
insurance program must cover all lawyers, it is unlikely that any
insurance carrier will commit to writing a state's mandatory program.
Insurance companies relegated to offering excess coverage would soon
see premium income decrease substantially. Some might even go out
of business.
Viewed from the standpoint of consumer protection, the argu-
ments against mandatory legal malpractice insurance are unsupport-
able and offer little hope of keeping down the frequency of legal mal-
practice claims and lawsuits. The former California legislature's
State Bar Monitor, Robert Fellmeth,4 3 and a former president of the
State Bar of California, P. Terry Anderlini, 4 have both come out in
favor of mandatory legal malpractice insurance. Once the extent of
legal malpractice and the extent of uninsured lawyers becomes
known, mandatory legal malpractice insurance programs will take
hold. Most Canadian law societies, and the Australian, English, and
Irish law societies, to which all barristers and solicitors from those
countries must belong to practice law, require legal malpractice
insurance.45
441. Id.
442. Laurel Defoe, Bill Would Force Malpractice Insurance on Lawyers, Bus. J. Sacramento
18 (Aug. 4, 1986).
443. Carla Rivera, State Bar Monitor Sees 'Best-In Nation' Disciplining of Lawyers, L.A.
Times 29 (Sept. 3, 1988).
444. Anderlini favors surcharges for adverse claim experience, so "if people are priced out of
practicing law it would be by their own deeds and negligence." Moss, 73 A.B.A. J. at 84 (cited in
note 44).
445. David Z. Webster, At Issue: Mandatory Malpractice Insurance; Has the Time Come to
Require Coverage? Yes: It's Essential to Public Trust, 79 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (Nov. 1993).
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Both California46 and Virginia4 47 now require lawyers to dis-
close to clients when they do not have legal malpractice insurance.
Some argue that, because forcing the disclosure of the absence of legal
malpractice insurance hurts business, such laws should suffice." 8
However, a closer look at these existing mandatory disclosure laws
does not reveal any realistic enforcement leverage. The attorney who
fails to disclose is still "entitled to collect a reasonable fee,"" 9 and
clients need to know the law exists in order to ask.4 0 These cosmetic
changes clearly do not go far enough.
Rhode Island requires malpractice insurance for court-
appointed lawyers.451  Similarly, most bar association-sponsored
lawyer referral services require evidence of insurance for enrolled
lawyers.452 Sophisticated clients such as banks, title companies,
insurance companies, and large corporations routinely require proof of
insurance before retaining the services of a lawyer. It is the
unsophisticated clients of the eleven to fifty percent of uninsured
lawyers 45 3 who are now most at risk. The reputation of the legal pro-
fession will suffer even more if, for purely self-interested economic
reasons, lawyers continue to oppose mandatory malpractice insurance
reforms. Most lawyers will not call for legal malpractice insurance.
However, it is a fundamental change that a knowledgeable public and
legislatures will inevitably embrace.
446. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6147(a) (6) and § 6148(a) (4) (1993).
447. Rules of the Supreme Court of Va., Pt.6, § IV, 18 (Financial Responsibility). See also
Public Can Receive Data, Richmond News Leader at 25 (cited in note 76) (reporting that "[a]ll
active members of the state bar must report such information to the state bar, which is the arm
of the Virginia Supreme Court responsible for the regulation of the practice of law in Virginia!).
448. Schneider, 79 A.B-.A J. at 45 (cited in note 9).
449. For example, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 6147(b) and 6148(c) are not all that troublesome
for uninsured lawyers. These sections provide that "[flailure to comply with any provision of
this section renders the [retainer] agreement voidable at the option of the [plaintiff/client], and
the attorney shall, [upon the agreement being voided,] be entitled to collect a reasonable fee."
Id.
450. Public Can Receive Data, Richmond News Leader at 25 (cited in note 76) (noting that,
in Virginia, the client must know to telephone the Virginia State Bar to determine if the lawyer
has reported that she has no malpractice insurance).
451. Webster, 79 A.B.. J. at 44 (cited in note 445).
452. Id.
453. Moss, 73 A.B-. J. at 84 (cited in note 44).
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B. Avoiding Malpractice: "Triple Check Everything"?
Like so many of society's ills, legal malpractice is a problem
without a solution. As long as there are attorneys, there will be legal
malpractice claims and lawsuits. If it is true that every year an
average of ten percent of adult Americans get sued,4M then it is not
surprising that more than twenty percent of practicing American
lawyers have or should have a legal malpractice claim made against
them every year.4 5 As we have seen, both good lawyers and bad
lawyers make mistakes. Understanding both the individual and
situational underpinnings of legal malpractice, and making
fundamental changes in regulation based on that understanding,
should decrease the incidence and seriousness of legal malpractice.
Legal malpractice claims and lawsuits, a few leading lawyers
argue, are actually beneficial to both lawyers and the public. James
Vorenberg, then Dean of the Harvard Law School, argues that they
put pressure on lawyers to maintain high professional standards. 456
Louis Nizer, from the vantage point of his sixty-two years of practice,
tends to agree. His anti-malpractice lawsuit formula includes a
healthy tinge of paranoia: "I triple-check everything that leaves this
office."1457
Do legal malpractice claims or lawsuits effectively deter legal
malpractice?458 David Randolf, the president of the Texas Lawyers
Insurance Exchange, Texas' largest legal malpractice insurance car-
rier, does not believe so: 'My first view when I started in this
business was that the lawyer with a claim would be the best risk. It
was true of some, [but we found a greater tendency for lawyers to
slide into a downward spiral. The time span between claims becomes
progressively shorter.]" 459
454. The Real Estate Group, Headline News, 'Ractoid" (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 12,
1993).
455. See Appendix B. See also text accompanying notes 39-49.
456. William L. Tabac, Crossfire at the Bar, N. Y. Times § 6 at 30 (May 3, 1987).
457. Id.
458. Begleiter, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 280 (cited in note 193) (stating. "The malpractice
revolution has benefits for both lawyers and the public.... [Forced s~pecialization may offer
great benefits to lawyers. Complaining is the wrong response. Recognizing the benefits... for
both attorneys and the public and doing what is necessary to complete each estate plan
competently and effectively is what the malpractice revolution is all about. The time of the
gambler is over'). See also Samuelson, Wash. Post at A21 (cited in note 169).
459. Baird, Houston Post at ID (cited in note 155) (reporting also that Larry Dougherty, a
Houston plaintiff malpractice lawyer who has sued over 100 lawyers, says: 'I have yet to see
someone found guilty of malpractice turn over a new leaf and become a better lawyer. Anyone
who thinks civil litigation will improve the situation is dreaming").
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What is also often forgotten is that it is usually the insurance
carrier that pays the settlement and defense costs.460 For instance,
most law firms that represented failed savings and loans have not
suffered. Indeed, the firms that have paid huge settlement amounts
to the FDIC, OTS, and RTC continually portray themselves as
victims, while their insurance carriers pay. ALAS, the insurer for the
Cleveland-based law firm Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, paid almost all
of the $75,000,000 that it took to settle the legal malpractice lawsuits
arising from Lincoln Savings' $2 billion federal government bailout.
The firm's managing partner, William McCartan, doubts that the firm
will make any changes due to the settlement. He notes that the
charges by the government's regulators and the investors were quite
unique, that "politics had overwhelmed the merits," and that "what
was truly amazing is the regulators' success in shifting responsibility
for their own shortcomings and ineptitude to the professionals who
serviced thrifts."461
Legal malpractice claims or lawsuits may do little to reform an
individual lawyer or law firm. However, mandatory legal malpractice
insurance will not only give all injured clients and nonclients some
redress, but will act as a depository for much needed information on
legal malpractice and, perhaps, even reverse the profession's sagging
prestige.
Additional interdisciplinary research is also needed on
whether reformation of existing laws, policies, or institutions will
affect the behavior of attorneys who act detrimentally to themselves
and their clients. For example, if the adversary system per se is the
problem, it may make sense to do comparative studies of jurisdictions
that rely heavily on alternative dispute resolution ("ADR') programs.
Scholars should measure whether problem-solving, ADR, counseling,
negotiation, and mediation approaches affect the level of hostility in
dispute relationships. Varying rules on the limits of discovery may
alter the combativeness and distress experienced by litigation attor-
neys. Altering trial calendaring or slowing the "fast tracking" of cases
may decrease stress and malpractice by giving attorneys more time to
be prepared, and not forcing them toward quick and negligent settle-
ments. Changing or abolishing outmoded, conflicting, or ambiguous
ethical guidelines and reducing the importance placed on "zealously"
460. Steve France, Just Deserts: Don't Cry for Kaye, Scholer, Legal Times 28, 28 (April 6,
1992).
461. Reske, 79 A.B- J. at 16 (cited in note 141).
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representing one's client may make a difference in reducing lawyers'
exposure to legal malpractice lawsuits by nonclients.
An expanded legal education curriculum that deals with social
science, psychology, and other approaches to the practice of law will
probably have little effect if law graduates end up in malignant
situations. Without knowledge of how those situations impact lawyer
behavior, changing those situations will not be possible. Education,
alternative work schedules, reduced billable hour requirements, en-
couraged participation in alcohol, drug, or depression assistance
programs, and an effort to place a premium on supervision and
"people" factors rather than profits could collectively start to make a
difference. 46 2
The legal profession is at a crossroads. Legal malpractice
should not remain a taboo subject; it should be studied. It should be
taught in law schools.463 It should be taught as a mandatory CLE
course.464 Legal and lay publications should publish more legal mal-
practice articles.465  Lawyers should discuss it. Settlement agree-
ments should not be confidential. 466 Insurance companies should be
forced to give out detailed informatibn, especially in states like
Florida where dissemination is statutorily required.467 The ABA
insists that legal malpractice is not widespread or serious, 468 but legal
malpractice is rampant and cannot be ignored. Fundamental changes
must occur and must be undertaken with the situational perspective
in mind.
The worn-out, unworkable "weeding out the bad apples" ap-
proach will only further fuel the legal profession's downward spiral.
Information is now available showing that legal malpractice is signifi-
cantly more widespread than previously thought. The legal profes-
sion's dirty little secret is out. Legal malpractice is an "iceberg' that
is unlikely to thaw anytime soon.
462. See ABA, State of the Legal Profession at 1, 4, 24, and 52 (cited in note 185). See also
ABA Commission on Women and the Profession, Lawyers And Balanced Lives at 5 (cited in note
186); P.C. Heintz and C.A. Ingram, Slaying the Dragon: A Plan to Combat Lawyer
Dissatisfaction, 54 Phila. Bar Ass'n Q. Mag. 2026, 2040-50, 2056 (1991); Elwork and Benjamin,
Lawyers in Distress at 30-32 (cited in note 369).
463. The Author teaches a course at Stetson University School of Law on legal malpractice.
Stetson is the only ABA accredited law school to offer a legal malpractice course. See
Braunstein, et al., Law Line Database at 9 (cited in note 2); note 275 and accompanying text.
464. ABA-CLE at 54-55 (cited in note 3) (noting that only Arizona mandates a legal
malpractice component in its CLE program).
465. See note 1.
466. Doggett and Mucchetti, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 643 (cited in note 7).
467. See notes 64, 69 and accompanying text.
468. Schneider, 79 ABA. J. at 45 (cited in note 9).
1994] 1733

APPENDICES
Appendix A
AUTHOR'S STUDY469  ABA STUDY47
0
#'S % #IS %
1.471 How many lawyers were insured
on the policy?
a. One 16 38.0 10212 34.9
b. 2 to 5 21 50.0 12737 43.6
c. 6 to 30 4 9.6 5631 19.3
d. Over 30 1 2.4 647 2.2
2. How many years had the insured
been admitted to practice at the
time of the alleged error?
a. Under four years 2 4.7 1308 4.5
b. 4 to 10 years 6 14.3 8728 29.9
c. Over 10 years 34 81.0 19139 65.6
3. What type of law office is the
insured a member of?
a. Legal Clinic 0 0 N/A
472  N/A
b. Legal Aid 0 0
c. Private Practice 42 100
d.
469. Based on the Author's southern California case list of 42 cases, the last group of legal
malpractice lawsuits and claims defended by him between February 1991 and December 1992.
The same ABA Study questionnaire was used. All of the cases were assigned by one insurance
carrier and were predominatly in San Diego, Orange, and Riverside counties. The Author
received all the insurance carrier's cases for San Diego County during this time period. He does
not contend that these cases form a representative sample of lawyers sued for malpractice. For
instance, the insurance carrier, one of the major legal malpractice carrier's in the country, did
not generally insure larger law firms. The insurance carrier was pushed out of Southern
California by Golden Eagle Insurance Company of San Diego with premium rates that were
thirty to forty percent lower. Consequently, after February 1992 this insurance carrier had few
if any, new claims in San Diego, Orange, and Riverside counties.
470. See generally ABA Study Data (cited in note 78).
471. Id. at 508-09. This column of questions are from the ABA Study Questionnaire.
Questions regarding the state of the claim and size of the city are omitted.
472. "N/A" means these numbers were not published by the ABA and are not available.
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Appendix A (cont'd)
AumO's STUDY
#'S %
4. What is the insured's relationship
to -the claimant?
a. Free legal service 0
b. Member pre-paid legal plan 0
c. Client other than a or b 30
d. Non-client 12
5. Did the claim arise after the insured
made an attempt to collect a fee?
a. Yes
b. No
0
0
71.5
28.5
5 11.9
37 88.1
6. Did this claim arise from an area of law:
a. Normal to the insured's 32 76.2
practice
b. Not normal to the insured's 10 23.8
practice
c. Not applicable
7. How was the claim disposed of?
a. No payment--claim 0 0.0
abandoned
b. Settlement payment- 1 3.0
no suit commenced
c. Settlement payment- 28 84.8
suit commenced
d. Suit dismissed/judgment 4 12.2
for defendant
e. Payment-judgment for 0 0.0
plaintiff
ABA STUDY
#IS %
176 .6
110 .4
25064 85.8
3877 13.3
2002 6.8
27225 93.2
N/A N/A
2760 50.0
1075 19.5
664 12.0
958 17.4
63 1.1
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Appendix A (cont'd)
AUTHOR's STUDY
#IS %
USE THE FOLLOWING RANGES FOR THE
COMPLETION OF QUESTIONS #8 AND #9
$ 0- 1,000
1,001- 5,000
5,001- 10,000
10,001 - 25,000
25,001- 50,000
50,001- 100,000
Over 100,001
Settlement Defense Settlement
Cost Q #8 Cost Q #9 Cost Q #8
1 3.0%
0 0.0
2 6.0
3 9.0
9 27.3
11 33.3
4 12.1
0 0.0%
2 6.0
11 33.3
15 45.5
4 12.1
0 0
1 3.0
3873 70.0%
494 8.9
365 6.6
361 6.5
167 3.0
103 1.9
167 3.0
8. What amount was paid to
the claimant (including the
deductible) Average Average
Settlement Defense
Costs
$60,393 $20,130
Average Average
N/A N/A
9. What amount was paid for loss expenses
(including the deductible)
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#IS %
Defense
Cost Q #9
3623 65.6%
1047 19.0
357 6.5
263 4.8
93 1.7
58 1.1
79 1.4
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Appendix A (cont'd)
SECTION B
IN WHICH AREA OF LAW WAS THE
INSURED RETAINED BY THE CLIENT?
a. Real Estate
b. Estate, Trust & Probate
C. Family Law
d. Personal InjurylProperty Damage-
Plaintiff
e. Personal Injury/Property Damage-
Defendant
f. Worker's Compensation
g. Securities (S.E.C.)
h. Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights
i. Collection and Bankruptcy
I. Taxation
k. Criminal
1. Admiralty
m. Antitrust
n. Civil Rights and Discrimination
o. Consumer Claims
p. Construction (Building Contracts)
q. Corporate and Business Organization
r. Environmental Law
a. Government Contracts and Claims
t. Immigration and Naturalization
u. International Law
v. Labor Law
w. Local Government
x. Natural Resources
y. Business ransactiona(Commercial Law
AUTHOR's STUDY
#Is %
11.9 6808
9.5 2038
14.3 2303
42.9 7331
2.4 942
ABA STUDY
#IS
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Appendix A (cont'd)
SECTION C
INDICATE THE ONE MAJOR ACTIVITY
WHICH THE ATToRNEY WAS ENGAGED
INAT THE TIME THE ALLEGED ERROR
OCCURRED
a. Commencement of action or
proceeding (initial pleading, service)
b. Pre-trial, pre-hearing (investigation,
subsequent pleading, discovery motion)
C. Trial or hearing
d. Post trial or hearing
a. Appeal activities
f. Preparation, transmittal or filing
ofdocuments other than pleadings
g. Settlement and negotiation
h. Ex parte (noncontested) proceedings
i.e. adoption, and probate
L Investigation, other than litigation
k. Tax reporting or payment
I. Title opinion
m. Other written opinion
n. Consultation or advice
0. Recommendation of or referral to
another profesaional including another lawyer
p. Other (please specify)
16 38.1
4 9.5
7234 24.8
2324
486 1.7
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Appendix A (cont'd)
SECTION D
INDICATE THE ONE ALLEGED ERROR OR
MISCONDUCT WHICH IS THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT TO THE CAUSE OF THE
CLAIM BEING MADE
AUTHOR'S STUDY ABA STUDY
#'S % #'S %
a. Failure to calendar properly 2 4.8 3254 11.2
b. Failure to react to calendar 3 7.1 1015 3.5
C. Failure to know or ascertain deadline 4 9.5 1997 6.9
correctly
d. Failure to file documents where no 1 2.4 1230 4.2
deadline is involved
e. Procrastination in performace of 5 11.9 1406 4.8
services or lack of follow-up
f. Error in mathmetical calculation 0 0 221 .8
g. Lost file, document or evidence 0 0 193 .7
h. Clerical error 0 0 425 1.5
i. Error in public record search 0 0 1382 4.7
j. Planning or strategy error 0 0 2238 7.7
k. Inadequate discovery of facts 10 23.8 2615 9.0
or inadequate investigation
1. Failure to understand or anticipate 0 0 537 1.8
tax consequences
m. Failure to know or properly apply 2 4.8 2766 9.5
the law
n. Failure to follow clients instructions 2 4.8 1631 5.6
o. Failure to obtain clients consent or 4 9.5 2686 9.2
to inform client
p. Improper withdrawal from representation 1 2.4 433 1.5
q. Conflict of interest 3 7.1 979 3.4
r. Libel or slander 0 0 436 1.5
a. Malicious prosecution or abuse of process 5 11.9 1224 4.2
t. Violation of civil rights 0 0 502 1.7
u. Fraud 0 0 1213 4.2
v. Other, (please specify) _ 0 0 750 2.6
1994]
# OF INSURED CLAIMS
LAWYERS MADE
570
636
646
ANNUAL
FREQUENCY
RATE
10.6%
9.8%
12.2%
10.2%
9.9%
8.7%
10.4%
11.4%
12.4%
12.3%
13.2%
SEVERITY
474
$15,885
15,803
14,642
17,750
12,503
15,451
14,539
16,037
14,821
16,327
N/A
CLAIMs MADE BY AREA OF LAW
AREA OF LAW
Personal Injury
Business
Real Estate
Family Law
Bankruptcy/
Debtor-Creditor
4 76
Estate and Probate
Workers' Comp.
PERCENT OF CLAIMS
1993
16.1%
1992
18.1%
1991
16.0%
12.1 13.3
1990 1989
18.35% 20.73%
19.57
14.98
13.15
13.0 11.1
26.83
17.68
11.18
0.61 N/A
473. See 1993 Oregon PLF (cited in note 28). See also 1989-1992 Oregon PLF (cited in note
38); Letter from Rudd & Wilson, Inc. to Oregon PLF CEO Kirk R. Hall (Aug. 4, 1993) (on file
with the Author) (regarding the 1994 Oregon PLF assessment).
474. Memorandum from Kirk R. Hall to PLF Board of Directors (Aug. 5, 1993) (unpublished,
on file with the Author). Hall uses a $15,850 "severity figure" ($10,250 indemnity and $5,600
expense) as the average for all claims. See also Hall letter at 4 (cited in note 106) (stating that
the average settlement amount figures were not available for claims or lawsuits that settle).
However, once the average settlement for the two-thirds of claims for which indemnity was paid
is refigured, the average settlement on claims and lawsuits that settle becomes $25,625. See
also Table 3.
475. 1993 Oregon PLF (cited in note 28) ("Projected" numbers only).
476. This new category was added in late 1989. See 1990 Oregon PLF (cited in note 38).
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AREA OF LAW
Criminal
Securities
Tax
47 7
Other
1993
5.9
0.4
0.8
5.9
[Vol. 47:1657
PERCENT OF CLAIMS
1992
7.1
3.3
1.6
5.8
100.00 100.00
1990
3.98
1.22
N/A
2.45
100.00 1O0.00
477. This new category was added in 1990. See 1991 Oregon PLF (cited in note 38).
1989
3.66
2.24
N/A
5.08
100.00
1994]
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APPENDIXD4 o
The following chart summarizes ALAS' experience to November 30, 1990, categorized
by area of practice:
Claims by Area of Practice-1979 Through November 30, 1990
Total Incurred
Losses (Payments
and Reserves)4 81  Percent Average
Percent of at November of Total
Indemnity/Cost/
Category Claims Total Claims 30,1990 Incurred Claim
4 82
Corporate Banking 750 34.8% $173,145,000 47.4 % $ 230,860
Securities 150 7.0 80,852,000 22.1 539,013
Litigation 753 34.9 38,635,000 10.6 51,308
Estate Trust
Probate 114 5.3 35,959,000 9.9 315,429
Real Estate 147 6.8 18,267,000 5.0 124,265
Tax ERISA 85 4.0 10,760,000 3.0 126,588
Patent Trademark/
Copyright 16 0.7 4,474,000 1.2 279,625
Divorce 47 2.2 2,309,000 0.7 49,127
Bankruptcy 35 1.6 470,000 0.1 13,428
Labor/Workers
Compensation 17 0.8 6,000 - 3,882
Bar Association 9 0.4 - -
Administrative Law 4 0.2 - -
Admiralty 1 -...
No Coverage 27 1.3 - - -
Total 2,155 100% $364,937,000 100% 169,344
480. Robert E. OQ'alley, et al., Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, C641
ALI-ABA 42 (1991). The entire chart has been reproduced. It includes the two paragraphs
below the chart, except notes 482, 484 and the "Average Indemnity/Costs/Claim" column. See
also O'Malley interview (cited in note 6) (citing "proprietary information," ALAS will not give
out any more information).
481. O'Malley, et al., C641 ALI-ABA at 42 ("[i]ncluding supplemental reserves, but
excluding claims management costs of $14,703,000").
482. There is no information available on the percentage of claims that are dismissed, incur
no indemnity payment, or are still pending. The number is arrived by the Author by dividing
total incurred losses (which probably includes reserves for estimated future indemnity and
defense costs, actual indemnity and acutal defense costs paid) by the number of claims and is a
"best guess" figure based on such limited information.
483. OtMalley, et al., C641 ALI-ABA at 42 n.2 (cited in note 480) (stating that "ALAS'
share, after reinsurance, of total incurred losses is $146,469,000, excluding claims management
costs of $7,486,000. This totals to $513,955,000, which is ALAS' aggregate net incurred loss').
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Claims involving corporate and banking matters represent the largest amount
of loss. These claims principally have resulted from assertions by clients of
faulty advice and drafting of documents, and charges of conflict of interests
arising out of the Firm's representation of more than one party to a
transaction.
Claims alleging violations of Federal and state securities acts continue to
be troublesome. While representing only 7% of claims reported, they account
for over 22% of ALAS' net incurred losses. As of November 30, 1990, 17 of
these claims have been settled at a cost of approximately $27.4 million, of
which ALAS' share was $7.6 million. 484 A common factor in almost all of them
is the insolvency or financial difficulty of the issuer of the security.
484. Reske, 79 A-B.A. J. At 16 (cited in note 141). Add the 1993 $75,000,000 paid by an
ALAS' insured for one securities claim then 18 ALAS claims settled for $102.4 million or an
average of $5,688,888 for each securities claim or lawsuit that settles.
Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New
Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Thomas A Piraino, Jr. 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1755 (1994)
Traditionally, the courts have assumed that, under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, antitrust conduct must be judged under either of two opposing
standards of analysis: a per se rule that deems certain conduct illegal on its
face or a rule of reason that inquires into all conceivable circumstances before
determining the legality of a particular restraint. This Article argues that, in-
stead of being divided into such opposite standards, Section 1 conduct can be
arrayed along a continuum. The Article proposes a simple three-part contin-
uum based on the degree of analysis necessary to determine a particular re-
straint's impact on competition. Conduct on the continuum would range from
the most suspect to the least suspect, with more ambiguous restraints in the
middle of the continuum. Conduct at the most suspect end of the continuum
would be presumptively illegal; conduct at the least suspect end would be pre-
sumptively proper; and conduct at the middle of the continuum would require
a more detailed market power analysis. Such an approach would simplify the
analysis of restraints that are challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
thus conserving judicial resources and giving greater guidance to business on
the legality of particular conduct.
The Article provides specific examples of how particular competitive
restraints would be analyzed under the proposed continuum. Horizontal price
fixing, territorial allocations, and group boycotts would be classified at the
presumptively illegal end of the Section 1 continuum. The courts could
determine the legality of such conduct on its face. Tying and exclusive dealing
arrangements and certain joint ventures among competitors would lie at the
middle of the continuum, where a more detailed inquiry would apply. The
plaintiff should be required to prove the market power of the parties to such
restraints, and, once proven, the court should balance such market power
against any efficiency arguments raised by the defendant. Vertical restraints
imposed by manufacturers on their distributors would occupy the presump-
tively legal end of the Section 1 continuum. The courts could determine the
legality of such conduct on its face and without a market power inquiry.
Thus, the continuum of the Section 1 analysis would come full circle, with a
presumption of legality that would be as simple for the courts to apply and the
litigants to understand as the conduct deemed presumptively illegal at the be-
ginning of the continuum.

